Post-
Fukushima
accident

Netherlands

Peer review country report

Stress tests performed on European nuclear power plants

ENSREG
European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
Stress Test Peer Review Board

1 GENERAL QUALITY OF NATIONAL REPORT AND NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS

The accident at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan on 11th March 2011 triggered the need for a coordinated action at EU level to identify potential further improvements of Nuclear Power Plant safety. On 25th March 2011, the European Council concluded that the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed, on the basis of comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessments - the stress tests. The stress tests consist in three main steps: a self-assessment by licensees, followed by an independent review by the national regulatory bodies, and by a third phase of international peer reviews. The international peer review phase consists of 3 steps: an initial desktop review, three topical reviews in parallel (covering external initiating events, loss of electrical supply and loss of ultimate heat sink, and accident management), and seventeen individual country peer reviews.
Country review reports are one of the specific deliverables of the EU stress tests peer review process. They provide information based on the present situation with respect to the topics covered by the stress tests. They contain specific recommendations to the participating Member States for their consideration or good practices that may have been identified, and to some extend information specific to each country and installation. Draft country review reports were initiated during the topical reviews based on discussions with the country involved in the three topics and on the generic discussions within each of the three topical reviews. Issues identified for each country during the topical reviews, due to only limited time available for each country, have required follow-up discussions in more detail, both between the topical reviews and the country reviews, and during the country reviews.
The current National Report was finalized at the end of the Country Review, after final discussion with the reviewed country and visit of nuclear power plant (NPP). It is a part of the Final Report combining the results of the Topical Reviews and Country Reviews.

1.1 Compliance of the national reports with the topics defined in the ENSREG stress tests specifications

The Netherlands' National Report on the Post-Fukushima stress test for the Borssele Nuclear Power Plant (National Report) was submitted to the European Commission by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture & Innovation (EL&I) in December 2011. The National Report in general is compliant with the specifications defined by ENSREG. All topics defined in the ENSREG stress tests specifications are addressed. The report encompasses the single operating nuclear power plant in the Netherlands – Borssele NPP. The plant consists of a single unit, designed by Kraftwerk Union (KWU), Germany, and operated by the licensee Elektriciteits-Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland EPZ (EPZ).

1.2 Adequacy of the information supplied, consistency with the guidance provided by ENSREG

The national report basically addresses all relevant issues related to earthquakes and flooding, but the information available on the assessment of extreme weather conditions is very limited. Adequate information has been provided during the country session, satisfying the requirements in the ENSREG specifications.
Regarding the loss of electrical power and loss of ultimate heat sink, some information is missing (system drawings/schematics, analyses of incident scenarios when the steam generators are not available, national regulation requirements), but has also been provided during the peer review process.
The information supplied in regard to the management of severe accidents, supported by additional information provided during the peer review process, complies very well with the guidance provided in the ENSREG stress tests specification. The report is of a very good quality, suggesting an in-depth and challenging review has been conducted by the regulator. The report provides information in

sufficient detail in most areas to allow commensurately detailed questions to be asked in the peer review process.

1.3 Adequacy of the assessment of compliance of the plants with their current licensing/safety case basis for the events within the scope of the stress tests

In general the information provided in the National Report is sufficiently adequate and it is also consistent with the ENSREG guidance.
The current version of the Dutch safety rules came into force end of May 2011, when the last version of the license was issued to Borssele NPP. The safety requirements in the Netherlands are based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements with adaptions, including the Western European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA) Reference Levels. During the preparation of the implementation of the new safety rules, the state of compliance was checked by the regulator. It was confirmed that a large majority was already complied with. It was decided to allow more time for implementation of the design requirements through the process of Periodic Safety Review (PSR). The other requirements are to be complied with immediately. It is part of the PSR approach that if deviations with large safety impact are detected, the correction will be made as soon as reasonably possible, and if necessary the reactor will be shut down. During the evaluation phase of PSR which will be finished by the end of 2013, both the licensee and regulator verify compliance with existing and modern regulations. Deviations will have to be solved within four years after 2013, unless due justification is provided and agreed with the Regulator.
The report provides satisfactory evidence that the plant is in compliance with its current licensing basis for all external events: earthquakes, flooding and extreme weather conditions. Inspections and PSR are tools applied for assessment. The report identifies explicit work to demonstrate ongoing compliance with external events safety cases.
Also with respect to the Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP), Station Black Out (SBO), primary Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) loss, and primary UHS loss together with SBO, the information provided is generally satisfactory, although comprehensive and unambiguous information on the current licensing and safety basis for the Borssele NPP is missing but more information was provided during the country visit.
The Dutch regulator has conducted a thorough review, looking in depth at severe accident management within the remit of the stress tests. It is confirmed that requirements for severe accident management are addressed explicitly within the Dutch regulatory framework. Based on this review, the Dutch regulator is confident that the licensee is in compliance with its current licensing basis, though it is noted that there are no detailed reviews of compliance in individual sections of the national report to back-up this assertion. Nevertheless, no deviations have been highlighted through the stress tests process, though a number of improvements to reduce or mitigate risks have been identified. No evidence was presented during the ENSREG peer review process to suggest any non-compliance with the Dutch licensing basis in regard to severe accident management.

1.4 Adequacy of the assessments of the robustness of the plants: situations taken into account to evaluate margins

The safety margins beyond design basis are described and discussed in the report. The margins for seismic events and flooding are basically assessed, with limited identification of cliff edge effects and weak points. Margins for extreme weather are not quantified in the report. The assessment has been performed, basically, on the engineering judgement basis or by simplified methods. A more comprehensive assessment of all external hazards is being done in the ongoing PSR. The assessment provided in the Partner National Report encompasses many various situations linked to loss of power and ultimate heat sink events. Nevertheless, adequacy of the assessments of the robustness of the Borssele NPP is not clear as far as information on transient/incident scenario analysis for all initial plant operational conditions is not presented. The results of scenarios presented in the report may be understood provided for "steam generators available" plant state, although scenarios linked to "open primary circuit" and "core in spent fuel pool" plant states shall be analysed as well. The National report gives no time constraints linked to cliff edge effects such as time to core (fuel) damage, nevertheless they were presented during peer review. The Dutch report addresses all the constituents

that, based on international guidance, would be expected for the management of severe accidents. This includes organisational arrangements of accident management and emergency planning, hardware measures to be used in case of a severe accident, (e.g. depressurization, hydrogen management, corium stabilization etc) as well as procedures (Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) and Severe Accident Management (Guidelines)(SAMG)). These arrangements are already well-established at Borssele, though a number of improvements are also in progress / being considered.
The results of the assessments of margins for earthquake, flooding and extreme meteorological conditions, as well as those for loss of electric power and loss of ultimate heat sink, have been taken into account in the severe accident management section of the Dutch report.

1.5 Regulatory treatment applied to the actions and conclusions presented in national report (review by experts groups, notification to utilities, additional requirements or follow-up actions by Regulators, openness,…)

The comments of the regulatory authority concerning the licensee's analysis and conclusions are presented. It is reported that the regulator is ready to endorse measures proposed by the licensee after assessment of its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the regulatory authority stressed some problems as inadequately addressed and made a few additional recommendations. Regulatory treatment of the provided information and proposed actions seems to be adequate.
The Dutch national report was prepared by its regulatory body, with support from the German TSO (Technical Support Organisation) GRS. The regulatory body appears to have taken a proactive approach to the stress tests work, looking not only at the submitted report, but also at other safety documentation produced in the past by the licensee, and drawing from its history of regulatory interaction. The report also documents other interactions, including meetings with the licensee and a site visit.
The key lessons learned from the stress tests and ENSREG peer review exercise relating to severe accident management are the need for better qualification / substantiation of Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) required in severe accidents; improvements in the effectiveness of existing procedures and guidance, specifically for long term scenarios and the need for timely implementation of the identified improvements.
A broad implementation plan has been proposed by the licensee. During the peer review the regulator has provided information that the licensee was asked to refine this by adding a firmer time schedule to the plan. By 1st of March 2012 a list of improvements to be addressed in 2012; by 1st of June the list of the remaining improvements. It will be decided if and which measures are handled within the plant's current PSR to be delivered in 2013 .

2 PLANT(S) ASSESSMENT RELATIVE TO EARTHQUAKES, FLOODING AND OTHER EXTREME WEATHER CONDITIONS

2.1 Description of present situation of plants in country with respect to earthquake

2.1.1 DBE

2.1.1.1 Regulatory basis for safety assessment and regulatory oversight (national requirements, international standards, licensing basis already used by another country,…)

The Netherland's legislation does not specify a definition of Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) in terms of a ground motion level or occurrence probability. The operator demonstrates the resilience of the plant against a certain DBE. This documentation together with the results of SHA needs to be accepted by the regulator. It is stated that IAEA documents are "part of the license".

2.1.1.2 Derivation of DBE

The original design of the plant, which started operation in 1973, does not consider seismic loads. Seismic Hazard Assessment (SHA) has been performed in 1993 and updated in 1995. According to the licensee, the DBE corresponds to Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)=0.6m/s² (PGA=0.06g) at the

ground level and PGA=0.75m/s² (PGA=0.076g) at foundation base. The licensee's judgement of the DBE refers to German KTA standards (KTA 2201.1, KTA 2201.2).

2.1.1.3 Main requirements applied to this specific area

The DBE was established using a deterministic approach by adding one degree of intensity to the maximum intensity observed due to the strongest observed earthquake in the region (Zulzeke-Nukerke, 1938; M=5.6; I_{loc}=5.5MMI (Modified Mercalli Intensity). The DBE is therefore defined by I=6.5MMI. Additional PSHA revealed that this ground shaking level is related to a medium return period of 30.000 years.
Liquefaction is recognized as a potential hazard. The licensee explains that the probability for liquefaction is much lower than the DBE as higher PGA and longer earthquake durations are needed to cause such phenomena. It is further claimed that liquefaction will cause "no instability of the plant anyway".

2.1.1.4 Technical background for requirement, safety assessment and regulatory oversight (Deterministic approach, PSA, Operational Experience Feedback)

DBE value is not explicitly required by regulator. DBE was established by licensee, later than the original design, using a deterministic approach and updated during the PSR. The PSR starting now (2012) will include state-of-the-art seismic analysis and seismic data will be assessed according to IAEA NS-G-2.13, as reported in the presentation session of the country.All SSCs required to support the safety functions are identified, classified and designed to withstand the DBE.

2.1.1.5 Periodic safety reviews (regularly and/or recently reviewed)

PSRs are regularly conducted in ten years intervals. Information on the past PSRs is contained in the National Report. Such reviews were carried out in 1984, 1993 and in 2003. The next PSR will be submitted in 2013.
PSRs have lead to the implementation of seismic qualification of the plant, which was not originally designed to withstand seismic loads, and to installation of additional safety features (for instance in 1986: additional protection by "Bunker Concept" to improve the safe shutdown of the plant under external events as earthquake, flooding and malevolent actions beyond the original design basis; in 1997: emergency control room, second ultimate heat sink, additional larger and spatially separeted diesel generators; in 2006: autonomy time increased to 72h after accident, higher protection limits against floods).
SHA has been reviewed as part of the Safety Assessment Report (SRA) in the early 1990s and during International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team (IPSART) missions.

2.1.1.6 Conclusions on adequacy of design basis

In the National Report no clear statement is given on the judgement of the adequacy of the design basis for Borssele NPP. Reviewers note that a DBE of PGA=0.06g (PGA=0.076g at foundation level), which has been established for the plant, is below the IAEA's suggested minimum of PGA=0.1g. As clarified during the country visit, a comprehensive SHA is being performed within the framework of the ongoing PSR and will include also liquefaction. This SHA will take account of the state of the art and consider a PGA value of 0.1g at free field for the DBE, as per IAEA guidance.
The Borssele NPP is in a region with low seismicity. In view of this fact, of the result of the margin assessment (0.15g) and of the coming comprehensive seismic analysis ,the regulator considers the present analysis as adequate.
According to the licensee and the regulator the DBE used for Borssele NPP applies German standards and is considered to be justified due to low seismic activity in the area. However, the regulator considers that the information and methods used in derivation of DBE should be updated in accordance with present state of the art.
The plant has no seismic instrumentation. The regulator points further out that possible effects by human–induced earthquakes e.g. gas drilling activity in the Northern part of the Netherlands and shale drilling in Noord-Brabant should be considered too.

2.1.1.7 Compliance of plant(s) with current requirements for design basis

The regulatory position is that the plant complies with its current licensing basis. The position is based on decades of regulatory oversight.

2.1.2 Assessment of robustness of plants beyond the design basis

2.1.2.1 Approach used for safety margins assessment

No seismic PSA and seismic margin assessment (SMA) has been done in the past. The PSA shows that seismic hazard contributes less than 5.4% to the total core damage frequency (for full power state). No detailed fragility analysis was done.
According to the Licensee's report, elements of the EPRI NP-6041 method were used for the margins assessment, together with data from earthquake studies and experience at the German NPP of Neckarwestheim I and the Swiss NPP of Gosgen.
For buildings and SSCs designed for seismic loads a screening value of 0.3 g (EPRI NP-6041 screening value, median NUREG/CR-0098 spectrum) was used and the HCLPF capacity was determined for functions (e.g. subcriticality, decay heat removal) on the basis of the 0.3 g screening value. For the reactor building the HCLPF capacity was estimated to a value of 0.15 g.
A full scale seismic margins assessment is scheduled in the ongoing PSR.

2.1.2.2 Main results on safety margins and cliff edge effects

The result of the EPRI study was that for most safety relevant SSC's the 0.3g PGA value could be verified. A minimum value for all safety relevant SSC's was 0.15 g. The HCLPF capacity for many safety-relevant systems and buildings is higher. A list of the SSCs considered in the analysis is provided in the licensee report.
The seismic load leading to loss of containment integrity is stated as 0.3g. No detailed fragility analysis is available. The report concludes that "earthquakes up to an intensity of VII-VIII (VII½) (i.e. exceeding the DBE by one degree of intensity) will not lead to core damage or confinement failure under high confidence".
The following potential "cliff-edge" effects were identified in the review: failure of confinement integrity in case of earthquakes with ground motion exceeding about 0.30g; unavailability of staff limiting accident management after about 10 hours; inoperability of some conventional fire fighting systems which are not seismically qualified; failure of the containment filter venting which is also not seismically qualified.

2.1.2.3 Strong safety features and areas for safety improvement identified in the process

Accident management and mitigation might be endangered after a beyond DBE due to a potential inaccessibility of staff to the site, unavailability of the main control room, and non seismic-classified fire-fighting and containment filtered venting systems. Overall, emergency preparedness and accident mitigation should be enhanced.

2.1.2.4 Possible measures to increase robustness

The related modifications / investigations that according to the licensee could be envisaged are:
- establishment of an additional Emergency Response Centre
- storage facilities for portable equipment, tools and materials needed by the alarm response organization that are accessible after all foreseeable hazards would enlarge the possibilities of the alarm response organization;
- ensuring the availability of fire annunciation and fixed fire suppression systems in vital areas after seismic events would improve fire fighting capabilities and accident management measures that require transport of water for cooling/suppression;
- by increasing the autarky-time beyond 10 h the robustness of the plant in a general sense would be increased;

– ensuring the availability of the containment venting system TL003 after seismic events would increase the margin in case of seismic events;
– uncertainty of the seismic margins can be reduced by a SMA or a Seismic-PSA. In 10EVA13 either a seismic-PSA will be developed and/or an SMA will be conducted and the measures will be investigated to further increase the safety margins in case of earthquake;
– in 10EVA13 the possibilities to strengthen the off-site power supply will be investigated. This could implicitly increase the margins in case of LOOP as it would decrease the dependency on the (primary) emergency generators and the SBO generators;
– develop a set of Extensive Damage Management Guides (EDMG) and implement training program;
– develop check-lists for plant walk-downs and needed actions after various levels of the foreseeable hazards;
– Modification in process to install a seismic monitoring instrumentation in the plant, as reported in country session.

2.1.2.5 Measures (including further studies) already decided or implemented by operators and/or required for follow-up by regulators

The regulator endorses the measures considered by the licensee. Additionally a SMA or a Seismic-PSA is envisaged.

2.1.3 Peer review conclusions and recommendations specific to this area

During the Topical meeting questions were asked to the Dutch regulator in order to clarify and compare the approach used for design basis and margins for earthquakes at the Borssele NPP and the Belgium NPP at Doel. Reason for this is the relative short distance between both sites (about 40 km). Additional information has been given and discussed during the country visit and no significant differences appear to be in the seismic assessments already performed.
Reviewers suggest to consider updating the hazard assessment for Borssele NPP. It is understood that a comprehensive and state of the art seismic analysis will be performed as part of the PSR of the Borssele NPP starting this year. During the country visit it was also explained that this analysis will consider a PGA value of 0.1g at free field for the DBE, as per IAEA guidance.
Moreover, the reviewers recommend to follow-up the mentioned analysis for verifying its global scope and adequate performance, in particular concerning the revision of the DBE level.
The combination of young unconsolidated sediments; grain size effects; and high water tables are expected to make the site susceptible for liquefaction. It is therefore recommended that the national regulator should consider assessing the liquefaction problem in connection with the ongoing seismic analyses.

2.2 Description of present situation of plants in country with respect to flood

2.2.1 DBF

2.2.1.1 Regulatory basis for safety assessment and regulatory oversight (national requirements, international standards, licensing basis already used by another country,…)

The regulator states that there are no specific requirements for the NPP regarding Design Basis Flooding (DBF).
During the country visit the regulator stated the following with respect to the general flooding policy of the country:
– The Netherlands is protected by a system of levees, dams and dunes. They all have to fulfill strict and legal safety standards that specify the hydraulic conditions that they have to be able to withstand. They legal standards vary from conditions that occur each year with a chance of 1/10,000 for the coastal regions in Holland to 1/250 per year along the Meuse in the province of Limburg.

- The design and maintenance of most of the dykes is the responsibility of the regional water boards (waterschappen) and the Dutch National Water Authority (RWS). Once every 6 year a general safety assessment has to be performed and a report of the state of the national levee system is sent to the parliament.
- For the levee at the site of the plant a safety standard of 4000 year return period has been specified. At this moment the levee does not comply with this standards and a reinforcement of the levees at the plant is starting within the coming months. The reinforcements will include margins in order to guarantee the legal safety standard also in the future. Therefore, the actual protection provided by the levee after the reinforcement should be higher (against events with a return period of 10,000 years).

2.2.1.2 Derivation of DBF

The original design basis for Borssele NPP was 5 meters above NAP (Normal Amsterdam Water Level) - Maximum value known: 4,7m +NAP, February 1953. Currently, the DBF is 7,3m above NAP including dynamic wave height. The new DBF is based on reassessments and modifications implemented. Within this concept all systems essential for operating the plant and all installed (safety) systems for safe shutdown stay available up to at least the level of 5 meters +NAP

2.2.1.3 Main requirements applied to this specific area

In the Netherlands, flooding is a relevant external hazard to be assessed regarding the site of any (industrial) activity. Nevertheless a value for DBF is not explicitly required by Dutch regulator.
The Water Act ('Waterwet') replaces former acts on water management, like the Flood DefensesAct and Public Works Act, both of which were important for the implementation of the governmental policy on flood risk.

2.2.1.4 Technical background for requirement, safety assessment and regulatory oversight (Deterministic approach, PSA, Operational Experience Feedback)

Basically, a deterministic approach had been used for the evaluation of the design basis flood.
The DBF considers the high tide water level with a return period of one million years. For the static effect of the flooding, the dykes of the national dykes network are not considered. The dykes are only considered for dynamic effects such as effects of the waves against the buildings. This combination leads to a level of 7.3 meters + NAP.
However, in the current situation, the site is also protected against flooding by the network of dykes in Zeeland. This network will be improved to comply with the legal requirements of 4000 year return period. The reinforcements will include margins in order to guarantee the legal safety standard also in the future. Therefore, the protection provided by the levee after the reinforcement should be higher (against events with a return period of 10,000 years).

2.2.1.5 Periodic safety reviews (regularly and/or recently reviewed)

Information on the PSRs is contained in the National Report and is summarized in section 2.1.1.5. The next PSR report will be submitted in 2013 and will contain a new comprehensive risk analysis.

2.2.1.6 Conclusions on adequacy of design basis

With regard to SSCs and external flooding the current design basis is adequate with the present situation. The regulatory body has the opinion that the impact of floods with long return periods (ten thousand years or more) is not known in much detail yet and that further assessments is necessary.

2.2.1.7 Compliance of plant(s) with current requirements for design basis

PRSs, including the assessment for DBF, are conducted every ten years to assure that current requirements are fulfilled, modifications made if necessary. A surveillance programme is put in place to ensure DBF levels.

No deviations from the current licensing basis are identified.

2.2.2 Assessment of robustness of plants beyond the design basis

2.2.2.1 Approach used for safety margins assessment

Regarding safety margin, the plant vulnerability (buildings, systems) is assessed at different flood levels. The details of the method are not described in the national report.

2.2.2.2 Main results on safety margins and cliff edge effects

In the low high-water concept (5 m + NAP) of licensee, the weakest link is the cooling water inlet building which is designed against a static water level of 5 m + NAP, but which is water tight to 7.4 m + NAP. However, a possible margin could exist, even when taking wave and run-up effects into account.
Water level reaching the 6.7 m + NAP floor of building 04, 05 and 10 will endanger the electrical power supply from Emergency Grid 1. However, most of the 6 kV / 0.4 kV transformers, including the transformer feeding bus bar CU of Emergency Grid 1 are located in building 05 at the 6.7 m + NAP floor. The air intakes of the cooling of these transformers (via natural convection) are openings in the wall of building 05 at 5 m+ NAP. This means that these transformers are subject to the dynamic water level as is present outside the buildings. This does not apply to the transformer feeding bus bar CV which is fed by bus bar BV; all these components are located in building 10 and are thus not subject to a dynamic water level. As a consequence, this part of Emergency Grid 1 is available up to a static level of 6.7 m+ NAP.
At this level the availability of the main control room is not guaranteed. But its functionality is to be expected because of the availability of (part of) Emergency Grid 1, rectifiers, batteries and the dispatcher (till at least 8.0 m +NAP).
If the water level reaches the 7.3 m + NAP the flooding is covered by the Bunker Concept. The availability of the main control room is not guaranteed. However, its functionality is to be expected because of the availability of (part of) Emergency Grid 1, rectifiers, batteries and the dispatcher. (Emergency) communication to outside parties must be assumed to be lost as no specific protection of the external communication lines against wide-spread flooding is foreseen.
Exceeding the DBF of 7.3 m + NAP by 1.25 meter will potentially lead to core damage.
Accessibility of personnel and means of communication in extreme external conditions has been assessed.
Loss of several electrical rails and main control room will be endangered by the flooding above 6,7m.

2.2.2.3 Strong safety features and areas for safety improvement identified in the process

Presumed a failure of dyke and flooding in extreme weather conditions, LOOP must be anticipated, accessibility to site and communication endangered or lost.
Regarding structural measures, wave protection beneath the entrances to the bunkered backup injection- and feed water systems and to the bunkered emergency control room would mitigate the sensitivity to large waves combined with extreme high water and would make the plant less dependent from the dyke.
Failure mechanisms of dykes (three dykes surrounding the site) will be included in the risk analysis of the ongoing PSR.

2.2.2.4 Possible measures to increase robustness

To improve plant robustness during actual flooding situations, the following measures are proposed by the licensee:
- establishment of the set of EDMG and implementation of a training program. Examples of the issues to be addressed are:
- procedures to staff the Emergency Control Room (ECR)
- use of autonomous mobile pumps
- procedure to transport own personnel to the site

- procedure for the employment of personnel for long term staffing
- an Emergency Response Centre facility that could give shelter to the alarm response organisation after flooding (and all foreseeable hazards) would increase the options of the alarm response organisation;
- storage facilities for portable equipment, tools and materials needed by the alarm response organisation that are accessible after flooding (and all foreseeable hazards) would increase the options of the alarm response organisation;
- establishing independent voice and data communication under adverse conditions, both onsite and off-site, would strengthen the emergency response organisation;
- improvement of plant autonomy during and after an external flooding, for example by establishing the ability to transfer diesel fuel from storage tanks of inactive diesels towards active diesel generators would increase the margin in case of LOOP.
- Wave protection beneath entrances bunker
- Adjustment flood resistance buildings containing emergency supply

2.2.2.5 Measures (including further studies) already decided or implemented by operators and/or required for follow-up by regulators

The protective dykes around the site are regularly inspected, and the sea dyke A of 9,4 m + NAP will be improved in 2012.
Development of an Operating procedure for flooding has been initiated.
Regulator endorses measures proposed by the licensee in section 2.2.2.4.
Regulator considers the impact of floods with long return period must be further assessed. Additional study on extreme flooding with long term period including dyke failure mechanisms is envisaged.

2.2.3 Peer review conclusions and recommendations specific to this area

The main protection against flooding is ensured by Water Act.
Provisions against flooding are in place, e.g. an operating procedure in case of threatening flooding at sea water level + 3,05 m + NAP.
The design basis originated from the highest measured sea water level (4.7 m +NAP). This is updated by extrapolation of high tide total exceedance frequency charts with the addition of several factors (e.g wave height). This has led to a DBF of 7.3 m +NAP. DBF in particular will be regularly checked in PSRs every ten years. Provisions will be conducted if necessary. A surveillance program for ensuring the design levels has been established.
Licensee has identified relevant improvements in order to increase plant robustness against flooding. In 2013 the Borssele NPP will perform a new assessment of the DBF in the frame of the PSR.
However, considering the very specific approach of the Netherlands for the flooding protection of the site, which relies on the national dyke system, the reviewers recommend to examine thoroughly the consistency of this approach with the new IAEA guidance (SSG-18), i.e.:
"A nuclear power plant should be protected against the design basis flood by one of the following approaches:
(a) The 'dry site' concept (…)
(b) Permanent external barriers such as levees, sea walls and bulkheads (…) Care should also be taken that periodic inspections, monitoring and maintenance of the external barriers are conducted, even if such barriers are not under the responsibility of the plant operating organization. (…)
For both approaches, as a redundant measure against flooding of the site, the protection of the plant against extreme hydrological phenomena should be augmented by waterproofing and by the appropriate design of all items necessary to ensure the fundamental safety functions in all plant states. All other structures, systems and components important to safety should be protected against the effects of a design basis flood."

2.3 Description of present situation of plants in country with respect to extreme weather

2.3.1 DB Extreme Weather

2.3.1.1 Regulatory basis for safety assessment and regulatory oversight (national requirements, international standards, licensing basis already used by another country,…)

Regulatory requirements are not described in the national report. Design basis mainly originated from civil engineering codes and climate models.

2.3.1.2 Derivation of extreme weather loads

The phenomena considered are:
- maximum and minimum water temperature
- extremely high and low air temperature (no design basis specified)
- extremely high winds (incl. tornados, storms)
- wind missiles and hail
- formation of ice
- heavy rain and snow
- lightning (based on KTA standards)
- credible combinations of the phenomena

The report discusses very briefly the impact of external phenomena on SSCs. Data collection for extreme weather conditions in order to verify the design basis varies around 30 to 60 years, as reported in country session.
Water temperature values have reference to observations. However, the period of observation is not given.

2.3.1.3 Main requirements applied to this specific area

Extreme values allowable for different parameters are not specified as design basis. In the case of lightning the requirements are as established in KTA standards.

2.3.1.4 Technical background for requirement, safety assessment and regulatory oversight (Deterministic approach, PSA, Operational Experience Feedback)

Safety assessment is performed mainly by applying criteria for civil engineering codes and engineering judgment.
The design load of buildings is higher than the design wind load. The maximum expected wind speed is sufficiently covered by the design explosion pressure wave.
Wind missiles and hail is covered by the resistance against a small airplane crash since the design-basis airplane crash.
Credible combinations of extreme weather conditions have been considered and no significant deficiencies have been identified.
Effects from accidents from nearby industrial facilities have been studied.

2.3.1.5 Periodic safety reviews (regularly and/or recently reviewed)

General information on the PSRs is summarized in section 2.1.1.5. A more thorough analysis of the expected frequency of weather conditions considered is ongoing in the current PSR. Concerning the effects of a super storm having a return period of one million years on the site, a study will be carried out in 2012.

2.3.1.6 Conclusions on adequacy of design basis

It can be concluded that there are no flaws in the protection, although there is some room for improvement. These possible improvements are discussed in the evaluation of the safety margins.

2.3.1.7 Compliance of plant(s) with current requirements for design basis

PSRs are performed every ten years to assure that requirements are fulfilled. In general, the degree of resistance against external influences that is required is defined so that the probability of an accident with serious consequences caused by external weather influences is small compared to the risk of serious accidents by causes within the plant.

2.3.2 Assessment of robustness of plants beyond the design basis

2.3.2.1 Approach used for safety margins assessment

Safety margins are considered for water and air temperatures, wind, ice formation, rainfall, snowfall and lightning. Maximum allowable loads and foreseeable weather conditions have been compared.

2.3.2.2 Main results on safety margins and cliff edge effects

Margins exist, but they have not always been quantified in detail. No cliff-edges are identified.

2.3.2.3 Strong safety features and areas for safety improvement identified in the process

– Study of minimum depth of underground piping required for proper protection against freezing
– Possibility to operate diesel generators at extremely low temperatures.
– Potential effect of wind transported snow on roofs.

2.3.2.4 Possible measures to increase robustness

Measures identified by licensees: checklists for walk-downs during/after extreme weather conditions.

2.3.2.5 Measures (including further studies) already decided or implemented by operators and/or required for follow-up by regulators

The regulatory body endorses licensee's proposal, however evaluation of its effectiveness is needed before implementation.
Heavy rain does not pose extreme challenges to the plant. A special case is the accumulation of water resulting from fire-fighting activities if drain pipes are blocked. It is considered that the possible consequences of this needs to be studied.
Further recommended topics that should be considered for additional studies are: the minimum depth of underground piping required for proper protection against freezing, possibility to operate diesel generators at extremely low temperatures and the potential effect of accumulation of wind transported snow on roofs.

2.3.3 Peer review conclusions and recommendations specific to this area

The relevant phenomena of extreme weather conditions are considered, but information available on the assessment is limited. However, more information was provided during the country visit.
The regulatory position is appreciated to do additional studies on freezing underground piping, operating of diesels under extreme low temperatures, potential effects of wind transported snow on roofs and effects of accumulation of firewater. The reviewers have also noticed the study to be carried out about super storms with a very long return period.

3 PLANT(S) ASSESSMENT RELATIVE TO LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

3.1 Description of present situation of plants in country

3.1.1 Regulatory basis for safety assessment and regulatory oversight (national requirements, international standards, licensing basis already used by another country, ,…)

The regulatory basis is not described in the National Report. During the peer review it was explained that the Dutch Safety Rules (including those for LOOP, UHS and SBO) to a large extent are based on the IAEA-system, with adaptions including the implementation of the WENRA reference levels. The country has a small scale nuclear program with one NPP. It has therefore implemented the Dutch Safety Rules mainly by attaching them directly to the license as a requirement. Well known standards such as KTA are used by utility, after endorsement by the regulator.

3.1.2 Main requirement applied to this specific area

Description of specific requirements relevant to LOOP, SBO or loss of UHS is not provided in the National Report of the country. During the country visit, more details were given by the Dutch Regulator.
Main requirements applied to this area are based on corresponding IAEA safety standards (adapted to the Dutch situation), including WENRA Reference Levels. In particular, the following documents apply: NVR NS-R-1 (design safety), NVR NS-G-1.8 (emergency power systems), NVR NS-G-1.9 (reactor coolant system and associated systems), NVR NS-G-1.10 (containment systems). In some cases, additional standards are imposed, such as KTA3701 for electrical power supply in NPPs.

3.1.3 Technical background for requirement, safety assessment and regulatory oversight (Deterministic approach, PSA, Operational Experience Feedback)

Safety assessment of NPPs of the country involves deterministic as well as probabilistic (probabilistic safety analysis – PSA) studies. PSA is used in the country to evaluate whether a nuclear installation meets the established risk criteria (which is not nuclear specific), to identify improvements areas and to optimize operations at the plant. This is a living process and PSA is updated yearly. Plant modifications and updated failure data are included in this continuous process.
The country explained during the peer review that the “stress tests” assessments were done by the utility, and mainly in an analytical (deterministic) way with support from other organisations. The regulatory authority together with its technical support organisations assessed the information presented by the utility and provided its conclusions.

3.1.4 Periodic safety reviews (regularly and/or recently reviewed)

Information on the PSRs is contained in the National Report (section 7.1) and is summarized in section 2.1.1.5.
During the peer review, the country explained that PSRs played a significant role in the enhancement of the safety capabilities of Borssele NPP. During previous PSRs deviations from international regulation and practice were indentified and based on that very serious improvements were implemented, especially linked to external hazards impacts, to LOOP, SBO and loss of UHS. By this the safety concept of the plant was improved and adapted to the latest German design (Konvoi) resulting in a safety level far better than the original design. Two of the most significant improvements were performed in line with PSR results: introduction of the “bunker concept” and back fitting of an alternate UHS.
It is reported, that the coming periodic safety study will cover the investigation of possibilities to strengthen off-site power supply.

3.1.5 Compliance of plants with current requirements

The National Report indicates that, based on decades of regulatory oversight, compliance of the plant with its license has been established. The regulatory review of the utility report on the "stress test" has not raised compliance issues and has confirmed this position.

3.2 Assessment of robustness of plants

3.2.1 Approach used for safety margins assessment

The country analysed various possibilities to obtain power supply for the site, as well as possibilities to ensure cooling of reactor core and the spent nuclear fuel for scenarios specified by ENSREG. Possible power sources and heat sinks were taken into account, including non-conventional means like mobile equipment. All possibilities were evaluated and time constraints on the implementation of corresponding measures to supply power and (or) cooling were determined. Finally, the autonomy or capacity of the lines of defence were assessed.

3.2.2 Main results on safety margins and cliff edge effects

3.2.2.1 Power supply features

The country reports about various possibilities to supply power for on-site needs. There are several means for on-site power supply:

- Connection to the 150 kV power grid;
- 10 kV connection to the domestic grid;
- 6 kV connection to the neighbouring coal fired power station;
- Diverse two-level emergency power supply grids with three and two diesel generators respectively (called NS1 and NS2);
- NPP operation in "house-load" regime (with a 81% success rate from experience feedback);
- Uninterrupted power supply system (batteries);
- Possibility to supply power from coal fired plant emergency diesel generators(EDG);
- On-site mobile EDG.

3.2.2.2 Heat sink features

The primary UHS for Borssele NPP is water of River Westerschelde. It supplies the main cooling water system and the conventional and emergency cooling water system. The country reports availability of alternative UHSs:

- eight deep-water wells supplying the backup cooling water system for reactor cooling (at least 13h after shutdown form full power) and/or fuel pool;
- the atmosphere, in case of steam dumping via the main steam relief valves;

In addition, low pressure fire water system and fire trucks, demineralised water distribution system, and public water supply system are different sources of water that can be used after establishing special connections or plant alignment.

3.2.2.3 Loss of off-site power (LOOP)

LOOP is within the design basis of the plant. The National Report presents an analysis of various possible situations, indicates preventive features, estimates availability of features and proposes measures for extension and recovery of Alternating Current (AC) power supply. The reported time for start up of EDGs NS1 (belonging to emergency power supply) in case of LOOP is 2 seconds, and full power is reached in 10 seconds. Two of the NS1 EDGs have their own fuel stock for at least 72 hour of operation. The third NS1 diesel generator, separate from the others and serving as back-up, has enough fuel to last for 25 hours. NS 2 will be activated if NS 1 is not available. NS 2 has two separated EDG's each of which is capable to support systems for safe shutdown (see also National Report, section 5.1.1.1).

The coal fired power plant (considered as a non-safety grade on-site AC provider) can immediately supply power if it is in operation. Power from diesel generators of the coal fired power plant can be supplied in 30 minutes. Runtime of the coal fired plant diesel generator is 9 hours. A 1 MW mobile diesel generator is available on the site, but it is stored in a container and needs to be transported over the site using external resources in case of an emergency (a truck is needed to place the DG near the NS2 diesels). The time estimated for on-site transportation is 2 hours, and the time needed for connection is 4 hours. The possibility of delivering an off-site additional diesel generator in 8 hours was also reported. According to the ENSREG specifications, the site remains isolated from delivery of light material for 24 hours, and no credit can be given to mobile generators (on-site or external) for the management of the situation.
The maximum running time of a particular EDG can be extended by using available fuel stocks from several tanks. The minimum amount of available diesel fuel in the stock on-site is reported to be 245 m^3, which is enough to feed one EDG for up to 1300 hours. However, this would require diesel fuel transfer whereas there are no dedicated hardware provisions and procedures available to support the required fuel transfers. According to the National report this situation will be improved to ensure and improve the autonomy of the EDGs.
The batteries for uninterrupted AC power supply (for motor driven pumps and valves) are reported to be available for up to 2.8 hours. There is the possibility to prolong the availability of the batteries up to 5.7 hours, but in that case the turbine will be damaged due to inoperability of the oil pump (possible enhancement of the battery capacity is being considered).
An assessment of the impact of external hazards is also performed. It is stated that emergency grid NS2 together with its two EDGs is well protected from flooding, earthquakes and explosions. However, the mobile diesel generator could not be available in case of flooding (measures for improvement are currently under consideration).
Numerous options are available to cope with a LOOP scenario for a period of at least 72 hours without any external support.

3.2.2.3 Station blackout (SBO)

- **SBO-1 with loss of the normal back-up AC power sources**

In this case, the first-level emergency grid (NS1) is lost. Power supply can then be provided by the redundant and diverse second-level (NS2) emergency grid, which has its own 2 EDGs. Fuel is ensured for 72 hours. This time can be prolonged up to 1300 hours using on site fuel stocks. However, hardware provisions and operational procedures for the usage of additional diesel stocks are not available and will be developed according to the improvements reported. Other options can be power supply from neighbouring coal fired power station, existing mobile generator, and from batteries. AC power can be supplied for up to 5.7 hours. However, no credit can be given for on-site mobile diesel generator given the ENSREG assumptions (see previous paragraph).
The NS2 EDGs provide an adequate response to the SBO-1 scenario for a 72 hour period without any external support. Hardware provisions and procedures will as one of the improvement measures of the stresstest be developed to support operators for on-site fuel transfer operations.

- **SBO-2 with loss of permanently installed normal and diverse back-up AC power sources**

The country describes this situation as the loss of all AC power sources – the emergency grid, connection to coal fired power plant and diesel generators. The only power sources in such situation are the batteries. The discharge time of the 220 V batteries for uninterrupted AC power is more than 2 hours, but can be extended to up to 5.7 hours, following certain procedures (battery load reduction). The possibilities to obtain additional AC power sources are under consideration. Batteries can be recharged when AC power (normal or emergency grid 1) is restored. Recharging takes 8 hours.
Critical time constrains (cliff-edge effect) such as times to core damage are not presented because the situation is bounded by loss of UHS together with SBO.

3.2.2.4. Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

The country gives an analysis of various situations linked to the loss of UHS, and their consequences on reactor cooling as well as cooling of the spent nuclear fuel pool. It is mentioned that the loss of primary UHS is within the design basis of Borssele NPP, and no additional means are needed. Nevertheless, cooling of the spent nuclear fuel pool may need alternative means, which are described in the report. Core cooling is ensured by supplying the steam generators with water from various stocks (main and auxiliary feed water system, demineralised water system, back up feed water system) for about 75 hours. Steam is released via the steam valves. When "decay heat removal" conditions are met, a cooling line can be established using the conventional and emergency cooling system water fed by the low pressure fire system. Another option available after 13 hours is the backup cooling system (protected against external hazards) supplied by the 8 deep-water wells. This latter option provides an unlimited water resource. As for the spent fuel pools, several options are available to provide cooling for the long term (backup cooling system, low pressure fire system).
Several options are available to provide cooling to the core and the spent fuel pools for more than 72 hours without any external support.
In case of the loss of both primary and alternative UHS, cooling may be provided using water stocks in the reservoirs available at the plant. The cool down operational phase is dealt with using the same option as for the loss of primary ultimate heat sink scenario. The cooling line using the conventional and emergency cooling system water fed by the low pressure fire system (UJ) is established to remove heat from the core once the residual heat removal state is met. The UJ system has its own tank providing cooling for about 7 hours. Replenishment is then initiated via the public water supply system or a fire truck (taking suction from various ponds or river).
For the spent fuel pools, the same option is implemented (UJ system) to ensure cooling of the fuel.
The country concludes that characteristic time periods in case of loss of primary and alternative UHS depend on the following available options:
- the reactor cool down phase can be extended for more than 14 days by applying all available on-site water stocks;
- the decay heat removal phase only relies on the fire extinguishing system or fire truck supply, which will last 10 hours and 13 hours respectively (relying on on-site stocks) when decay heat removal starts three hours after reactor shut down, and 11 hours and 16 hours respectively when decay heat removal starts 13 hours after reactor shut down;
- the spent fuel pool cooling can be extended for more than 14 days when evaporation is accepted. With replenishment from the public water system or the river Westerschelde, cooling can be sustained for an unlimited time, assuming that sufficient power sources are available.

The loss of the primary and alternate UHSs is a beyond design basis scenario. It can be controlled in the long term by supplying the UJ system with water from the public system or fire truck. The robustness and reliability of fire protection system (UJ) should be proven and improved where necessary, as it was requested by regulatory authority.
As a general conclusion, the plant can manage this situation for at least 72 hours without any external support.

3.2.2.5. Loss of UHS & SBO

Two scenarios are analysed in this part:
- the loss of the primary heat sink and SBO-1 (loss of ordinary emergency diesel generators NS1);
- the loss of the primary heat sink and total SBO (NS1 and NS2 unavailable).

In the first scenario, no cooling problem will occur due to the availability of the NS2 emergency grid (EDGs) and alternative UHS means (deep water wells).
In the second scenario, all options using electrical systems are unavailable. The steam turbine driven pump can be operated and secondary feed and bleed can be operated for about 3 hours until the water reserve of the main and auxiliary feedwater system are exhausted. After this short period, the low pressure fire system (UJ) can supply water for about 8 hours using its own fuel stocks. Replenishment of the UJ tank is needed after about 10 hours (public water supply or fire truck).
The "decay heat removal" operational states have not been reported in the National report. It is stated that if no option is available for cooling the core in the most critical case, damage to the fuel would occur in a matter of hours (6 hours is the figure provided during the peer review). Further information

is found in the Licensee Report on page Chapter 5-17. It describes as a bounding critical case the operational state "primary loops not completely filled" (mid-loop). In case of loss of all AC power (including SBO EDGs) and without operator actions, boiling in the open primary circuit will occur after 15 minutes. Core uncovery could be delayed until about 43 hours if required local operator actions to open manual valves – including inside the containment – are performed in a short time. The establishment of an operating procedure and associated training is announced in the Licensee Report. During the peer review it was established that the concept and the elaboration of the corresponding procedure is still under study and that hardware solutions could also be considered.
If the reactor is assumed to have been stopped during operation and primary and secondary feed and bleed systems are available, time till core uncovery is about 12 hours.
The situation of cooling of spent nuclear fuel pool is analysed as well. It is concluded that in case of the loss of all AC power the cooling can be performed only by evaporation. The water inventory in the pool allows a grace period of at least 80 hours before damage to the fuel occurs.
It should be concluded that:

- there is a high reliance on the UJ system for providing cooling in some scenario's, and improving its robustness will be aimed at according to the National Report;
- the fuel supply for its diesel driven pump is a cliff edge effect, and this should be procedurised; one of the improvement measures in the National Report copes with this issue (see 3.2.5)
- the capabilities to cope with SBO situations during mid-loop operation should be developed and formalised.

improvement should be envisaged to make the existing site mobile diesel generator available, providing an option to retrieve AC power and to control the situation (in the National Report measure M5 is intended to reduce connection time, see 3.2.5.; to improve the availability during a flooding situation is an action from the World Association of Nuclear Operators(WANO)inspection).

3.2.3 Strong safety features and areas for safety improvement identified in the process

As strong safety features can be mentioned: the redundancy of power supply (NS1 and NS2 EDGs), and the coal fired power station nearby with its own diesel generators and linked to the NPP. Another strong point is the fully qualified alternate UHS consisting of 8 deep water wells. It should be noted as good practice to use risk monitor for planning maintenance during operation and outages.
In a number of SBO and loss of UHS scenarios, the plant relies strongly on the low pressure fire system (UJ) to supply makeup and/or cooling water. It has been required that the robustness of this system will be improved (see 3.2.5). An identified weakness is that the on-site mobile diesel generator needs external support to be transported to the connection point. Given the ENSREG assumptions, the mobile generator would not be available in the first 24h or even 72h. According to the National Report an improvement of this situation will be sought in order to reduce connection time to 2 hours (see also 3.2.5).

3.2.4 Possible measures to increase robustness

The utility proposed a number of various additional measures to improve the robustness of the Borssele NPP related to scenarios loss of power and loss of UHS. These measures have been endorsed by the regulatory authority. The measures considered to enhance the robustness of the plant are specified in section 3.2.5 below.

3.2.5 Measures (including further studies) already decided or implemented by operators and/or required for follow-up by regulators

The following proposals for improvement of the Borssele NPP capabilities during LOOP, SBO and loss of UHS events are reported and presented during the peer review:

- Increase the robustness by an extra grid connection to the nearby 400kV grid;
- Enhance possibilities to transfer diesel fuel to various locations;

- Reduce connection time of the mobile Emergency Diesel Generator(s);
- Introduce Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines for safety such as coal fired plant connections to Emergency Grid 1, direct injection of fire fighting water into the alternative deep-well pumps system;
- Enhance the use of steam to power Emergency Feed Water System in case of total loss of electrical power (in case of loss of Emergency grids 1 and 2);
- Perform training on the procedures (which are still to be developed) and actions during mid-loop operations in case of total loss of electrical power (loss of Emergency grids 1 and 2);
- Implement additional reserve spent fuel cooling system;
- Envisage potential actions to prevent running out of on-site diesel supply for fire extinguishing system and the fire brigade.

The regulatory authority endorses the actions proposed by the utility. In addition some other measures were required:

- Assessment of the design classification and testing of Structures, Systems and Components handling severe accidents;
- Increase the amount of lubrication oil in stock;
- Analyses of the highest core temperatures during the cooling statutes;
- Assessment of the cooling possibilities in the case of loss of the main Grid, Emergency Grids 1 and 2 and no secondary bleed and feed available;
- Test severe accident measures to restore power from various possibilities like mobile diesel generators and connections to the coal fired plant;
- Increase the robustness of the fire fighting system.

3.3 Peer review conclusions and recommendations specific to this area

The National Report indicates that comprehensive complimentary safety analysis is done by the utility for Borssele NPP, and that measures are proposed to increase the safety capabilities in case of LOOP, SBO, and loss of UHS (without external support). This has been evaluated by the regulatory authority. The assessment of the regulatory authority was adequately independent and robust, although the further assessment is going on.

The country assured that structures, systems and components relevant to LOOP and SBO, loss of UHS (without external support) are under adequate supervision of the utility, and are one of the subjects of regulatory inspections. The “stress tests” results will be further analysed and lead to additional inspections.

The country explained some measures (for example linked to availability of deep wells), decided by the utility immediately after events in Fukushima Daichi NPP.

The capabilities to cope with SBO situations during mid-loop operation should be developed and corresponding procedures should be prepared and validated. Due to the short times available for manual intervention and the worsening accessibility of the containment after the start of water boiling in the open primary circuit, the possibility to use remotely controlled valves allowing for primary system water make-up in case of SBO during mid-loop operation should also be investigated.

The time necessary to get the on-site mobile diesel generator operational will be improved in order to provide in a timely manner a last resort to retrieve AC power under a total SBO scenario.

Possibilities to increase the robustness of back-up power supply from mobile means, as well as from small portable equipment, should be further investigated considering external support.

The country reported about a plan for the implementation of modifications and other measures for further improvement of safety capabilities, which shall be prepared by the utility taking into account results of “stress tests” and peer review. This is going to be discussed and endorsed by the regulatory authority.

4 PLANT(S) ASSESSMENT RELATIVE TO SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT

4.1 Description of present situation of plants in Country

4.1.1 Regulatory basis for safety assessment and regulatory oversight (national requirements, international standards, licensing basis already used by another country, ,…)

The Dutch Nuclear Energy Act sets the framework for nuclear safety management. Beneath this, "Decrees" provide for additional regulations, including provisions for licensing and requirements for risk assessments, and specifically those for managing severe accidents.

The regulator can also issue "Nuclear Safety Rules" (NVRs) – the third tier in the regulatory framework. These have allowed the regulator to attach international safety standards to the licence, including the WENRA Reference Levels (RLs) and IAEA Safety Requirements and Guides (47 are attached at present). The safety standards attached include "Severe Accident Management Programmes for NPPs" (NS-G-2.15).

Basic requirements for emergency preparedness are provided for in the operating licence; this includes requirements to conduct emergency exercises.

In principle, the approach adopted in the Netherlands enables regulation in accordance with current international practice, and to be flexible in adopting further requirements if this changes. The regulatory body agrees with this view and states that it considers the totality of the Dutch legal framework gives it adequate powers to require any SAM measures it deems necessary, the main instrument being through the operating licence.

4.1.2 Main requirements applied to this specific area

The Decrees include specific requirements for numerical risk. These are general requirements that apply to all industrial activities in the Netherlands. From this, risks need to be less than: 10^{-6} per year for individual risk (mortality) as a consequence of operating an installation; 10^{-5} per year for societal risks, i.e. risks directly attributable to events leading to 10 or more fatalities. Supplementary criteria are also applied, requiring a hundredfold reduction in this limit for each tenfold increase in the predicted number of fatalities.

As already noted, aspects such as the WENRA RLs and IAEA safety standards are provided for under the licence. This process ensures that the requirements imposed will align with wider international practice. In regard to severe accident management, the content of the national report suggests this coverage is adequate.

4.1.3 Technical background for requirement, safety assessment and regulatory oversight (Deterministic approach, PSA, Operational Experience Feedback)

The licensee has conducted Level 1, 2 and 3 PSAs, which include external hazard initiators. The Level 3 PSA (which utilises the COSYMA computer program) results in estimated risk levels compliant with the regulatory criteria outlined above. These are "living" PSAs, i.e. they are updated yearly.

Early, late, and very late release frequencies over all operational states are calculated in the Netherlands. Large release frequencies are not calculated and so used in the licensing basis. Instead the risk levels mentioned above (including individual and societal risks) are included in the licence process.

The calculated total core damage frequency, over all power states, has been calculated as 2.12×10^{-6}/yr. This includes an early release core damage frequency value of 2.34×10^{-8} /yr (1.1% of total).

Twin strategies are applied to manage a severe accident. Firstly for in-vessel retention and then, if this fails, for corium retention within the containment. The licensee is currently reviewing international research to better underpin these strategies.

SAMGs have been in operation at Borssele since 2000 as an outcome from the PSR at the plant in 1993. Their scope was expanded following the 2003 PSR to include shutdown conditions. The SAMGs are based on the generic SAMGs produced by the Westinghouse Owners Group and were considered state of the art in 2003. They are intended to address scenarios deriving from severe external hazards, such as earthquakes and floods, where there is the imminent potential for core melt.
The SAMGs include guidance for using the pressure relief valves and various pressuriser spray options to control the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure. For an ex-vessel event the containment (37,100m^3) has filtered venting, a spray system, air coolers, a filtered recirculation system and Passive Autocatalytic Re-combiners (PARs). The containment is designed for overpressures of 3.8bar; however, the design has no core catcher.

4.1.4 Periodic safety reviews (regularly and/or recently reviewed)

Information on the PSRs is contained in the National Report (section 7.1) and is summarised earlier in this report (section 2.1.1.5). All three previous PSRs have led to significant improvements in relation to the management of severe accidents. Notable improvements in this regard were implemented as follows:

1986: Introduction of the Bunker Concept with Station Blackout diesels, backup coolant make up (TW) and backup feed water (RS) systems

1997: Improvements to heat removal systems
New Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)
Filtered containment venting
Measures for hydrogen management (PARs) in core melt scenarios
Improved independence in safety systems
Introduction of SAMGs
Autonomy time for external design basis events increased to 24h and autarky time to 10h
Emergency control room and reactor protection systems included in bunker concept
Installation of primary bleed and feed valves (no high pressure core melt scenarios)
Installation of the alternative UHS system (VE)

2006: Increases in the autonomy time for design basis events to 72 hours
Further improvements in cooling and powering arrangements
Improvement in flood margins by moving EDG air intakes
New crash tender capable of dealing with large kerosene fires
Expansion of SAMGs to shutdown conditions

Autonomy time for external design basis events increased to 72h

In the 1990s, the regulatory body requested the licensee (EPZ) to implement an age management programme. This was done in order to prevent severe accidents by the control of physical degradation of safety systems, structures and components. This obligation was added to the licence conditions in 1995. A subsequent IAEA AMAT mission assessed the age management programme. Improvements have been made to the programme on the basis of the suggestions from the mission. Age management is extremely important in life time extension for the evaluation of degradation. As an example: new test coupons of the reactor material are exposed in the reactor to simulate neutron embrittlement after 60 years.

4.1.5 Compliance of plants with current requirements (national requirements, WENRA Reference Levels)

As already noted, the Dutch regulator has confirmed Borssele's ongoing compliance with its national licensing basis and other legal criteria. In addition and noted above, IAEA safety standards and the WENRA RLs are incorporated into the licensing basis as NVRs.
Specific compliance with WENRA has been confirmed in recent years as part of the WENRA Reactor Harmonization Working Group (RHWG) initiative by the regulator. However, as compliance to WENRA RLs was not in scope of the stress test, the detail and extent of this compliance was

discussed during the country visit. Nuclear Safety Department KFD confirmed compliance with the 2008 WENRA Reference Levels (RLs) during the review process and these have been incorporated into the NVRs.
During the peer review process KFD stated that upon issue of the license mid 2011 the licensee had to fully comply to all NVRs, except for the Design-series NVRs.For the latter NVRs, the licensee has to comply as much as reasonably possible. The justification for this position of the regulator is that the design of an older generation NPP cannot be considered in the same way as more modern NPPs. The level of compliance between existing NVRs and modern regulations will be identified as part of the 2013 PSR in 2013. Any deviations between the NVRs and the RLs will be identified and, under the PSR programme, a plan to achieve compliance in the period 2013 to 2017 will be developed. However, issues identified with a potential large safety impact will be addressed as soon as reasonably possible.

4.2 Assessment of robustness of plants

4.2.1 Adequacy of present organizations, operational and design provisions

4.2.1.1 Organization and arrangements of the licensee to manage accidents

IAEA GS-G-2.1, '*Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency'*, is attached to the site license as an NVR and is thus applicable for the Borssele NPP.
Borssele has standard arrangements for controlling the plant in the event of a severe accident. The Main Control Room (MCR) has a filtered air supply and, following a SBO event, compressed air and respirators are available. There is also an alternative Emergency Control Room (ECR, which is bunkered and has gas-tight doors, but which does not have a filtered air supply) for managing a controlled shutdown, core cooling and spent fuel pool cooling. Both the MCR and ECR have suitable and robust access to plant measurements needed to control a severe accident. Radiological analyses suggest both would remain habitable, even in an extreme severe event, though further confirmation of this has been requested by the regulator.
There are seven operations shift teams at Borssele, each managed by a shift supervisor and each composed of at least eight operators. It is the shift supervisor's responsibility to decide on the extent of the licensee's Emergency Response Organisation (ERO) that needs to be activated. Once the ERO is operational, the site emergency director takes over responsibility for the emergency. Based on data from exercises, the ERO will be set up within 45 mins (even outside normal working hours) and then requires a further 30 mins to become operational.
The ERO has a very similar structure to those in place in other nations participating in the stress tests exercise. The ERO supports plant operation in accident and severe accident conditions and combines an industrial safety and nuclear emergency organisation. The responsibilities of the ERO cover all the areas to be expected in the management of severe accidents. The ERO is a scalable organisation: the number of staff called in (by pagers, phone calls) will depend upon the scale of the emergency being addressed. The regulator is however concerned that there may not always be sufficient staff for the ERO in all circumstances, e.g. in long events, or where site access may be difficult, and so suggests two further shift teams may be needed. This is to be analysed further by the licensee.
The ERO will be located in the plant's Alarm Coordination Centre (ACC). This is a purpose-built facility designed for internal events and emergencies. Though bunkered (like the ECR), it is not designed to withstand severe events such as a major earthquake, flood or aircraft crash. The licensee has therefore proposed a new Emergency Response Centre (ERC) to provide a more robust shelter. In the meantime, the ERO will need to relocate, if the ACC becomes uninhabitable, to a standard meeting room. This will however entail losing much of the functionality (e.g. communications provisions) of the ACC. Interim measures are therefore envisaged to enhance the capability of some of the meeting rooms on site (though not to the same standards as the ERC will have), pending full ERC commissioning.
The licensee has no offsite facilities but other organisations have facilities that could be used to assist in an emergency some of which are mobile. Contractual arrangements are in place to facilitate this.

The ERO is responsible for liaising with the local and national (government) authorities. The arrangements here include provision for a liaison officer to be stationed with the local authorities during an accident to facilitate communications and technical understanding.
The emergency plan includes provision for technical advice in the event of an emergency. This includes access to a 'think tank' organised by the regulator and to the plant vendor's experts (AREVA's crisis staff based in Germany). Both these groups will have plant measurements available online and access to simulator outputs.
The regulatory inspection programme for Borssele, that encompasses the ERO, is based on IAEA GS-G-1.3 (*Regulatory Inspection of Nuclear Facilities and Enforcement by the Regulatory Body*). Regulatory inspections consider the following: Training of the ERO staff, Accident Management Handbook, Exercises by the ERO staff, Use of procedures of the ERO staff, Communication (internal and external), Procedures for accident management measures, Adequacy of source term estimation, Adequacy of radiological predictions.
Training and emergency exercises are conducted routinely and include change-over of ERO shifts. Scenarios are controlled using the plant's full scope simulator (located in Essen, Germany), though it is noted that this cannot simulate severe accidents. Emergency exercises can be very large scale, e.g. a recent national exercise involved 1000 people. The licensee produces an annual summary report of its exercises which is assessed by the regulator. The KFD participates in six emergency exercises annually. One or two KFD-inspectors are based at the ERO location to observe the exercise and to check if the correct measures are taken to restore safety functions.
Training for Technical Support Centre (TSC) staff requires them to be qualified to address seven specific scenarios and then complete refresher training in at least two of these in each subsequent year. Nevertheless, the regulator believes there is still scope for improvements in training, and specifically is seeking improved training in the SAMGs, focusing on circumstances of reduced accessibility to the site, reduced numbers of ERO staff, reduced availability of instrumentation, harsh conditions and long duration accidents.

4.2.1.2 Procedures and guidelines for accident management (Full power states, Low power and shutdown states)

The use and history of SAMGs at Borssele have been described in previous sections. As per the WENRA RLs, the SAMGs are entered if the EOPs have not been successful in protecting against the imminent possibility of, or an actual core melt; The SAMGs then provide guidance on the mitigation of consequences and on how to bring the plant back to a stable state. The EOPs are based on event- and symptom-based approaches developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). The SAMGs are also derived from the generic WOG approach; no particular difficulties have been encountered however from applying a Westinghouse-based approach to a KWU-designed plant.
The EOPs and SAMGs are wide-ranging and include coverage of shutdown states. The regulator is confident that their coverage is adequate and that the sets of EOPs and SAMGs complement one another. Sample SAMGs and records (and reports) of exercises using SAMGs were discussed during the review process.
The procedures are based on dose limits specific to severe accident management scenarios (500 mSv to save human life; 100 mSv to save important material interests; 100 mSv for other activities necessary for SAM). Human factors aspects have also been considered explicitly. The EOPs are reviewed every four years and on design changes; SAMGs are reviewed on design changes. The SAMGs and EOPs were verified and validated following an emergency exercise in 2000. KFD approved their validation in August 2001.
The licensee is currently in the process of developing a set of Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) to augment the SAMGs. This is an approach developed in the USA following the events of 11th September 2001. They address gross infrastructure problems deriving from a major incident, e.g. blocked roads, or doors no longer amenable for access. The EDMGs will be a 'living' collection of specific guidelines (~ 15 guidelines). Addition measures that may be identified in the stress tests and/or the 2013 PSR may require additional or updated guidelines. In 2012, the licensee will perform analyses of international examples and develop a Quality Assurance procedure for EDMGs. It is planned to draft the EDMGs in the period 2012-2013.

As noted above however, the regulator is seeking better training for applying the SAMGs. In addition, because the SAMGs were developed relatively early compared to other nations (in 1990s), they are based on the then-practice of making best use of existing equipment. The modern approach however is to utilise specific equipment designed for addressing severe accidents (e.g. PARs, filtered venting, bleed & feed strategies, extensive use of mobile pumps, additional power supplies) for SAM. The regulator is thus seeking improvements in the SAMGs so that Borssele's overall approach aligns with wider international good practice.
The Regulator wants the Licensee to study the world-wide post-Fukushima developments regarding SAMGs and improve on those in use where necessary.

4.2.1.3 Hardware provisions for severe accident management

Reactor hardware provisions at Borssele have been outlined briefly above. These include a steam-driven pump available to supply emergency feed during the first hours of a SBO event, measures for decreasing RPV pressures following a core melt using standard non-dedicated means (i.e. pressure relief valves and various pressuriser spray options) and measures for depressurising containment (filtered venting, the spray system, air coolers, a filtered recirculation system, PARs). The PARs have been designed for severe accident conditions.
The SAMGs assume a core melt-through will occur, so the strategy is based around RPV depressurization aimed at preventing high pressure melt ejection. This is needed since an analysis of the forces on the RPV showed these would be too high. Several power supply options are available to supply the systems needed for depressurising the RPV. In case of site flooding, batteries are installed at elevations safe from the floodwater to ensure these have adequate power supplies.
No explicit means of core vessel cooling is provided. The licensee has looked at the possibility of flooding the ex-vessel cavity in both 2000 and 2004. However, these analyses failed to identify any practical solutions. A key problem here is the narrowness of the cavity, which would mean high steam or hydrogen pressures. This position is to be reviewed at the next PSR. It is noted that such a measure has however not been installed anywhere yet on a KWU-designed Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), although it has been installed on other reactors of comparable power.
As noted above, the design has no core catcher. So the severe accident strategies, supported by calculations, rely on adequate corium cooling to ensure retention within the containment. Studies here are ongoing. In the analyses used for the SAMG strategies it is conservatively assumed that molten corium has a non-coolable configuration and will ultimately penetrate the basemat. Consequently containment pressure shall be reduced to prevent a high pressure melt-through the basemat. General opinion is, however, that the corium will spread and become coolable if not come to a stand-still, provided the basemat is thick enough. The SAMG strategies maintain efforts to submerge the corium.
In an extreme scenario, filtered venting could be used as a last resort to control containment pressures. The SAMGs envisage venting being carried before a 6.3bar over-pressure is reached (c.f. a design over-pressure of 3.8 bar). Manual operation of the filtered venting system is possible. Seismic qualification of the system is currently ongoing.
The containment venting system is kept inerted with nitrogen. The possibility of detonation/deflagration in the stack is currently dismissed because of the PARs.
The case of sub-atmospheric pressures in the containment has also been considered. A system that acts as a one-way pressure valve is installed that opens automatically on a measured high negative pressure difference. This valve can also be operated manually. The system consists of two trains of two motor operated valves. These valves are all controlled by signals from the engineered safety features activation system (ESFAS).The valves will open if a sub-atmospheric pressure of < 30 mbar is detected. They will then close if a sub-atmospheric pressure of < 10 mbar is detected. In this way they act like one-way valves. The valves are electrically feed by batteries. Two parallel trains cover the single failure criterion in the open direction. They are isolatable because there are two valves in sequence (safe against single failure in the closing direction).
In addition to venting, containment spraying can be used as an additional measure, though the system is primarily designed to wash-out radioactive products. The spray system contains boron; besides, the system allows the addition of other chemicals.

Following upgrades, the installed SAM instrumentation is designed to cope with LOCA conditions. This should be bounding in all respects except in regard to the radiation levels expected in an ex-vessel core melt scenario. Furthermore, a containment pressure sensor has been replaced by a type that can handle pressures above the containment design pressure, in order to allow the containment to be vented as per the SAMGs. All radiation and radioactive release instrumentation has been designed with high radiation scenarios in mind.

In the National Report it is stated that the regulator recognizes that in the Licensee Report, for the assessment of ENSREG-postulated scenarios, the licensee has given credit to SSCs that are not designed, classified or tested for their purpose in severe accident management. This is a common and acceptable approach for accident management past the design basis and for the purpose of the stress tests this is acceptable too. This conclusion was based on an evaluation performed in the process of implementing the Westinghouse Owners' Group generic SAMGs (*WENX 99-02 "Borssele Nuclear Power Plant Severe Accident Management Guidelines instrumentation report" rev. 2, December 1999).* Consistent with the SAMG philosophy, all available instrumentation may be used to obtain process information. The main instrumentation consists of the qualified post-accident instrumentation, which include some instrumentation installed for coremelt accidents. Nevertheless, validation of the data is mandatory in the SAMG decision process.

During the peer review country visit, the licensee reported that, containment instrumentation is required to function correctly in radiation fields of up to 10^3 Gy during normal operation and to ~ 10^5 Gy during accident conditions.

The regulator has recommended further studies to establish the validity of the assumptions made regarding the associated SSCs. The regulator has stated that further assurance is needed to provide adequate confidence that the SSCs in place to handle severe accidents will deliver their intended safety functions reliably. Improvements to SSC functional testing and operator training have therefore been requested.

A mobile diesel generator is available on-site and further mobile generators can be brought onto the site if there is the need. In addition there is potential to use the emergency diesels located at the coal-fired power station on the site. This will not be a conflict as the two plants have a common owner and the NPP will be given priority. The location of the on-site mobile generator is to be moved to reduce its vulnerability to flood events. In addition, further improvements are proposed to the engineered connection points and new connection points are envisaged, but further study is required.

There appears to be reasonable diversity in the means of supplying cooling capability, including several tenders (fire trucks) operated by the site's fire brigade (one of which is an aircraft crash tender).

The national report notes that providing storage facilities for portable equipment, tools and materials needed in an emergency that are accessible after all foreseeable hazards would increase the potential effectiveness of the emergency response organisation. These storage facilities are under investigation but as a temporary measure, it is planned to use existing locations in the reactor and ancillary buildings as they have seismic and flood protection. This may require expansion of the auxiliary building to create space. Additional offsite or mobile locations may be identified later.

The arrangements through which the operator ensures that the plant and equipment it has in place to address severe accidents remains in an appropriate working condition (e.g. routine inspections, maintenance and testing) were discussed during the peer review exercise. Similarly, regulatory inspection of these items and the regulator's approach to the underlying safety assessments that prove these provisions are adequate. In general, equipment used for SAM is subject to routine maintenance and inspection. However, the licensee has noted that not all SAMG equipment is inspected. In this case, equipment/component faults identified during an exercise are corrected (non-routine maintenance). The licensee will review this situation.

Post accident instrumentation is identified as such and qualifications are preserved through surveillance and maintenance instructions. In general (with a similar exception as above to certain equipment), surveillance and maintenance by the plant is under regulator supervision.

The regulator uses IAEA GS-G-1.3 as the basis for its inspection program. GS-G-1.3 states that all safety relevant SSC's should be inspected. The regulator has stated that all equipment which can be used in severe accident management has to be inspected and that the inspection program will be improved on this specific subject.

4.2.1.4 Accident management for events in the spent fuel pools

The Dutch report gives extensive coverage to the management of severe accidents affecting the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The SFP is adjacent to the reactor inside the containment building. Fuel stored in the SFP is kept to a minimum; once Technical Specifications allow, it is shipped for reprocessing. The overall strategy is to ensure adequate cooling by preventing the uncovering of the fuel.
There are no specific SAMGs for the SFP, but some SAMGs in effect cater for accidents involving the SFP because of its in-containment location, e.g. strategies for entering containment, controlling containment conditions, controlling hydrogen levels etc. The underpinning logic is that the pressure containment is designed for LOCA events, so accidents affecting the SFP will either make a small contribution to the total accident or will be appropriately bounded.
As a result of the stress tests review, further means of providing emergency make-up to the SFP will be provided. The make-up options will include using water from the Safety Injection (SI) tanks; use of flexible hoses to connect to the demineralised water system or to other sources, and using the containment sprays. Some of these are new proposals and have yet to be implemented.
Two diverse, independent and multiply-redundant systems are provided for ensuring ongoing SFP cooling. Each of these systems can be supplied in an emergency from fire tenders drawing water from the nearby river. However, operating some of these systems would require entry into containment and so the licensee is exploring the installation of a dedicated cooler submerged in the SFP which can be supplied and operated from outside.

There are two PARs installed above SFP for control of hydrogen. However, as these were not located with SFP faults in mind, further studies are to be carried out, e.g. on the inerting effects of ongoing steam production.

In addition, studies are to be provided looking at radiation levels as a function of reducing SFP water levels.

4.2.1.5 Evaluation of factors that may impede accident management and capability to severe accident management in multiple units case

Borssele has looked closely at the likely effectiveness of its severe accident management arrangements during extreme events. The review has concluded that accessibility and habitability of vital areas is ensured, except in the case of prolonged external flooding. It should be noted that as it is a single unit site, multiple unit effects are not relevant.
In regard to flooding, the site can be reached from three sides, so there is some redundancy in potential routes for supplying the site with additional resources or personnel if needed. However, as a result of this review, the licensee is looking at the possibility of using helicopters to bring in reinforcements.
As already noted, the Emergency Response Center (ERC) is vulnerable to very extreme events so the ERO may need to relocate, e.g. to an alternative meeting room on the site. Recognising the shortcomings in these arrangements, the licensee is proposing to build a purpose-built ERC.
The ability to restore / maintain power supplies in an extreme event has been looked at in detail. The regulatory body has however asked for this to be analysed in more depth for extreme flooding scenarios.
Contaminated water storage provisions are extensive on the site, and include access to further large tanks at the coal fired plant if needed. However the regulator considers further analysis would be of benefit here in light of the problems experienced at Fukushima in this regard (though noting that the volumes generated will likely be less at a PWR than for a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)).

4.2.2 Margins, cliff edge effects and areas for improvements

4.2.2.1 Strong points, good practices

- Explicit incorporation of international standards (e.g. those of IAEA, WENRA) into the licence via the Nuclear Safety Rules (NVRs) approach.

- Borssele has SAMGs for all operational states (including shutdown). The licensee has been very proactive in this regard, implementing them far faster than in many nations reviewed. Its SAMGs were considered state of the art in 2003
- Borssele has used a full scope Level 3 PSA for deriving its severe accident management strategies (many nations reviewed are still developing Level 2 PSAs) and has been subject to IAEA IPSART missions.
- The scale of emergency exercises at Borssele is unusually large by international standards – one recent national exercise involved 1000 people.
- PARs are already installed that are designed for severe accident conditions (in many other nations, PARs are either in the process of being installed or are only designed for design basis events).

4.2.2.2 Weak points, deficiencies (areas for improvements)

- Specific SAMGs need to be developed for the SFP.
- There are question marks over whether all the SSCs installed for severe accident management are capable of delivering their intended safety functions reliably.
- Ambiguous tagging of keys of rooms (e.g. emergency control room) in the bunkered building.
- Not all SAM equipment is subjected to routine maintenance/inspection.

4.2.3 Possible measures to increase robustness

4.2.3.1 Upgrading of the plants since the original design

There have been a significant number of major improvements to the Borssele plant since it was commissioned in 1973. The major improvements have been implemented through the plant's three PSRs, as summarised above in section 4.1.4.

4.2.3.2 Ongoing upgrading programmes in the area of accident management

Other than the work to introduce EDMGs (see above), no significant improvements appear to have been ongoing at Borssele prior to Fukushima. This is perhaps not surprising given the point in the plant's PSR cycle at which the stress tests have been performed (the result of the next PSR is due in 2013 with implementation of improvements before the end of 2017).

A possible exception to this statement is the ongoing work to seismically qualify the containment venting system, which may have been initiated before Fukushima.

Work to complete the remaining recommendations from IAEA's 2010 IPSART mission (where concerns were expressed in regard to MAAP calculations and the validity of what these had assumed) is ongoing. The Regulator receives regular progress reports on this work and it will be completed before the 2013 follow-up IPSART mission. In addition, it was confirmed during the stress tests review that future analysis is to use the MELCOR program.

4.2.4 New initiatives from operators and others, and requirements or follow up actions (including further studies) from Regulatory Authorities: modifications, further studies, decisions regarding operation of plants

4.2.4.1 Upgrading programmes initiated/accelerated after Fukushima

Improvements relevant to severe accident management initiated or accelerated since the Fukushima accident are listed in the preceding sections. A more complete list of measures is provided in the Dutch national report. Highlights from this list relevant to severe accident management include:

- Provision of a new Emergency Response Centre (ERC)
- Improved storage facilities for equipment, tools and materials needed in an emergency
- Means to refill the SFP without needing to enter containment

- Improvements in the diversity of means for ensuring SFP cooling
- Improvements in arrangements for using mobile diesel generators
- Better communication systems
- Seismic upgrades to fire-fighting and containment ventilation systems
- Improvements to the flooding withstand of the ECR
- Develop and implement EDMGs

The regulator has welcomed these proposals, but reserves the right to look in more detail at their effectiveness when more detail becomes available. In addition, the regulator has identified a number of areas where further work is needed to build on the licensee's proposals. Most of these are requests for further analysis (see next section). However, the regulator has also requested the following, relevant to severe accident management:

- Seismic qualification of additional parts of the fire-fighting system not identified by the licensee
- Improvements to EOPs, SAMGs and training to cater, for example, for longer term events.

4.2.4.2 Further studies envisaged

A significant number of topics have been proposed for further study as a result of the stress tests process. Lists are provided in the national report and, during the peer review discussions, several further topics were stated as having been requested for review / analysis. Key areas being addressed directly relevant to severe accident management include:

- Establishing the validity of assumptions in regard to the SSCs needed to manage severe accidents and in particular whether there is a need for upgrades to equipment and/or instrumentation to address severe accident scenarios;
- Performing either a seismic margins assessment or a seismic PSA;
- Strategies for corium stabilisation within containment;
- More extensive use of steam for powering the emergency feed water pump;
- Revisiting previous analyses of ex-vessel RPV cooling;
- The possibility of detonation / deflagrations in the containment filtered venting stack
- Better arrangements for emergency diesel generators, including improved means for recharging batteries and strategies to conserve battery power
- Updated and extended analysis of hydrogen management within containment, including for the SFP;
- Potential improvements to SFP cooling arrangements so that this does not require a containment entry;
- Improvements to SAMGs and EOPs, e.g. focusing on longer term accidents and including better training provisions;
- Analysis of potential doses to workers during severe accident management activities, including assessments of how dose levels increase with reducing SFP level and habitability of the MCR and ECR;
- Reassessments of ERO staffing, including how the ERO would cope if not up to full complement;
- The handling of large volumes of contaminated water generated by accident management strategies;

4.2.4.3 Decisions regarding future operation of plants

The Fukushima accident and subsequent analyses of the robustness of severe accident management provisions (e.g. the stress tests) have not led to any issues that necessitate changes to the plans for future operation of the Borssele plant.

4.3 Peer review conclusions and recommendations specific to this area

The national report and the subsequent ENSREG peer review exercise suggest a good approach has been adopted in the Netherlands for the management of potential severe accidents. This approach

goes back many years – the improvements that Borssele has put in place, e.g. from past PSRs, are only now starting to be implemented in some other nations.
A key area however, identified by the Dutch regulator in the National Report, and supported here by the peer reviewers, is the need for further assessment work to establish the validity of assumptions made in regard to the SSCs needed to manage severe accidents. Though it is agreed that such qualification / substantiation need not necessarily be to the conservative standards expected for normal Design Basis provisions, analysis, testing etc to underwrite the performance of these SSCs in their potential operating environments and to ensure they will function after a severe initiating event, are key aspects for gaining confidence that suitable and sufficient SAM measures are in place and will function acceptably on demand. Moreover, it is important that these assessments are systematic, i.e. addressing all the SSCs mentioned in the EOPs and SAMGs, and carried out reasonably early in the overall process to suitably inform other activities, e.g. the need for further plant and equipment enhancements.
The approach of including international standards, guidance and practices within the licensing approach via NVRs has been noted above as a good practice.
The extent and nature of the proposals put forward for improvements in safety in light of Fukushima appear broadly sound, the peer reviewers have examined the licensee's initial proposals for proposed timescales. Part of the work will be done in the PSR (mainly the studies), the remaining work will be done with a more stringent timescale. It is in the intent of the Regulator that the implementation schedule will be kept as short as possible with a view for completion by 2016-2017.
The overall approach to improving severe accident management arrangements in the Netherlands is judged to be soundly-based and appears to be being appropriately managed and regulated.
Recommendations from the ENSREG peer review of severe accident management are therefore as follows:

- The Dutch regulator's suggestion for further analysis to establish the validity of the assumptions made regarding the SSCs needed for SAM is supported and should be pursued as a matter of priority.
- The maintenance schedule for equipment related to accident management should be reviewed by licensee
- Unambiguous tagging of keys of rooms (e.g. emergency control room) in the bunkered building should be implemented.
- The licensee should consider placing the SAM execution procedures at the location where they are to be used.

List of acronyms

AC	Alternating Current
ACC	Alarm Coördinatie Centrum (Alarm Coordination Centre)
DBE	Design Basis Earthquake
DBF	Design Basis Flood
DC	Direct Current
ECR	Emergency Control Room
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EDMG	Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines
EL&I	'Ministerie van Economische zaken, Landbouw & Innovatie'; ministry of economic affairs, agriculture & innovation
ENSREG	European Nuclear Safety Regulator Group
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedure
EPZ N.V.	Elektriciteits-Produktiemaatschappij Zuid-Nederland EPZ
ERO	Emergency Response Organisation
ERC	Emergency Response Center
I&M	'Ministerie van Infrastructuur & Milieu'; Ministry of infrastructure & the environment
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IPSART	International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team
HCLPF	High Confidence Low Probability of Failure
I & C	Instrumentation and Control
KFD	Kernfysische Dienst (Nuclear Safety Department)
KTA	Kerntechnische Ausschuss
KWU	Kraftwerk Union
LOCA	Loss-Of-Coolant Accident
LOOP	Loss Of Offsite Power
MCR	Main Control Room
NAP	Normaal Amsterdams Peil
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
NVR	Nuclear Safety Rules
NS 1	Nood Stroom net 1 (Emergency Grid 1)
NS 2	Nood Stroom net 2 (Emergency Grid 2)
PAR	Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner
PGA	Peak Ground Acceleration
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Analysis
PSA	Probabilistic safety Analysis
PSR	Periodic Safety Review
PWR	Pressurised Water Reactor
RHWG	Reactor Harmonization Working Group
RL	Reference Level, WENRA
RPV	Reactor Pressure Vessel
RWS	Rijkswaterstaat
SAMG	Severe Accident Management Guidelines
SBO	Station Blackout
SRA	Safety Assessment Report
SFP	Spent Fuel Pool
SHA	Seismic Hazard Assessment
SMA	Seismic Margin Assessment
SSCs	Structures, Systems and Components
TSC	Technical Support Centre
UHS	Ultimate Heat Sink
UJ	Low Pressure Fire System
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators

WENRA	Western European Regulators' Association
WOG	Westinghouse Owner's Group