



NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

## ADOPTED IN 2022

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

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CONFRONTING RUSSIA'S THREAT DECLARATION 473	1
STANDING WITH UKRAINE DECLARATION 474	4
STRENGTHENING THE CYBER RESILIENCE OF ALLIED SOCIETIES RESOLUTION 475	7
SUPPORTING NATO'S POST-MADRID SUMMIT DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE INITIATIVES RESOLUTION 476	9
THE CORRUPTION-SECURITY NEXUS RESOLUTION 477	12
RUSSIA'S WAR ON UKRAINE: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES RESOLUTION 478	15
NATO POST-MADRID SUMMIT: FIT FOR PURPOSE IN THE NEW STRATEGIC ERA RESOLUTION 479	18
CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY –NATO'S AGENDA RESOLUTION 480	22

## CONFRONTING RUSSIA'S THREAT DECLARATION 473\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Condemning**, in the strongest possible terms, Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war of choice against Ukraine and the horrific war crimes for which it must be held accountable;
2. **Underlining** that Russia's aggression against Ukraine since 2014 and other recent aggressive actions, rhetoric and ultimatums fit into a pattern of persistent violations of its international commitments and systematic attempts to undermine democracies, to upend the European security order and to destroy the international rules-based order;
3. **Condemning** Russia's ongoing illegal occupation of parts of the territory of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, the systematic human rights violations in occupied territories and the persistent efforts to destabilise these countries and derail their European and/or Euro-Atlantic integration;
4. **Stressing** that Russia's aggressive actions, grounded in revisionist policies and backed by extensive military modernisation, constitute the most immediate and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic security;
5. **Recognising** that Russia's renewed, full-scale invasion of Ukraine has created a new strategic reality which NATO Allies confront;
6. **Stressing** that Russia's recent actions confirm the relevance and timeliness of the Assembly's two key priorities for NATO's new Strategic Concept – reaffirming the Alliance's shared democratic values and core principles and adapting NATO to a radically altered security environment;
7. **Stating unequivocally** that Russia has turned its back on the core principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act;
8. **Reaffirming** that NATO, as a defensive alliance, is not seeking confrontation with Russia;
9. **Declaring absolute** the NATO Allies' commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and **making clear** that Allies will take all necessary measures to deter and defend every inch of NATO territory and across the entire spectrum of Russia's threats to transatlantic security;
10. **Acknowledging** that, while NATO has consistently affirmed its openness to meaningful dialogue, Russia's own actions currently make such dialogue impossible;
11. **Cognisant** of Russia's growing military co-operation with China and **troubled** by the 2022 Russia-China Joint Statement, in which the countries challenge the rules-based international order and where China, for the first time, echoes Russian opposition to the right of all nations to choose their own path;
12. **Welcoming** the submission by Finland and Sweden of their application to join the Alliance, and **denouncing** the threats directed against those NATO partners;

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\* Adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Monday 30 May 2022.

13. **Applauding** the unity and resolve of Allies and their key partners, including NATO's primary partner the European Union, in the face of Russian aggression, the practical and political support provided to Ukraine and other partners and the swift and necessary measures taken by the Alliance to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture;
14. **Aware of** the multiplication of cyber threats and disinformation operations for political purposes carried out by Russia;
15. **Stressing** that continued Allied unity and resolve, guided by shared democratic values, is fundamental to meeting Russia's threats;
16. **URGES** Allied Heads of State and Government when they meet in Madrid:
  - a. to reaffirm all aspects of their support for Ukraine, its independence and territorial integrity in the face of Russia's war, as recommended in the Assembly's declaration 474 on [Standing With Ukraine](#);
  - b. to clearly identify Russia's malign revisionism and aggressive actions as the most immediate and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic security in NATO's new Strategic Concept;
  - c. to continue to significantly strengthen and adapt the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture across the full spectrum of military power, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities;
  - d. to swiftly move to a "forward defence" posture, especially through the permanent deployment of troops and equipment along NATO's Eastern flank, improving command and control structures and increasing military preparedness;
  - e. to reaffirm and meet the 2014 Wales Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety and to enshrine the 2%/20% guidelines of the Pledge as a minimum commitment for the long term;
  - f. to refine concepts for deterring and defending below the Article 5 threshold, through a combination of political and military tools;
  - g. to step up efforts to decisively and forcefully tackle Russia's cyber threats and their consequences, including disinformation;
  - h. to assess and address the implications of Russia-China co-operation for Euro-Atlantic security;
  - i. to keep channels for diplomacy, de-confliction, de-escalation and arms control open with Russia to avoid unintended escalation, misunderstanding or miscalculation;
  - j. to support one another in bolstering transatlantic energy security and independence by diversifying energy sources, considering new routes and phasing out coal, gas, oil and uranium imports from Russia;
  - k. to ensure effective information exchange on potential further Russian aggressive actions beyond Ukraine and its attempts to expand its influence in key regions, from the Black Sea to the Western Balkans and the Alliance's southern neighbourhood, including through mercenaries like the Wagner Group;
  - l. to step up political and practical, including military, support for other NATO aspirants and partners subject to Russian pressure and attempted intimidation, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;

- m. to reaffirm the Open Door policy which no third country can veto\*\*;
  - n. to continue working closely with the European Union and other key partners in addressing Russia's threat;
  - o. to place shared democratic values at the heart of NATO's response to Russia's threats, including through the establishment, within NATO, of a Democratic Resilience Centre to serve as a resource and a clearinghouse of best practices and cross-fertilisation on democratic benchmarks available to member, partner and aspirant states.
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\*\* i.e. prevent or challenge

## STANDING WITH UKRAINE DECLARATION 474\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Standing firmly** with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people;
2. **Condemning in the strongest possible terms** Russia's unprovoked and unjustified war of choice against Ukraine – the gravest aggression in Europe since World War II – and **reaffirming** its unwavering support for Ukraine's democracy, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
3. **Reaffirming that** the forcible occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territories by Russia constitute an illegal and unjustifiable aggression, which violates fundamental principles of international law;
4. **Rejecting** Russia's efforts to legitimise the illegal occupation and annexation of territory through illegitimate referenda and elections;
5. **Determined** to hold accountable the Russian regime, its accomplices in the Belarusian regime and all other actors who have committed war crimes and bear responsibility for the deaths, suffering and destruction;
6. **Strongly condemning** the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including attacks against civilian populations and civilian infrastructure, the targeting of maternity wards, hospitals, residential buildings, theatres, kindergartens, schools and buildings used as temporary shelters for refugees, as well as the use of prohibited weapons, including cluster bombs, which violates international obligations and rules and as such must be stopped immediately;
7. **Deeply concerned** about the increased risks faced by the most vulnerable groups in times of conflict, in particular women and children, including the risk of sexual violence and human trafficking;
8. **Conveying its profound respect and admiration** for the remarkable bravery of the Armed Forces and security services of Ukraine and of volunteers, for the unity and resolve of the Ukrainian people as well as for the Ukrainian authorities' outstanding leadership in the face of this brutal aggression;
9. **Recognising** that, with its aggression against Ukraine, Russia seeks to crush Ukraine's democracy, intimidate other sovereign and democratic countries and, by extension, undermine the values that are fundamental to NATO and the entire democratic, civilised and peaceful world;
10. **Warning** the Russian regime that its policy and practices, including murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, rape and sexual assaults, severe physical injury to civilians, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, destruction of property, and attacks on hospitals, among others, which aim at removing by violent and terror-inspiring means the Ukrainian civilian population from certain geographic areas, constitute war crimes;
11. **Stressing** that Putin's war of choice against Ukraine, unacceptable aggressive rhetoric against and ultimatums to NATO Allies and partners – including the implicit threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear escalation – confirm that Russia's actions represent today the gravest security threat to Europe's security and fit into a pattern of systematic attempts to undermine the rules-based international order;

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\* Adopted by the Assembly at its Plenary Sitting in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Monday 30 May 2022.

12. **Convinced** that these actions mark a turning point and create a new strategic reality which NATO Allies and partners must adjust to immediately and for the long term;
13. **Affirming** that it will never recognise Russia's illegal claims in Ukraine nor any attempt by Russia to create illegitimate alternative administrative structures in Ukraine and **reaffirming** its full support for Ukraine's democratically elected government and parliament;
14. **Applauding** the unity of Allies and their key partners, including NATO's primary partner the European Union, in the face of Russian aggression, the practical and political support provided to Ukraine and the swift and necessary measures taken by the Alliance to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture;
15. **Resolved** to help bolster democracy in Allied and partner nations – more specifically among those partners at risk as a result of Russian activities – and continue to defend the fundamental principles of the rules-based international order, including the right of all nations to choose their own path;
16. **Reaffirming** its steadfast support for the path towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which the Ukrainian people have chosen and is anchored in Ukraine's Constitution;
17. **Grateful** for the support for Ukraine which many citizens around the world have expressed, including those who face harsh censorship and repression;
18. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to continue building a strong global coalition to support Ukraine with all possible assistance and to increase pressure on Russia to cease all military and hybrid operations and immediately withdraw its troops from Ukraine;
  - b. to maintain and increase massive, crippling and sustained sanctions for however long it takes until Russia reverses its illegal actions and withdraws all of its troops from all Ukraine's territory within its internationally recognised borders, including enlarging the list of sanctioned oligarchs and officials connected with the Russian regime as well as their families, propagandists and state media and the phasing out of coal, gas, oil and uranium imports from Russia;
  - c. to increase substantially the level of intelligence sharing and the supply of military equipment, particularly anti-aircraft, artillery, ammunition, anti-missile, and anti-ship systems, which Ukraine urgently needs to defend itself against Russian aggression;
  - d. to provide, in close cooperation with relevant international partners, further emergency humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and to step up support to Ukrainian refugees both within and outside of Ukraine;
  - e. to provide substantial short- and long-term financial and material assistance to Ukraine;
  - f. to continue and strengthen NATO's assistance for Ukraine's security and defence sector and cooperation with the Ukrainian armed forces;
  - g. to agree on the next steps in support of Ukraine's NATO integration path;
  - h. to demand that Russia unblocks exit routes for Ukrainian grain exports to avoid further devastating consequences on global food security;

- i. to expel Russian diplomats engaged in hostile activities, including spreading hate speech, disinformation and fuelling the conflict;
  - j. to support the initiatives aimed at establishing accountability of the Russian Federation under international law, international human rights law and international criminal law, notably the investigations launched by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the European Union Member States, as well as the establishment of a special *ad hoc* international criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine and bringing the perpetrators to justice;
  - k. to hold the Belarusian dictatorship accountable for its support of and role in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and to maintain and increase massive, crippling and sustained economic sanctions against the Belarusian regime;
  - l. to continue making it very clear to Russia that the international community will never recognise the illegal and illegitimate occupation and annexation of Crimea, the "independence" of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics and Russia's occupation of Ukraine's territorial waters nor any attempt by Russia to create illegitimate alternative administrative structures in Ukraine;
  - m. to continue to press Russia to engage constructively in credible talks with Ukraine to achieve concrete results, starting with a sustainable ceasefire and a complete withdrawal of its troops from Ukrainian territory that fully respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine;
  - n. to reiterate that Ukraine decides its own future and that no decision about Ukraine will be taken without Ukraine;
  - o. to continue seeking ways to engage with Russian civil society, both in Russia and abroad, supporting all initiatives aimed at resisting the Kremlin's aggressive policies;
  - p. to remain vigilant and ensure effective information exchange on potential further Russian aggressive actions beyond Ukraine;
  - q. to swiftly move to a "forward defence" posture, including the permanent deployment of a significant number of troops and equipment along NATO's Eastern flank, ensuring the capability and readiness to defend every inch of NATO territory;
  - r. to step up political and practical, including military, support for other NATO aspirants and partners subject to Russian pressure and attempted intimidation;
  - s. in the revised NATO Strategic Concept, to clearly identify Russia's revisionism and aggressive actions as the most immediate and principal threat to Euro-Atlantic security and respond by moving to "forward defence", adjusting adequately NATO's posture, NATO's defence plans, especially on the front line of NATO's Eastern Flank, command and control structure and military preparedness while placing shared democratic values at the heart of NATO's response to today's challenges, including through the establishment, within NATO, of a Democratic Resilience Centre.
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## STRENGTHENING THE CYBER RESILIENCE OF ALLIED SOCIETIES\*

### RESOLUTION 475

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The Assembly,

1. **Acknowledging** the essential contribution of digital technologies to the functioning, well-being, cohesion and security of Allied societies;
2. **Concerned** about the growth, sophistication and increasingly destabilising impact of malicious cyber activities targeting all sectors, including public services, private companies and democratic institutions;
3. **Commending** efforts made in recent years by Allies and NATO to enhance their capacity to prevent, deter and counter malicious cyber activities; and **welcoming** the emphasis on combatting the latter and commitments made in NATO's new Strategic Concept;
4. **Alarmed** by the aggressive and irresponsible behaviour of authoritarian states in cyberspace; and **concerned** by the multiplication and diversification of malicious non-state cyber actors, their objectives and their techniques;
5. **Strongly denouncing** the unacceptable proliferation of malicious cyber activities against critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine before and during Russia's new illegal and unprovoked invasion of the country, and **recognising** the importance of Allied support to Ukrainian authorities in thwarting them;
6. **Reaffirming** that Allies have a duty to maintain and strengthen their national cyber resilience and that NATO can provide support in this regard, notably through the Cyber Defence Pledge;
7. **Stressing** that NATO has recognised cyberspace as an operational domain; and **reiterating** the possibility for the North Atlantic Council to decide, on a case-by-case basis, when a cyber-attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5;
8. **Reaffirming** the crucial role of partnerships in combatting cyber threats that defy borders, and **welcoming** the extensive and effective cooperation between NATO and the European Union (EU) in this area;
9. **Recalling** that enhancing the cyber security of Allied societies cannot be achieved at the cost of undermining the democratic freedoms, rights and principles that underpin them;
10. **Noting** that the international community has recognised the applicability of international law in cyberspace, and **reiterating** the Alliance's commitment to its observance in order to promote a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace;

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\* Presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2022

11. **URGES** the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and, where appropriate, NATO bodies:
- a. to swiftly implement agreed-on common policies, notably the Cyber Defence Pledge, the Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy and the new Strategic Concept;
  - b. to enhance cyber deterrence and defence capabilities:
    - i. by being transparent about their action doctrines;
    - ii. by consolidating their ability to quickly and effectively coordinate their responses, in particular concerning attribution, to cyber activities while respecting Allies' national competence ;
    - iii. by reserving the right to voluntarily adopt joint measures against perpetrators of cyber operations below the threshold at which they would be considered armed attacks warranting a military response;
    - iv. by taking action and developing cyber capabilities – including, at the national level, offensive capabilities – and greater interoperability to enable Allies to impose significant costs on perpetrators for their malicious cyber activities;
  - c. to deepen understanding of cyber threats, intelligence sharing and research, for example through the creation of dedicated applications for the general public, and to invest in network security in order to better prepare for and thwart malicious cyber activities;
  - d. to strengthen national policies and legal frameworks for combatting cyber threats and to continue working towards the development and implementation of international standards for responsible behaviour in cyberspace;
  - e. to intensify cooperation with relevant international organisations, notably the EU, partner countries, industry and academia, in particular by consolidating the exchange of information and best practices;
  - f. to raise awareness among all societal actors of their individual role in collective cyber resilience; to deepen collaboration with all private sector actors; and to strengthen civil-military cooperation in the cyber domain;
  - g. to maintain and increase support for partner countries facing cyber risks, in particular Ukraine, in order to counteract the irresponsible malicious cyber activities against the latter in the context of Russia's escalating war of aggression ;
  - h. to pursue and strengthen the regular organisation of exercises and training involving all the actors concerned, aimed at identifying their cyber vulnerabilities and testing and developing their individual and collective capacity to react to and recover from malicious cyber activities;
  - i. to ensure that parliaments, civil society and the public have all the information and means necessary to monitor measures aimed at enhancing cyber security to make sure that these do not infringe on democratic values or individual rights.
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## SUPPORTING NATO'S POST-MADRID SUMMIT DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE INITIATIVES\*

### RESOLUTION 476

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The Assembly,

1. **Denouncing** in the strongest possible terms Russia's brutal and unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, demonstrating it is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
2. **Commending** Ukraine's continued valiant and just self-defence, as enshrined in the UN Charter, against Russia's aggression to protect its people, its sovereign territorial rights and democracy;
3. **Welcoming** the demonstration of Allied unity and the far-reaching decisions taken at the 2022 Madrid Summit, which lay the groundwork for a fundamental shift in NATO's baseline deterrence and defence posture;
4. **Convinced** NATO's new Strategic Concept provides a solid roadmap to adapt the Alliance to meet the threats and challenges of an increasingly complex security environment, in defence of Allies' common values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
5. **Praising** the continued, significant, and vital Allied and partner military, economic, political, and humanitarian support to Ukraine;
6. **Alarmed** by the Russian government's reckless nuclear rhetoric directed at NATO Allies, reflecting a pattern of aggressive brinkmanship to disrupt Euro-Atlantic support for Ukraine's just self-defence against Russia's illegal and unprovoked war on its territory;
7. **Recognising** that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, remains the most significant asymmetrical threat to Allied and partner security and stability, and **supportive** of Allied leaders' strong recommitment to work with NATO's unique and essential partner, the EU, as well as with other partners, particularly in the Middle East, across the Sahel, and in the Horn of Africa, to fight terrorism and respond to shared threats and challenges;
8. **Concerned** about Afghanistan's potential to re-emerge as a haven for terrorism under the current Taliban leadership;
9. **Troubled** by China's stated ambitions and coercive policies, which challenge Allied interests, security, and values;
10. **Concerned** about the erosion of frameworks for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, Russia's irresponsible nuclear brinkmanship, Russia and China's expansion of their nuclear arsenals, and Iran and North Korea's continued development of their nuclear and missile programmes; all of which are negatively impacting strategic stability;
11. **Acknowledging** that malign actors, both state and non-state, increasingly seek to disrupt and degrade Allied institutions, infrastructure, economies, and societies in cyberspace;

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\* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2022

12. **Recalling** that NATO's deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complimented by space and cyber capabilities;
13. **Welcoming** the significant steps taken since 2014 to adapt NATO's deterrence and defence, and **recognising** they must be built upon to meet the security challenges facing the Alliance today;
14. **Encouraged** by Allies' decision to commit to a modern forward defence posture via the reinforcement of NATO's forward presence, a significantly strengthened force model for multi-domain, high-readiness follow-on forces, the prepositioning of equipment, and enhanced command and control, particularly along NATO's eastern flank, to guarantee the security of all Allied populations and territory;
15. **Stressing** that NATO's actions are defensive and designed not to provoke, but rather prevent conflict;
16. **Recognising** the need for Allies, working in close cooperation with the EU, to increase the resilience of their national critical infrastructures, particularly the energy and communications networks upon which our economies, governments, and societies depend;
17. **Endorsing** the Allies' call for each member state to develop national goals and implementation plans to increase collective resilience within the Alliance, which is critical to NATO's core tasks;
18. **Underscoring** that NATO's strength and resilience is grounded in a foundational commitment to democratic values and institutions, as articulated in NATO's new Strategic Concept, which states that Allies will "safeguard our freedom and democracy" and reinforce "our shared democratic values"; and **recognising** that the new Strategic Concept specifically identifies, for the first time, authoritarian actors as a challenge to "our interests, values and democratic way of life";
19. **Praising** Allied leaders' endorsement of NATO's 2022 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy, which commits the Alliance to have the capabilities needed to counter WMD proliferation as well as operate effectively and prevail in any environment;
20. **Supporting** the establishment of a multinational Innovation Fund, to bring together governments, the private sector, and academia to complement the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) and bolster Allies' technological edge;
21. **Determined** to maintain defence investment momentum, building upon the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge, to underwrite and sustain the initiatives necessary to implement NATO's new baseline deterrence and defence posture;
22. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to work collectively and diligently to ensure the prompt and effective implementation of the new decisions taken at the Madrid Summit to reinforce NATO's new baseline deterrence and defence posture;
  - b. to promptly and fully implement the modernisation of the NATO Force Structure, thereby boosting the Alliance's overall presence on the eastern flank, while maintaining a 360-degree approach;
  - c. to persist with and build upon the political and practical support to Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity, including via the enhanced Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine;

- d. to implement, in a timely fashion, the “Tailored Support Measures” adopted at the June 2022 Summit for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, which will further enhance their defence capabilities and resilience;
  - e. to state clearly that the Russian Federation under the current regime, whose forces are launching indiscriminate attacks, and deliberately and systematically targeting civilian objects and critical infrastructure in Ukraine, acts as a state that supports and perpetrates terrorism and war crimes;
  - f. to carry forward the political unity and will demonstrated at the June 2022 Summit, to commit the financing and resources necessary, using the benchmark 2% of GDP as a minimum investment level to adapt the Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture, and to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures on equipment, including related research and development, to meet the challenges of a more contested global security order;
  - g. to implement national plans, in line with Article 3 of the Washington Treaty and seeking maximum synergy with the EU, to increase national and collective resilience, especially to guarantee the security of critical energy and cyber networks, essential supply chains, and government and civil services;
  - h. to operationalise the commitment to shared democratic values, reaffirmed in the new Strategic Concept, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve as a resource to propound democratic values and protect the institutions that keep Allied democracies strong;
  - i. to channel the power and potential of Alliance-wide initiatives, such as the Defence Innovation Fund and DIANA, to support defence innovation, enhance Allies’ technological edge and contribute to the development and adaption of dual-use emerging technologies to today’s critical security and defence challenges;
  - j. to continue to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups, including by enhancing cooperation with the EU and other partners;
  - k. to pursue strategic risk reduction in an increasingly complex international security environment through dialogue;
  - l. to continue to take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of NATO’s nuclear mission;
  - m. to fully support the commitments made in the 2022 CBRN Defence Policy and remain vigilant to the CBRN threat posed by Russia, and other state or non-state actors;
  - n. to continue to boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which Allied collective defence and security depends;
  - o. to work together responsibly, as Allies and with like-minded partners, to address the systemic challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies.
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## THE CORRUPTION-SECURITY NEXUS\*

### RESOLUTION 477

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The Assembly,

23. **Noting** that corruption appears to be a catalyst for conflict, undermines state institutions and, as expressed in NATO's 2021 Brussels Summit's Communique, puts national security at risk by marginalising civil society, enabling terrorist and transnational criminal networks to finance their operations, and forging links among corrupt political elites, organised criminal groups and intelligence operatives from rival states;

24. **Lamenting** that corruption erodes democratic governance by weakening election integrity and civil participation in the life of the state while undercutting investment, raising risk premia, driving young people into exile and reducing economic potential by allocating resources based on opaque connections rather than merits, thus disproportionately harming the most vulnerable populations in society;

25. **Acknowledging** that in Afghanistan, endemic corruption contributed to the erosion of state legitimacy, was a factor in state failure, led to the disbandment of its army, and significantly exacerbated that country's fragility, all of which, among others, opened the door for the Taliban's return to power;

26. **Stressing** the importance of strong and independent judiciaries, journalists, and other civil society actors in exposing corruption and in holding corrupt actors to account;

27. **Recognising** that Russia has used corruption as a tool of hybrid warfare and curried favour with certain actors dedicating to weakening the state, undermining democratic governance, and countering Euro-Atlantic aspirations;

28. **Noting**, however, that although Ukraine long struggled with corruption, reforms since 2014 helped its society establish stronger anti-corruption norms that have enhanced its resilience;

29. **Aware** that a kleptocratic Russian state not only deploys corruption internationally but also wields it against the Russian people;

30. **Warning** that China's opaque business practices, which have disastrous consequences for human rights, evade democratic scrutiny, often produce debt traps, undermine governance, and empower corrupt officials whose interests diverge significantly from those of society at large;

31. **Acknowledging** that cryptocurrencies have become a widely used vehicle for the transfer of value for illegal purposes and for the laundering of money garnered through criminal and corrupt practices;

32. **Lamenting** that Western property markets have become a particularly important vehicle for laundering the proceeds of those who have acquired wealth through corrupt means;

33. **Noting** that increasingly extensive international sanctions against Russia following its attacks on Ukraine, including: asset seizures targeting those close to the regime; preventing Russian banks from using the SWIFT financial messaging system; enhanced efforts to prevent Russian money laundering and asset acquisitions in the West; and restrictions on Russia's energy sector, which itself is an agent of massive corruption, mark a radical change in that they not only represent a

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\* Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2022

response to the Russian security threat but also enhance the capacity of allied governments to counter the illicit flow of money acquired through and disbursed for corrupt practices;

34. **Applauding** intensified allied national efforts like the Biden Administration's U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption, which have highlighted the security risks posed by corruption and taken important steps to counter it, as well as the vitally important role played by international organisations like the European Union, the OECD, the World Bank and the Financial Action Task Force in promoting legal and operational anti-corruption strategies;

35. **Welcoming** NATO's ongoing commitment to the Building Integrity program, an anti-corruption effort premised on the notion that corruption in the defence and security sectors poses serious challenges to peace and stability;

36. **Recognising** that anti-corruption measures in the security sector can serve as a model for broader efforts as demonstrated by the reform of the Georgian police in the early years after the Rose Revolution which subsequently inspired a series of other important reforms;

37. **Saluting** the strong reaffirmation in NATO's new Strategic Concept, of the Alliance's commitment to shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law and the recognition that these values must stand at the centre of NATO's response to today's challenges;

38. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- p. to encourage all Allies and partners to consider the national security dimension of corruption and to address these in a more coordinated and systematic manner;
- q. to engage in a collective effort to insulate Allies, partners, and the democratic world more generally from the nefarious influence of corruption, including its most malign forms as when authoritarian states like Russia deploy it to subvert democracy, weaken democratic alliances and advance their own anti-democratic agenda;
- r. to find ways to restrict or outlaw the use of funding from designated rival countries and their financial institutions to underwrite election campaigns;
- s. to increase support for the vital role played by NGOs, a free media, and civil society organisations in demanding transparency, integrity, and democratic accountability of state institutions;
- t. to reinforce NATO's Building Integrity program, which aims to foster resilience needed to counter corruption in defence and security institutions in both allied and partner countries;
- u. to encourage states to adopt anti-kleptocracy legislation that aims to close legal loopholes facilitating money laundering, to take active steps to implement sanctions and find ways to identify the legitimate ownership of property, and to encourage the development of stronger legal instruments to freeze and seize assets if they are found to result from corruption;
- v. to draw lessons from NATO's experience in Afghanistan to help inform any future NATO operations;
- w. to address gaps in Western property markets that allow corrupt officials and oligarchs to launder dirty money by purchasing properties through offshore shell companies;
- x. to empower anti-corruption efforts carried out by a range of international organisations, including the OECD's Convention on Anti-Bribery and its Anti-Corruption and Integrity program, the Financial Action Task Force's work on terrorist financing and parallel efforts by the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations;

- y. to monitor developments in cryptocurrency markets and continue efforts to make cryptocurrency transactions significantly less anonymous and easier to trace, thereby reducing the potential for these digital currencies to be used as tender for illegal activity;
  - z. to operationalise the Alliance's commitment to shared democratic values in the new Strategic Concept by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve as a resource and clearinghouse of best practices available to members and partners upon request.
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## RUSSIA'S WAR ON UKRAINE: ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES\*

### RESOLUTION 478

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The Assembly,

39. **Reaffirming** its declaration, [Standing with Ukraine](#), adopted at Spring session in Vilnius (Lithuania) in May 2022, which conveys full solidarity with Ukraine in the face of Russia's illegal and catastrophic war on Ukraine;
40. **Appalled** by the wanton violence and massive destruction resulting from Russia's war of aggression;
41. **Condemning** in the strongest terms Russia's use of torture and summary executions and its utterly reckless targeting of civilian and economic infrastructure, including housing, grain silos, energy plants, powerlines and other facilities needed to ensure the survival of the Ukrainian population, all of which constitute horrific violations of international humanitarian law;
42. **Honouring** the heroic sacrifices undertaken by the Ukrainian people to defend their homeland and, by extension, the democratic community of nations;
43. **Dismayed** that Russia's war on Ukraine has not only compelled millions of civilians to flee from their homes but is also having a profound impact on Ukraine's economy, which will likely contract by 35% in 2022 alone;
44. **Concerned** that Russia's illegal war has had global economic consequences, driven up prices and slowed growth while striking international energy, food, commodities, consumer goods, and equities markets—developments which have undermined growth in allied countries;
45. **Lamenting** that the developing world has been struck particularly hard by this war-driven shock and that rising food prices could trigger hunger, poverty, grave instability, a humanitarian crisis and mass migration events;
46. **Applauding** Allied and partner nations' steadfast support for Ukraine and clear refusal to recognise any of Russia's illegal and illegitimate claims on Ukrainian territory, including Crimea;
47. **Welcoming** decisions taken by Allied governments to apply an ever-broadening array of sanctions that aim both to weaken the Russian war machine and to target those close to Putin's regime including individuals who have promoted the war and propagated lies that the regime has employed to justify it;
48. **Stressing** that sanctions have weakened Russia's economy but that high energy prices have so far limited the costs to it;
49. **Endorsing** the commitment made by most Allied governments to reduce or eliminate imports of Russian energy, which constitutes the most important source of financing for the Russian military and the corrupt leaders who have used that military for such nefarious purposes;
50. **Welcoming** solidarity and cooperation among Allies in finding alternatives sources of energy;

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\* Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2022

51. **Asserting** that any attacks on Allied critical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, would be met with a strong and united response;
52. **Noting** that the decision taken by the EU and the G7 to impose a cap on the price paid for Russian oil will limit the revenues that country can generate from this key export;
53. **Emphasising** that reducing and ultimately eliminating Russian energy from the allied energy mix demands a broad-based strategy aiming not only to diversify the energy supply, but also to hasten the coming of a greener more sustainable energy future that, in due course, will enhance security and well-being;
54. **Condemning** the decision of OPEC Plus to reduce oil supplies at a dangerous moment of global economic uncertainty;
55. **Recognising** the importance and increasing effectiveness of Allied and partner financial sanctions against Russia, including banning Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system; freezing the assets of those individuals and institutions directly responsible for the war or for financing it; and denying key services like insurance to Russian traders;
56. **Observing** that given the importance of western technology in virtually all military systems, the decision to restrict Russian access to these technologies will impede the capacity of its military to operate on the battlefield;
57. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO partners:
- a. to hold Russian leaders accountable for any war crimes that they have committed, including through the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression;
  - b. to provide the Ukrainian government with all the means necessary to defend its people and its vital infrastructure against Russia's wanton bombing and ground campaign;
  - c. to increase military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support to Ukraine, including by accelerating deliveries of the weapons that Ukraine needs to protect itself and to restore its territorial integrity, and to sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail;
  - d. to sustain critical humanitarian aid to the Ukrainian victims of this war both in Ukraine and beyond;
  - e. to continue to strengthen sanctions on Russia both to further undermine its capacity to wage war on the European continent and to impose daunting costs on its leadership and the economic forces that underwrite it;
  - f. to do everything possible to avoid purchasing Russian energy and to understand this sacrifice not only as an act of solidarity with Ukraine, but also as a long-term security investment;
  - g. to forge a trans-Atlantic approach engaging all Allies and the EU to overcome the immediate energy supply crisis and to plan for a long-term secure and sustainable energy future premised on diversifying energy supplies, rapidly adopting greener and more sustainable sources of energy and increasing energy efficiency;
  - h. to make the protection of critical civil infrastructure a central strategic priority in light of Russia's willingness to attack fundamental economic assets;

- i. to launch a concerted planning effort for a comprehensive aid programme akin to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of a more prosperous Ukraine firmly anchored to the liberal democratic family of nations—a project that Russia itself should ultimately help fund given its responsibility for the terrible and costly damage it has inflicted;
  - j. to recognise that this reconstruction will demand sustained financial and political support from the international community and to begin to outline in close consultation with Ukraine, the EU, and key international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF a strategy for financing Ukraine's economic rebirth;
  - k. to continue active support for Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions;
  - l. to support developing countries as they cope with the economic fallout from this war, including rising food, goods, energy and commodity prices and soaring interest rates, all of which disproportionately strike poor indebted countries.
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## NATO POST-MADRID SUMMIT: FIT FOR PURPOSE IN THE NEW STRATEGIC ERA\*

### RESOLUTION 479

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The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that the Euro-Atlantic area is no longer at peace and that the global security environment has deteriorated rapidly, particularly since the Russian regime launched an unjustified and brutal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine;
2. **Applauding** the adoption of NATO's new Strategic Concept at the transformative Madrid Summit on 29-30 June 2022, charting the way forward for the Alliance in the face of the greatest security threat since the Second World War and demonstrating transatlantic unity and cohesion of purpose, as well as the adoption of other milestone decisions throughout 2022 in order to keep NATO fit for purpose in confronting the full range of contemporary security challenges;
3. **Welcoming** the strong alignment between the Strategic Concept and its own contribution and recommendations, particularly the recommitment to shared democratic values, the reaffirmation of the indispensable transatlantic bond, as well as the strengthened Allied defence and deterrence and reaffirmation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as the bedrock of Allied collective defence;
4. **Condemning** in the strongest terms Russia's continuing escalation of the horrific war against the Ukrainian nation, including the despicable attacks deliberately targeting civilians and infrastructure that amount to acts of terror against the population and constitute war crimes;
5. **Stressing** that Russia currently represents the most significant and direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security;
6. **Emphasising** that Russia's illegal and cynical attempts to annex parts of the Ukrainian territory will never be recognised or accepted by the international community, as the vote in the UN General Assembly on 12 October 2022 clearly demonstrates;
7. **Reaffirming** its steadfast support for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as Georgia and the Republic of Moldova;
8. **Paying tribute** to the brave people of Ukraine, its armed forces and democratically elected institutions, and **reiterating** the need for steadfast Allied solidarity with Ukraine as it defends its independence and holds the frontline of the democratic world, at the price of immense suffering and the ultimate sacrifice;
9. **Welcoming** the strengthened Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine and the commitment by NATO to help Ukraine transition to modern equipment, boost interoperability and bolster further Ukraine's defence and security institutions, and **applauding** the crucial military, economic and humanitarian assistance that individual Allies and partners are providing Ukraine to help it defend itself against aggression;
10. **Noting** that the People's Republic of China is a strategic competitor and poses multiple and systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, interests and values; **saluting** the growing convergence of European and North American policies and perspectives on China;

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\* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2022

11. **Aware** of the impact of Russia's war against Ukraine on economic, humanitarian and security conditions in developing countries;
12. **Supporting fully** the fundamental shift in NATO's deterrence and defence posture and the transformation of NATO's force structure towards enhanced forward defence and a significant increase in high readiness forces;
13. **Emphasising** the importance for NATO to remain committed to a 360-degree approach to security and to retain a focus on countering the evolving threat of terrorism and addressing other challenges, including instability in the South, cyber attacks and hybrid operations, the security implications of climate change, irregular migration, human trafficking, threats to energy security, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced military technology;
14. **Welcoming wholeheartedly** the invitation for Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance, which has been ratified by nearly all member-state parliaments, and which would strengthen the Euro-Atlantic security as a whole, and **reiterating** its unwavering support to NATO's Open Door Policy and the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
15. **Valuing highly** the increased level of cooperation between NATO and the European Union as well as like-minded partners across the globe, united by shared democratic values and a strong commitment to protect the rules-based international order;
16. **Stressing** the need for the Alliance to maintain capabilities and expertise in crisis management, fully embracing lessons learned from previous missions, including NATO's 20 year-long mission in Afghanistan;
17. **Deeply concerned** about Russia's continuing violation of arms control obligations and the erosion of global arms control and non-proliferation regimes, and **condemning** Russia's reckless and unacceptable nuclear sabre-rattling;
18. **Welcoming** the emphasis on fostering resilience throughout the new Strategic Concept;
19. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to fully and promptly implement decisions taken at the Madrid Summit in regard to all three core tasks, prioritising the reinforcement and modernisation of the NATO Force Structure and strengthening forward defences, including by ensuring the adequate deployment of land, air, maritime, unmanned and artillery assets in the frontline Allied nations;
  - b. to finalise as soon as possible the ratification of Finland's and Sweden's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance;
  - c. to make clear that, given Russia's flagrant and repeated violations of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the document, with its provisions limiting forward deployment of NATO forces, is now null and void;
  - d. to fully deliver on their commitments under the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge and to continue the adaptation of Allies' defence capabilities ;
  - e. to increase military, intelligence, financial, training and humanitarian support to Ukraine, including by accelerating deliveries of the weapons that Ukraine needs to protect itself and to restore its territorial integrity, and to sustain this support for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail, while ensuring traceability of the weapons delivered;

- f. to recognise fully the value that Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration would add to Allied collective defence, to continue active support for Ukraine's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and to agree on the next steps towards Ukraine's NATO membership, which the Ukrainian people have chosen and is anchored in Ukraine's Constitution;
- g. to support the work of the International Crimea Platform, including its Parliamentary Summit as a tool to consolidate inter-parliamentary efforts aimed at de-occupation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol;
- h. to take collective action towards the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression committed by Russia with its war against Ukraine as well as to impose an obligation to make full reparation of damage loss or injury under international compensation mechanism;
- i. to state clearly that the Russian state under the current regime is a terrorist one;
- j. to operationalise the commitment to shared democratic values, reaffirmed in the new Strategic Concept, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters to serve as a resource to propound democratic values and protect the institutions that keep Allied democracies strong;
- k. to ensure that combatting terrorism in all its forms remains a top priority for the Alliance and to continue investing in prevention, protection and denial measures as well as enhancing capacity-building cooperation with partners, especially in the south;
- l. to strengthen NATO as a political institution and to make full use of NATO as the main platform for consultations among Allies on all aspects of Euro-Atlantic defence and security;
- m. to build on the Strategic Concept by developing a common Allied response to the increasing assertiveness of China, including through robust safeguards regarding third party investments in strategic sectors, in close cooperation with other allies as well as partners; including by reducing strategic dependencies and working with partners of the Alliance, starting with the EU and including those, new and existing Indo-Pacific partners to address shared security interests amplified by China's systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security and attempts to subvert the rules-based international order, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing, such as on addressing climate change, military transparency and arms control;
- n. to continue developing political and practical cooperation with the EU – NATO's unique and essential partner – across the board, while promoting the inclusive engagement of non-EU Allies in the Union's defence-related projects;
- o. to step up support to vulnerable partners Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova to help build their integrity and resilience, develop capabilities and uphold their political independence, and to continue supporting the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- p. to keep the security developments in the Black Sea region under close review and support Allied and partner countries in the region in preserving peace, security and stability in the area, including through the development of cooperation in maritime security, freedom of navigation, economic, tourism and commercial ties;
- q. to enhance NATO partnerships with like-minded partners, including in the Indo-Pacific, as well as with regions on NATO's southern flank where instability directly impacts Euro-Atlantic security;
- r. to continue to use NATO as a platform to coordinate arms control policies taking into account the prevailing security environment and effective deterrence and defence;

- s. to preserve the ability to operate out of area, especially in the broader Euro-Atlantic area, including in the Mediterranean and the Balkans; to take into account lessons learned from NATO's past missions in order to better define the parameters of NATO's engagement and to set clear, achievable and realistic goals, benchmarks and timelines;
  - t. to foster resilience as a comprehensive whole-of-society approach as the first line of deterrence and defence and to meet the robust baseline requirements across the Alliance;
  - u. to ensure an adequate level of investments in technological innovation to maintain NATO's technological edge and to support NATO's ground-breaking initiatives the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the NATO Innovation Fund;
  - v. to increase outreach efforts to Allied and partner populations, particularly young people, about NATO and the unique transatlantic bond to help reverse the onslaught of authoritarian narratives;
  - w. to sustain the momentum in carrying forward the Women, Peace and Security agenda;
  - x. to support NATO's objective of being the world's leading organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.
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## CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY – NATO'S AGENDA\* RESOLUTION 480

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The Assembly,

1. **Recalling** the Assembly's efforts since the 1980s to better understand and address climate change and its profound security implications and, in particular, [Resolution 427](#) (2015), which acknowledged that climate change-related risks are significant threat multipliers;
2. **Concerned** that climate change presents a real and growing international security challenge and **noting** that the new Strategic Concept recognises climate change as “a crisis and threat multiplier” that exacerbates existing security challenges all over the globe;
3. **Stressing** that extreme weather already poses a grave risk to Allied military operations and bases as well as to soldiers' health, military equipment and critical infrastructure and **acknowledging** that the frequency and intensity of extreme weather is increasing;
4. **Recognising** that climate change will require our militaries to assist more frequently in disaster relief and that the demands on our military forces to provide assistance will grow further;
5. **Noting** that a changing climate will alter our security environment and that it will have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations;
6. **Acknowledging** that the defence sector remains the single largest consumer of hydrocarbons in the world and that military operations and exercises consume large amounts of fossil fuels;
7. **Stressing** that energy independence from third countries such as Russia would enhance Allies' ability to carry out military operations and exercises;
8. **Recognising** that extreme weather phenomena caused by human-induced climate change are already having a profound impact on our environment, our economies, infrastructure, and social systems and **highlighting** the short-term impact that these events have on critical infrastructure and local communities including through temporary displacement;
9. **Worried** that climate change is likely to create instability throughout the world, which could lead to state failure and violent conflicts in fragile countries, and that the combined effects of instability and climate change are likely to amplify migration movements in coming years;
10. **Encouraged** by the fact that Allies adopted a Climate Change and Security Action Plan in 2021 which operationalises NATO's Climate Change and Security Agenda and **stressing** that NATO Heads of State and Government committed to integrate climate change and human security across the Alliance's core task;
11. **Welcoming** that NATO presented its first annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment (CCSIA) at the 2022 Madrid Summit which increases awareness of the impact of climate change on NATO's strategic environment, Allied installations and assets, missions and multidomain operations as well as resilience and civil preparedness;

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\* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 21 November 2022



12. **Emphasising** the importance of finding technological solutions to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change;
13. **Noting** the important work NATO's Science and Technology Organization (STO), including the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE), is conducting in this field;
14. **Recalling** the work carried out by other international organisations such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE on climate change and security issues;
15. **Welcoming** Canada's decision to establish a NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), which has been accredited by NATO at the 2022 Madrid Summit;
16. **Strongly endorsing** NATO's goals to reduce military emissions and "green" the armed forces which will help the Alliance to mitigate climate change and make the militaries more self-sufficient and able to carry out their missions;
17. **Noting** that the climate change policy of the Alliance must not weaken member states' abilities to perform their core tasks of collective deterrence and defence;
18. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to increase investments to strengthen the energy efficiency of Allied militaries and their adaptation to the changing climate;
  - b. to operationalise NATO's response to reduce vulnerabilities by updating its seven baseline requirements for national resilience to better reflect the impact of climate change on security;
  - c. to conduct frequent surveys of Allied civilian and military critical infrastructure to assess their current and future ability to withstand predictable as well as irregular, extreme weather events and organise frequent stress tests and exercises to improve their resilience;
  - d. to adopt a whole-of-society approach to the civil and military security challenge posed by climate change and bolster their communication efforts to develop awareness of the impact of climate change on Allied civil and military security;
  - e. to integrate climate change considerations as a cross cutting issue into all government budgets, projects, activities and initiatives with the objective to foster climate change resilience and preparedness;
  - f. to maintain Allies' support for multilateral efforts, in particular those of the European Union, aiming to find global and comprehensive solutions to climate change challenges;
  - g. to harness the potential of science and technology to support climate action by encouraging research on innovative and novel applications, particularly in support of climate change adaptation;
  - h. to boost investments into research and development of climate-neutral technologies, in particular climate-neutral fuels and propulsion systems, to further strengthen military effectiveness of Allied forces;
  - i. to evaluate how to strengthen the NATO STO's resources to help advance technological solutions and more generally, to allocate adequate human and financial resources to initiatives aiming to contribute to a better understanding of climate change;
  - j. to increase NATO's study and early warning capacities with regards to fragile governance through the creation of a Democratic Resilience Centre at NATO Headquarters to prevent that climate change-related extreme weather events lead to social unrest and political instability, which could corrode the social and democratic cohesion, values, and institutions of our nations;

- k. to strengthen NATO's and Allies' toolbox providing strategic foresight in order to monitor the impact of climate change on the political, economic and social stability of countries in the vicinity of the Alliance.
-