

# Netherlands Embassy Office Bujumbura-Burundi

## Multi annual strategic plan 2012 – 2015

The Multi-Annual Strategic Plan is a rolling document. The plan was presented by the Embassy Office in October 2011 and approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 2011. During the appraisal process, the focus of the strategy was enhanced and additional clarifications were received from the Embassy Office. These were incorporated in the final version. In some cases plans will have to be further elaborated and considered before they can be implemented as part of the strategic plan. The new policy priorities will be further developed and operationalized in dialogue with the government, civil society, private sector and development partners during the coming year.

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## 1. Executive summary

This Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP) for the Netherlands' bilateral and multilateral relations with Burundi covers the time period from 2012 until 2015. It builds upon the lessons learned from Netherlands presence during years of instability and in the recent period of gradual improvement of the functioning of Burundian institutions. The MASP defines Netherlands' priorities in Burundi in general terms: for diplomacy, development cooperation, trade and investments, military cooperation and other bilateral relations. It reflects the 3D approach the Netherlands will be following in implementing the plan: an integral focus on diplomacy, defense and development to help consolidate stability. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 2009-2017 between the Netherlands and Burundi forms a core element of the MASP.

Overall implementation of the previous MASP can be positively assessed. The main focus has been on support to security sector reform. Here the Netherlands' interventions have been successful and widely appreciated, both by the Burundians and other development partners. Also in the area of strengthening the capacity of government institutions a number of successes have been achieved, notably in the field of public finance management; nevertheless high levels of corruption still exist. Less has been achieved in supporting private sector development, although promising programs have been started which can be further pursued.

The context analysis carried out by the Embassy Office shows that Burundi has made some progress since its return to democracy in 2003, but that it faces tremendous challenges to consolidate what has been achieved and to make further progress. Burundi is still one of the poorest and most densely populated countries in the world. After many years of civil conflict and four wars since independence in 1962, the number of people living below the poverty line in Burundi has almost doubled from 37% in 1993 to 67% in 2006. Peace in the country is still fragile, as is demonstrated by recent politically motivated violent incidents. Burundi is also extremely vulnerable to external factors, such as increased food prices, international recession and regional instability. Peace and development in Burundi are also important for regional stability.

Building on the lessons learned and in order to have an impact on sustainable development and peace, the Netherlands will support Burundi in three complementary areas, the first building on the work done to date in the country and two new areas of focus: A. security and justice, B. food security, and C. sexual and reproductive health and rights including family planning. The three spearhead programs will be well linked up with regional programs managed from The Hague or Kigali. Where possible, Dutch NGO's, knowledge and training institutes and private firms will also be associated.

-A. The program for security and justice will have components for promoting more inclusive and effective policies and governance and for reinforcing the security sector.

-B. The food security program will focus on increased agricultural productivity including rural economic development concentrated in three provinces most affected by security problems, and closest to Bujumbura and neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda.

-C. The program for sexual and reproductive health and rights will focus on availability of modern birth control measures, on youth, and measures to combat sexual violence.

There are considerable contextual risks, most importantly Burundi's fragility for new conflict. Institutional capacity is also limited in this post-conflict country. Yet, the above three angles are key for helping reduce fragility and Burundi needs extra support to work on them simultaneously.

## 2. Results obtained under Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2008-2011 and lessons learnt

The overall strategic objectives of the Dutch commitment in the preceding plan 2008-2011 focused upon facilitating the consolidation of the peace process including the promotion of political stability (objective 1A) and support to reform of the security sector (objective 1B). Furthermore, initiatives for the reconstruction of Burundian society were supported by capacity building of government institutions (objective 2) and support to private sector development (objective 3). A new objective 4 was added in 2008: to contribute to macro-economic stability through general budget support.

**-Obj.1A:** The activities in the field of the first objective (1A) ranged from demarches to enhance the implementation of the Arusha Accords and support for the national political dialogue to contributions to the Peace Building Fund and reintegration of ex combatants. Promoting political inclusiveness was obviously complex, and external actors and donors had only limited influence. The quality of the integration process of ex combatants was critical, and implementation by governmental institutions (set up with external funding) lacked appropriate fiduciary systems.

**Lesson learnt:** Building up political will for making fast progress in the area of inclusive governance is a challenge. Well co-ordinated enhancement measures will therefore be necessary.

**-Obj.1B:** Dutch initiatives in support of creating more capacity in the security sector (objective 1B) have been successful. Capacity has been built for maintaining law and order and to undertake expeditionary missions by the armed forces, and for enhancing democratic control over the security sector. The Netherlands is appreciated as a crucial player in the field of the security sector. In 2010, the first year of the security sector development (SSD) program, the setting up of the structures of the program required much attention at the expense of concrete activities. Program execution was satisfactory in the second year of the program. The governance component is becoming more and more the heart of the program, working with representatives from inside and outside the security sector, including the parliament, different ministries, civil society and justice bodies.

During this first phase of the SSD program (2010 and 2011), progress was made in establishing the Dutch-Burundian partnership in practice, in building confidence among the various actors in the SSD program and in responding ad hoc to the urgent post conflict needs. This created momentum for a more long-term structural reform of the security sector that will be the focus of the next phases of the program.

**Lesson learnt:** It is evident that the need to deepen and reinforce the dialogue and partnership between Burundian and Dutch actors remains a priority, especially at policy level. Recent examples show that the current level of trust is sufficient to discuss sensitive subjects such as human rights abuses and to work toward improving the Burundian track record in this respect.

In preparation for the second phase starting in 2012, the setup of decision-making, monitoring and financial control for SSD projects is being improved, using mechanisms that are less complicated, bureaucratic and donor driven and more embedded within the structure of the partner institutions.

**-Obj.2:** Dutch initiatives to support increase of capacity of government institutions (objective 2) contributed significantly to the introduction of reforms for better public finance management and for the social agenda of land rights and human rights. There is a long way to go, however, and it is not yet clear at what speed reforms will be effectively implemented.

**Lesson learnt:** The work to date has created a window of opportunity that can be used for proposing reform and to create momentum and a constructive attitude for further steps to be taken (find drivers of change, pilot activities, etc.).

**-Obj.3:** Conditions in Burundi for supporting private sector initiatives (objective 3) were less favourable due to weak demand for investments, and a less conducive environment for doing business. The silent partnership with the USAID small scale enterprise program (business incubator) helped create some businesses. The partnership with Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) to help introduce more efficient and transparent land registration systems in rural areas, is successful and will be replicated in the next four years in other provinces. A project for rehabilitating micro-credit institutions (FORCE 1 and 2) has been successful, even if credit facilities are still hardly available in the country. The regional project CATALIST has been successful in identifying binding constraints for agricultural value chain development, in reinforcing private sector actors for input supply, and in managing a project for infrastructure development and erosion control. The number of companies that have applied for the Private Sector Investment Programme (PSI) and PUM instruments is limited, but increasing since 2011.

**Lesson learnt:** Even if conditions are difficult it is possible to find smart entry points for private sector development, working from two sides: fostering an enabling environment and direct support.

**-Obj.4:** General budget support (GBS) was given through the economic reform program of the World Bank. Together with the European Commission and other donors, GBS allowed the government of Burundi to

maintain macro-economic stability and satisfaction of basic public expenditure. The GBS donor group also succeeded in encouraging the Government to reform elements of the system of public finance management (PFM), e.g. a new law on procurement and a central tax office.

**Lesson learnt:** GBS is an effective tool for helping the country to maintain macro-economic stability and to encourage PFM reform.

### 3. Country analysis

#### 3.1 General and political analysis - binding constraints for development

Burundi is a nation growing out of civil war and instability in a fragile sub region. It occupies a strategic position as a possible corridor for the enormous resource base in DRC. The present post-conflict phase after thirteen years of ethnically-fuelled civil war requires the restoration of confidence and trust and the transformation of relevant institutions in the fields of security, justice and the economy.

With a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of only USD 170, Burundi is one of the poorest countries in the world. After many years of civil conflict, the number of people below the poverty line has almost doubled, from 37% in 1993 to 67% in 2006. The latter percentage shows a notable drop from 81% in 1998 yet far from the 2015 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of 18%. Rural poverty is estimated to be twice that of urban areas. Burundi's social and economic problems are exacerbated by a high population growth making it one of the most densely populated countries in the world (310 habitants per km<sup>2</sup>) and outpacing economic growth.

It is unlikely that Burundi will reach any of the MDGs by 2015, despite signs of progress. Life expectancy rose from 43 years in 2000 to 50 years in 2009. Vaccination rates have improved in 2009. The Burundian Government has attempted to increase coverage of health services by announcing in May 2006 free health services to children under five and pregnant women. This measure helped decrease under-five mortality rate by 20% from 2005 to 2009. However, the lack of essential medicine and qualified staff is affecting service delivery. In education, progress has been made, but further progress is critical to the future growth of the country. Since the "free school" policy was introduced in September 2005, primary education gross enrolment has significantly improved from 80% in 2003 to 2004 to nearly 100% in 2005 to 2006, and further in 2009. However, quality is low and completion rate is around 46%. As a result, the odds of reaching the MDG of 100% primary completion rate remain slim.

On the positive side Burundi is showing progress in the collective endeavours to break cycles of violence and to establish legitimate institutions and governance. In the past violence and conflict had an ethnic background, which is no longer the case today since power division is not along ethnic lines anymore, and both ethnic groups are represented in the security forces. The elections of 2010 showed that the formal democracy functioned relatively well as international observers qualified the process as free and fair. In 2011 the Burundian political leadership decided to strengthen its legitimacy by introducing a plan of action to improve good governance and to prevent corruption by establishing an independent human rights body with a well-recognized chairman and by facilitating the reconciliation process. However establishing institutions and enacting laws is not enough and will, by itself, not lead to visible results without predictable and proactive national leadership.

The consolidation of peace and the creation of political stability and democratically functioning state institutions will remain a challenge for Burundi in the years to come. The Burundian institutions are not yet able to fully protect the citizens, nor to guard against corruption or to provide access to justice. Politically motivated violence is on the rise and new insurgency movements are making the stability even more fragile. The institutional void in neighbouring Eastern DRC adds to instability in the region.

The exercise of political power in Burundi is still largely neo-patrimonial. Those in power use state resources to secure the loyalty of their supporters, friends and family. As a result, losing political power has a very high

cost. A by-effect of this phenomenon is a high-level of corruption. Burundi ranks 170 out of 178 on the 2010 Transparency International Global Corruption Index. In a reaction to corruption, the Burundian population calls on the Government to create a more inclusive and transparent state system. There is a need for civil society organizations to become more professional, in order to play a more constructive role in a dialogue with government institutions. Such role should also be officially recognized by the Government.

From a political perspective, Burundi is still a fragile state, which implies high contextual risks for any development cooperation program, in case new conflict breaks out. These risks will only increase if no progress is made with regard to wider security related issues.

Wider human security related challenges in Burundi include food security, job security and resource base security. Due to high population density and dominant subsistence farming, scarcity of land and food are a crucial issue, which will be even more pressing with population growth (3% per annum) and climate change. The combined effect of these changes is likely to put more people at risk of hunger, disease, displacement, or other forms of hardship. The most obvious is the risk of direct conflict over access to or control of scarce resources such as land or water. A vicious cycle of land shortage and environmental degradation leads to food shortage, unemployment and social conflict. In turn, social conflict creates instability which disrupts production systems and marketing channels by displacing the local farm population. This situation presents itself all over the country, but more profoundly in provinces as Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural.

Table 1. Binding constrains and solution areas for growth, self-reliance and poverty reduction in Burundi

<b>Primary binding constraints</b>	<b>Secondary binding constraints</b>	<b>Solution area</b>	<b>Section</b>
Legacy of conflict and aggression	Acceptance of violence Gender based violence Insecurity / fear	Re-education on social behaviour	3.2 + 3.4
		Reinforced security system	3.2
Neo patrimonial political system	Weak justice system/impunity Weak government institutions Corruption Poor business environment	Reinforced governance system	3.2 + 3.3
		Improved food security and economic development through increased agricultural productivity and improved business environment	3.3
High population density in relation to the way in which the resource base is used (low input subsistence farming), increasingly problematic with climate change	Land shortage, land conflicts Land degradation Low agricultural productivity Food insecurity Poverty Population growth faster than economic development	Family planning	3.4
		Improved education system	
High fertility rates / population growth	Young (fertile) population Low levels of education Lack of future perspective High mother and infant mortality	Improved health system	

Even with efforts to increase the agricultural productivity for which there still is much potential, the shortage of land has reached such an extreme that the agricultural sector can in the near future no longer support the entire population. Therefore, a long term perspective is required. This means that people will have to look for other employment options, both within (agro processing industries) and outside the agricultural sector. Since agriculture dominates Burundi's productive sector, any job creation strategy should be grounded in agricultural activities, encouraging private investment in this sector (cf. 3.3). However if Burundi continues its explosive population growth the expected agricultural productivity may not compensate for the increased land pressure.

The binding constraints and the corresponding solution areas are closely interrelated. In the following sections, they will be clustered and further analysed in three groups: security and justice (3.2), food security and economic development (3.3), and demographic development and reproductive health (3.4). These three clusters correspond with the priority themes chosen for the Netherlands' program in Burundi, not only because they are highly interrelated (cf. table 1), but also because of added value that the Netherlands can offer in each of these areas, especially if they are combined. The combined approach is urgent for Burundi to prevent a "social time bomb" from exploding. Education and health systems are not further analysed despite the fact that some of the binding constraints for development will have to be solved in these areas as well, but for this other donor partners will be sought (*division of labour*).

## 3.2 Context analysis of Security and Justice

For Burundi to break the cycle of violence, improve its Human Rights track record and work towards obtaining the MDGs, it is essential to strengthen legitimate institutions and governance in order to provide citizen security, justice and jobs. Legitimacy can be pursued through a more inclusive political system.

### ***The political system***

The present political system in Burundi still shows some features of the post-colonial period where violence and bypassing of democratic procedures were acceptable means to accede to or exercise political power. Given the destruction of state structures during the conflict and the limited experience of the current ruling party, consisting of former rebels, the capacity of the government needs to be strengthened to take charge of the stabilization and economic development of Burundi.

The relationships between the current Government and the extra-parliamentary opposition, that boycotted the 2010 elections, remain tense. Due to the electoral boycott and the resulting monopoly of power of the ruling party, a climate of political exclusiveness emerged after the elections and (politically motivated) violence increased. The Government insists in public statements that the recent attacks on police and military posts and on civilians and businesses with links to the ruling party are the work of common bandits, but public and political observers argue that a new rebellion may be forming. Most opposition leaders have left the country; the extra-parliamentary opposition that joined forces in a Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC) Ikibiri holds to its demand for renewed negotiations instead of a dialogue. On each side there is use of excessive violence. According to the United Nations (UN), elements within the Government of Burundi appear to be involved in extrajudicial executions.

National Forces of Liberation (FNL) combatants operate from the DRC and according to different sources, including the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), they are forming alliances with Congolese based rebel groups such as Mai Mai Yakatumba and the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). This shows how political tensions and conflict in the Great Lakes region seldom keep to national borders.

### ***The security sector***

Since the end of the conflict and the Arusha declaration of 2005, the Burundian security sector has seen some drastic changes to which the Netherlands has contributed with financial support and training. State security providers such as the Forces National de Defense (FDN) and the Police Nationale du Burundi (PNB) were redesigned into multi-ethnic forces that consist of former Hutu rebels and former Tutsi government soldiers and gendarmes. The integration of rebels into the military and police can be considered as largely successful. The FDN is performing rather well. It also participates effectively in African Union peacekeeping missions, like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) mission in Somalia. The police force however remains a poorly managed organization, and partly politicized. This is not only due to the fact that, unlike the military, the police did not have existing structures on which it could fall back. It is also due to limited internal and external control, and to lack of experience with the complex roles and responsibilities of the police in the security sector which in turn make the police the first line of defence against politically motivated violence. Another major player in the security sector is the Service National de Renseignement (SNR) that resides directly under the presidency and has a poor reputation of respecting human rights. Due to its position directly under the president the SNR is not controlled by parliament.

With regards to the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice faces the multiple challenges of limited levels of training, politicized oversight and inadequate infrastructure.

State and non-state security sector controllers such as the parliament but also civil society organizations and the media are often influenced by the executive power and by political actors. They lack capacity, skills and knowledge about their controlling roles and responsibilities in the security sector. Though civil society organizations and the media have been able to operate freely to a certain extent during and after the conflict, the recurring political tensions after the elections of 2010 have limited their room to manoeuvre. Furthermore, Burundian civil society organizations to a large extent seem to be mostly confined to Bujumbura with limited links to what is going on at a local level.

The trust of the Burundian population in the security services is limited. Since the end of the conflict the confidence in the army has improved, while a rather negative image of the police being corrupt and dangerous persists. The Belgian/Netherlands activities concerning the setting up of a neighbourhood police (*Police de Proximité*) are helping to improve the relationship between the population and the police and to fulfil the security needs of the population.

The Netherlands has been active in the Burundian security sector since 2006 when it assisted in the army and police integration and demobilization processes. In 2008 the Netherlands and Burundi signed an MoU for an eight year security sector development program. The program consists of three different areas of intervention:

1. support to the Ministry of Public Security (MSP) and the police,
2. support to the Ministry of Defence and Former Combatants (MDNAC) and the military
3. strengthening good governance in the security sector

The Netherlands is the largest and leading donor in the security sector and is well trusted by the Burundian counterparts. This has put the Netherlands in a position to discuss sensitive subjects such as human rights abuses by security forces, the lack of constitutional foundation of the police and the military organizations and to work on the eradication of corruption within the security sector, for example through public procurement and administrative system of the sector reforms.

The first phase of the Burundian-Netherlands SSD Program (2009-2011) was focused on offering solutions for the deficits that were the direct result of the conflict, such as a lack of military barracks and a lack of basic training and equipment for the fledgling army and police. The end of the first phase has seen a surge of activities concerning good governance. Successful activities with the parliamentary commission for security, that managed to point out a major flaw within the legal structure of the military and the police, will be elaborated in the second phase of the program.

Other donors in the security sector are the US, Belgium, France, Germany, Russia, Egypt and the UN. The Netherlands organizes monthly donor coordination meetings that have led to closely linked programs and activities in the security sector.

### ***Peace dividend***

In a post-conflict situation it is essential that the population reaps the benefits of peace as soon as possible. This 'peace dividend' is achieved by providing job opportunities and social benefits to the population. From a general security perspective it is relevant to mention two specific groups that find it difficult to participate in the formal economy and are easily manipulated by political agents: youth and former combatants.

Social-economic integration in society of youth and ex-combatants is key to reduce the risk of them diverting to the use of violence. The World Bank project on Demobilizations, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) supported by the Netherlands has been successful when it comes to demobilization but has been less effective in ensuring social integration of ex-combatants. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed a 24 million US dollar social and economic reintegration program for refugees and ex-combatants (not specifically targeting youth).

### ***Gender: Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV)***

Women and girls remain a vulnerable group in Burundi due to local culture and tradition, but also due to the deteriorated social fibre of society as a result of the conflict; during the war rape was commonly used as a weapon. Although the situation in Burundi is now post conflict, violence against women is still widespread, affecting thousands of women each year with rape regularly committed by state and non-state actors. As the



justice system lacks human, financial and material resources and is often not working properly, in the rare case that a woman does speak out, the conflict is often solved “amicably” by an exchange of goods or money between the families. In some cases if the victim is not married she may be forced to marry the perpetrator due to cultural norms that otherwise make her “unfit” for marriage.

In the Netherlands SSD program gender is part of every activity. Not only does the program strive to improve the gender balance in the security providing organizations, but it also trains security providers how to correctly handle cases of SGBV. Improved internal and external control will need to lead to the eradication of SGBV by security providers. See also 3.4 (role and approach of the youth).

### 3.3 Context analysis of food security and economic development

According to the Global Hunger Index, Burundi scores the second highest level of hunger in the world after the DRC and has one of the highest chronic malnutrition rates in the world. More than 50% of the population is undernourished and 75% of the population is affected by food insecurity. 90% of the active population is working in the agricultural sector that contributes around 50% to GDP. Its overall growth (estimated at 2.6%) remains below that of population growth (3 %). Approximately 1.2 million rural households have an average plot of 0.5 ha to practice subsistence agriculture. The pattern of subsistence farming continues, despite increasingly difficult circumstances, partly because the rural population has few other options and because markets for products and inputs are not developed. Women do most of the agricultural work and play a central role in the food sovereignty of families and communities. Nevertheless they remain largely marginalized and dependent. They have less access than men do to agricultural inputs and credit and they seldom control agricultural means of production and the distribution of family resources including land.

Burundi’s economic growth remains volatile due to its dependence on the widely fluctuating agricultural sector. The service sector, which is dominated by the public sector, accounts for 37% of the economy while the industrial sector is still small (17%). A major effort that needs to be made for economic development will be the improvement of the overall business environment. Burundi’s ranking on the list of the “Doing Business” Report 2011 is 181 out of 183 economies. This score reflects the still persisting situation of corruption and political interference in business.

Despite a favourable climate for agriculture, and the fact that as much as 90% of its population is still engaged in agriculture, many people are food insecure due to extreme poverty, insufficient access to land, and insufficient access to inputs for improving agricultural productivity. At the same time, the potential for improving agricultural productivity is very high: actual production levels could easily be multiplied by three to five, allowing for market oriented production instead of the now dominant subsistence agriculture. Without sufficient use of inputs subsistence agriculture will lead to more and more land degradation and, in combination with population growth, more and more. The question is how to inverse this trend and enable farmers to break out of this vicious circle?

Burundi has good policy documents for the development of the agricultural sector, of which the most recent is the *Plan National d’Investissement Agricole 2012 – 2017 (PNIA)*, which is based on the *Stratégie Agricole Nationale (SAN) 2008 - 2015*. The *PNIA* has been elaborated with participation of the different actors (government, donors and private sector representatives), and its main elements are also reflected in the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of Burundi (CSLP 2012- 2015) to be validated imminently. The plan identifies more than 15 agricultural value chains to be promoted and reinforced: coffee, tea, cotton, quinquina (export crops), milk, meat, palm oil, banana, potato, paddy, wheat, cassava, beans, fruits, flowers, etc. (for local consumption AND export with added value through processing). The plan also reserves a large part of the investments to development of irrigation: 22%. It affirms the need of reform and capacity building of the ministry of agriculture in order to enable it to put into practice the new policies. However the *PNIA* document remains unclear about how funds will be managed (allocation, disbursements, accountability). Taking into account the ambitions that exceed available resources and short term implementation capacity in Burundi, a big challenge remains as to which interventions to start with. Which are the most strategic investments, in combination with which accompanying measures, implying which actors? This degree of detail is still lacking in the strategies.

According to the Chamber of Agri-Business Development, the agricultural business environment is very weak and the ministry of agriculture does not have a clear policy for the promotion of agricultural investments. Current programs do not take into account the private sector role. The Government of Burundi showed its willingness to promote the agricultural sector by increasing the agricultural sector budget from 6 % in 2011 to 10 % in 2012 (in compliance with New Partnership for Africa's Development - NEPAD). It is also committed to continue the privatization process of the coffee and tea subsectors and to improve the business climate. Both the Chamber of Agricultural Business development (very recently created) and producer organizations like the Confédération des Producteurs Agricoles pour le Développement (CAPAD) do not have the capacity to hold the Government accountable for its agricultural sector policies and to influence these in favour of an improved business climate. CAPAD and farmer organizations even lack legal recognition.

With agriculture being a private sector activity, and knowing that economic development related to agriculture presents an opportunity for rapid economic growth and poverty reduction in Burundi, the question of priorities to be set will be answered from the angle of the five essential elements or factors of a favourable business environment: Law and regulation; Access to markets; Access to financial services; Infrastructure; Access to technology and knowledge.

Each of these five factors will be analysed with respect to binding constraints, especially for smallholder farmers and small enterprises, proposing solutions, and to what extent the Netherlands are already contributing to these solutions or could offer added value in contributing to them. Where known, contributions of other donors are also mentioned. Several donors are active in the agricultural sector, of which the most important are International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Belgium/BTC and World Bank. However donor programs are highly fragmented and not well coordinated, apart from geographic division of labour: programs that are limited to certain provinces.

**Law and regulation.** An important issue for most Burundians is secure access to land, which is at the same time a key factor for agricultural intensification to be realized through more investment in land (fertilization, liming, erosion control measures, etc.). The Netherlands is already engaged, through a silent partnership with the Swiss Agency for Development, in a program for certification of land rights and decentralized service provision of recording rights and transaction. Dutch NGO's ZOA and ICCO are also engaged in activities for secure access to land. A new law on land (*code foncier*) has been approved by Parliament in 2011, which will provide a good basis for large scale land titling, provided that care is taken with respect to the rights of women and repatriates who see 'their' land occupied by others. For women it is particularly important that the proposed new law on succession rights is finalized and approved as well. Land titling processes will have to be guided with much care and accompanying measures, a process to which Dutch knowledge organizations (KIT, ITC) could provide added value. Other aspects of law and regulation that need to be addressed are reduction of regulation pressures, law enforcement, and reduction of political interference in business.

**Access to markets.** Markets for agricultural produce are not working properly. Although based less than 20 km from Bujumbura central market, producer associations/cooperatives of perishable crops (horticulture) do not find their way to this market. When the Government of Burundi stopped purchasing rice on the local market in 2009 and when at the same time Japanese food aid (rice) became available at low prices, the rice market collapsed for local producers. Improved communication with markets in nearby Bujumbura, in combination with conservation and transformation facilities that could generate added value of agricultural produce at farm or producer organizations' level, could considerably increase agricultural revenues of farm households.

The input markets for fertilizers, pesticides and seeds are not working properly. Input prices doubled in the past 10 years but their quality has not improved. Input markets are disturbed by procurements and subsidized distributions by the Government of Burundi and this is said to lead to price speculation, black markets and low quality of inputs. A good functioning private market for seeds and fertilizers at affordable prices for small scale producers and industrial producers is missing and could decrease production costs. Projects like the International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC)-Catalist transform available fertilizers into a tailored good quality fertilizer for paddy, and these experiences could eventually help to create one part of a privatized input market.

One of the problems for producers and suppliers is the risk associated with the narrowness of agricultural output- and input markets as long as trade remains restricted to the national market. In order to promote regional trade Burundi joined the East African Community (EAC) in 2008 and is member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries

(CEPGL) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Burundi is said to have a competitive advantage in the EAC region for potatoes, cotton, coffee, tea, cassava and beans. The Platform "Rusizi sans Frontieres" initially piloted by IFDC and CEPGL, now led by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Burundi and CEPGL, requested FAO Rome for support to create a master plan, covering parts of Burundi, Rwanda, and DRC. This means that, where logical, development activities will cross borders. Markets will be open for both inputs and outputs. In order to benefit from regional market integration, action is required to improve Burundi's business climate and competitiveness.

**Access to financial services.** Access to rural finance is not ensured. One bank (Banque National pour le Developpement Economique) with a farm credit line and some micro-finance institutions like those supported by Terrafina and FORCE2 financed by the Netherlands, have limited means to provide credits to the agricultural sector. The introduction of credit-warrant systems for small holders, as experimented by IFDC-Catalist and OXFAM-NOVIB, is likely to significantly boost agricultural production by the provision of short term, seasonal credits; but probably does not cater for long term investments needed. Insurance products against climatic risks in agriculture do not yet exist in Burundi.

**Infrastructure.** Public infrastructure for transport (the main roads network) is of reasonable quality, although many rural areas have difficult access to markets by lack or bad quality of feeder roads. 67% of the rural population has access to safe drinking water, but only 2% to electricity. Also because of deforestation and the high price of firewood access to energy is problematic in rural areas. Infrastructure for communal or private use, like storage facilities and irrigation water supply, is generally lacking. Improvement in water management could help in boosting agricultural production under irrigated conditions and increase the surface suitable for agricultural production in plains and valley bottoms, mostly for paddy, or sugarcane. Existing irrigation schemes are currently being rehabilitated and new ones are under construction for the development of an important potential in the plains of the Rusizi and other valleys around Bujumbura. However, the actual management modalities (semi-government organizations) are not conducive. IFAD and BTC are planning studies for mapping the potential, including land rights issues and conflict sensitivity analysis.

The Netherlands will also look into needs to support regional water management and energy production in the Rusizi catchment and plain, shared by three countries.

**Access to technology and knowledge.** The interventions by the Dutch funded IFDC-Catalist-CAPAD program, but also by ZOA, show that agricultural productivity can be considerably increased (more than tripled, even seven to eight times for potatoes and wheat and three times for beans) by an appropriate combination of inputs and seeds as well as improved agricultural practices. Storage, conservation and transformation facilities and practices that could generate added value of agricultural produce at farm or producer organizations level and prevent the loss of perishable crops (horticulture) at farm level, are generally absent.

The actual Research and Extension system is publicly organized and seems incapable of delivering services to smallholders. Private research and advisory systems do not exist. Most of the advisory services are financed by agricultural projects. ISABU (National Institute for Agricultural Research) does not yet avail of the competencies needed to play a leading role in the production and multiplication of high quality seed varieties. BTC supports ISABU with capacity building activities. With the destruction of almost all knowledge and education centers and research capacity, the agricultural sector is seriously hampered by the absence of competent advisors, policy makers, researchers and vocational trainers. Those in place are also demotivated by low salaries and lack of means.

### 3.4 Context analysis of demographic development and reproductive health

Burundi is living on a demographic time bomb. Medium and long term stability and socio-economic recovery and growth are seriously and fundamentally threatened by high population growth. In 2010, Burundi's population totalled more than 8.5 million people. With this number Burundi is, given its small size, already the most densely populated country in Africa: 310 people per km<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, the population is increasing rapidly. If the present growth of 3% per annum continues, the population will double in only 25 years.

With the growing number of people the pressure on land for food security is increasing. Investments in the area of agricultural productivity are easily cancelled out by the increasing number of mouths to feed. Burundi is rapidly reaching its ceiling for the population size it can sustain in terms of food security, given the current production systems. The same is true for the development of education and health services and the creation of jobs. Moreover, such high pressures on resources are also identified as a security risk, since they may contribute to triggering internal conflict. Already now, 80% of court cases are on land conflicts. Most of these are conflicts between brothers or fathers and sons. Addressing population growth is therefore crucial for Burundi to break its current vicious poverty cycle and to move towards sustainable development. The Government of Burundi is well aware of this explosive demographic situation. In its Vision "Burundi 2025", it states that, if nothing is done, this situation will seriously slow down the socio-economic development. The President of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, has declared family planning one of the priorities in 2011. The National Program for Reproductive Health (PNSR) is the framework for delivering public family planning services.

The population growth in Burundi is propelled by high fertility. 46% of all women are in the fertile age groups. Modern contraceptive prevalence rate is on the rise, presently at 18%. A coverage rate of at least 40% is needed to effectively impact current fertility of 6.4 children per woman<sup>1</sup>. Although religious and cultural factors restrict the use of modern contraception, the expressed high level of unmet need in the communities reflect inadequate access to reliable family planning services rather than a reluctance to use them. Access to family planning can also significantly reduce maternal and infant mortality.

Family planning (FP) is a priority component of the government's policy on reproductive health<sup>2</sup>. Implementation of this component is financially supported by the German development bank KfW, who is the only major donor in this area. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is involved as coordinator and technical advisor. However, in order to substantially increase the contraceptive prevalence in Burundi substantially more funds are needed, according to UNFPA. The well managed PNSR remains an underfunded national program. PNSR collaborates with civic society partners to expand the access to family planning commodities and services. Population Services International (PSI) has successfully tapped into the commercial and informal sectors especially in the (peri) urban areas. The donor coordinator, UNFPA, stressed the importance to support the PNSR in light of sustainable economic development.

Over half (56%) of the population is younger than 20 years. The conservative society seems to ignore the sexuality of the youth. Before the war youth were guided by traditional counselling from family members. Partly as a result of the conflict and the insecurity the social fabric has become ineffective, with the loss of traditional authority and norm setting. Youths are particularly vulnerable to accept unsafe and irresponsible behavioural norms. Partly as a consequence of the past when sex was used as a weapon, sexual and gender based violence are very common<sup>3</sup> but are notoriously underreported. The danger of a trans-generational continuation of sexual abuse and violence from the time of the civil war is quite real: youth may regard violence a norm rather than an aberration. Constructive gender and sex education can be seen as crucial elements for the prevention of sexual violence and enhancement of community based gender security. Youth therefore have specific needs and demands regarding sexual and reproductive health. Yet no specific services or access to services are available for them, neither in state clinics nor in religious facilities. Special attention is needed for gender and sexuality information to young people to reduce sexual misconduct, especially in combination with the lack of perspective.

The most recent estimated maternal mortality ratio of 894 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2011<sup>4</sup> remains one of the highest in Africa just as the high infant mortality rate under 1 year mortality of 59/1,000 live births and under 5 years mortality of 96/1,000<sup>5</sup>. Maternal and infant mortality are a reflection of the effectiveness of the medical services chain. Investing to reduce maternal and infant mortality requires therefore a focus to strengthen the health system and medical services (public and private). The number of new HIV/Aids cases is

1 Enquête démographique et de santé Burundi (<http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/PR2/PR2.pdf>)

2 Plan Stratégique de Santé de la Reproduction 2010-2014

3 In 2003: 983 cases of sexual violence were registered, in 2006: 1930 and in 2007:2089. On average, 38% of the victims are children under age 15.

4 Progress towards Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 on maternal and child mortality: an updated systematic analysis/ Rafael Lozano et al. Lancet 2011; 378:1139-65

5 <http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/PR2/PR2.pdf>

decreasing<sup>6</sup>. With the availability of ARV<sup>7</sup> the AIDS related mortality is stabilizing, resulting in a slight increase of the number of people living with HIV (180,000). The national program of reproductive health (PNSR) adequately addresses all RH related medical issues. A well-funded international consortium is partnering with the government in the control of HIV/AIDS.

There is both a need and a value added for the Netherlands to include sexual and reproductive health as a focus area in the MASP 2012-15:

- the number of donors is very limited;
- the Netherlands has specific expertise to offer, in particular with respect to youths;
- progress on these issues will have direct benefits to our efforts in the other two focal areas;
- it would be in line with the government's policy and efforts on SRHR and gender based violence.

## 4. Proposed program: Goals, outputs, activities and risks

### **Overall Goal 0: Improve security and diminish the threat of instability and new violence in Burundi**

In order to reach this goal, the Netherlands Embassy Office will focus on three complementary spearhead programs:

- A. Security and Justice
- B. Food Security
- C. Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights including family planning.

Within the chosen areas, the Netherlands Embassy Office will focus on activities in which it can offer added value in synergy with others, including regional programs and NGO and private sector initiatives from the Netherlands itself. Consultations have been held with representatives of Dutch NGOs active in Burundi. Domains of complementarity and synergy have been identified, which will be elaborated in more detail during the first phase of this MASP, especially for the food security theme. The proposed program is in line with the new national strategy for poverty reduction (**SLCP-2 2012-1016**). Sector ministries have been consulted related to the different themes during the MASP formulation process. To the extent possible, care is taken that activities by other donors in these sectors and in other sectors such as health and education are complementary and further enhance our efforts. This will be further explored during the first MASP phase.

Given Burundi's track record on key indicators, budget support to Burundi is not envisaged during the MASP period. The discontinuation of budget support and subsequent phasing in of two new themes constitute the exit strategy.

### 4.1 Security and Justice

The intervention program of the Netherlands for fostering security will continue to pursue two goals, furthering the 8-year MoU between Burundi and the Netherlands:

*A-1. A more inclusive and effective government on national and local level and a decrease in politically motivated violence;*

*A-2. A democratically controlled effective security sector that satisfies the security needs of the population.*

A third goal regarding security: *Peace dividend for the Burundian population via social and economic gains*, will be pursued through the spearhead program on food security. To make sure that vulnerable groups who can have a destabilizing effect on the security situation can reap the benefits of peace, it will pay special attention to youth and ex-combatants. Outputs are formulated hereunder.

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<sup>6</sup> From 1990: 1.1% to 2009: 0.2%/per year

<sup>7</sup> ARV = Anti Retro-Virals : drugs to inhibit the growth of the AIDS virus HIV

**Goal A-1: A more inclusive and effective government on national and local level and a decrease in politically motivated violence**

A dialogue on national and local level seems to be the only feasible way to diminish the political tension in the country, to work toward a more inclusive government and to end the current violence and human rights abuses. Seeing that the current political leaders refrain from concrete steps to engage in a constructive dialogue, maybe alternative actors and ways of dialogue that might have a positive impact on the Burundian political climate can be found. The Netherlands, in close cooperation with its EU partners, will continue to call for a national political dialogue, but in the meantime will invest in alternative ways to improve the political climate.

The Burundian army and police, with support of the Netherlands, will work to improve internal and external control systems. The Netherlands Embassy Office will support the newly installed Independent National Commission for Human Rights (CNIDH) to map and address human rights abuses. Within the governance pillar of the Netherlands-Burundian SSD-program parliament, senate, civil society, media, and other security controllers will be trained to take a more active controlling role toward the government security providers on human rights abuses. These activities will also focus on creating trust between government representatives, civil society and the media.

The Netherlands will support improved Public Finance Management (PFM), which will also allow the Embassy Office to participate at the sector group on macro-economic issues.

**Country output A-1-a:** An improved political climate in Burundi through dialogue

**Embassy outputs A-1-a:**

- Improved dialogue and training levels of political actors.
- EU member states called for an Inter-Burundian dialogue

**Country output A-1-b:** Inquiries by the Burundian authorities into Human Rights Abuses by security forces

**Embassy outputs A-1-b:**

- State and non-state security controllers such as civil society, media, courts, prosecutors etc. are trained to enhance their controlling role toward human rights abuses by state security providers
- The independent Human Rights Commission has the capacity to establish a mapping system for Human Rights abuse

**Country output A-1-c:** Improved PFM and reduced corruption.

**Embassy outputs A-1-c:**

- The government has improved PFM capacity, among other things a joint governmental procurement cell and capacity to review procurement laws and procedures
- Participation in common funding mechanisms to support a coherent PFM reform plan

**Contextual risks:** The government has shown some willingness to engage in a dialogue with the extra-parliamentary opposition, though an exclusive political atmosphere remains. However, the extra-parliamentary opposition is pushing for negotiations which are unacceptable for the government. This deadlock seems to block an effective political dialogue at national level. Furthermore, if the use of violence and human rights violations continue to increase, the political will for a dialogue might decrease. The MoU provides for a yearly ministerial level meeting between the Netherlands and Burundi in which above mentioned issues can be further discussed.

**Goal A-2 : A democratically controlled effective security sector that satisfies the security needs of the population**

To work towards a democratically controlled and effective security sector that fulfils the security needs of the population, Burundi and the Netherlands will continue their collaborative Security Sector Development program (SSD). However, this will be contingent on sufficient political will on the part of the Burundian government to implement reform and deal with human rights violation and corruption. The Netherlands ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs closely work together on this program as part of the 3-D approach. In the remaining three phases of the SSD-program (2012 – 2017) the interventions related to the direct effects of the conflict as executed in phase 1 of the program will be replaced by more strategic, long term

reform of the security sector. These reforms will be based on medium term strategic planning by the ministries of Public Security and of Defence that take into account the needs of the Burundian population. Under the SSD program, the Burundian ministry of Defence is currently executing defence review that, based on a threats and needs assessment, will redefine the mission, organization, and activities of the Burundian military for the coming 15 years. The police and the military action plans for the second phase of the program (2012-2014) are divided into five axes determined by the political committee of the program and cover four main areas of reform:

- developing of midterm strategies
- sustainable capacity building
- integrity building of individuals and institutions
- gender

The governance activities, the heart of the SSD-program, will focus on improving internal and external control in the security sector by working not only with state security providers (police, military, security service etc.), courts etc.) and state security controllers (parliament, ministries etc.), but also with non-state security providers (security companies, militias etc.) and non-state security controllers (media, civil society etc.). Within the range of identified outputs the Embassy will focus on those areas where opportunities present themselves.

**Country output A 2-a:** A sector wide security policy for the medium/long term development of the security sector and strategic plans for the ministry of public security and the police, and for the ministry of defence and the army. These will be based on actual threats and on the security needs of the population.

**Embassy outputs A 2-a:**

- The ministry of Public Security (MSP) (and the National Security Council (NSC)) have the capacity to develop a sector wide security policy
- MSP has the capacity to write a strategic plan for MSP and police that is in line with existing development documents and donor activities
- The ministry of Defence has the capacity to execute a defence review that will lead to a white paper and an implementation plan
- The constitutional court has the capacity to draft a strategic plan that is in line with the policy documents and existing strategic plans in the justice sector
- The government has the capacity to implement a middle and long term expenditure framework

**Country output A-2-b:** Strengthened sustainable institutional capacity in the Security Sector

**Embassy outputs A-2-b:**

- Infrastructure of MSP/Police and MDNAC/military strengthened
- Level of education of members of MSP/Police and MDNAC/Military improved
- MSP has the capacity to develop a 'police de proximité'
- Army and Police have the capacity to participate in peacekeeping missions (AMISOM), in close cooperation with the U.S. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.

**Country output A-2- c:** Improved integrity of personal and institutions in the security sector

**Embassy output A-2-c:**

- Improved internal control within MDNAC/Military and MSP/Police
- Improved external control in the security sector
- MDNAC has the capacity to execute military ethics training
- Non state security providers (militias, private security companies and self-defence groups) are mapped and possibilities to improve control mechanisms for these organizations are identified

**Country output A-2-d:** Proactive policies on gender in the state security institutions

**Embassy outputs A-2-d:**

- Gender is integrated in all activities within the Burundian-Netherlands SSD-program
- The ministry of Gender has the capacity to implement the Netherlands National Action Plan (NAP) for the UN Resolution 1325 (in cooperation with Cordaid)

All above mentioned activities are developed in cooperation with Burundian Government representatives and are in line with the security priorities of the Burundian Government (as mentioned in the latest draft of the Burundian poverty reduction strategy paper, the *Cadre stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté II (CSLP2)*) and with the activities of the main donors in the security sector.

**Contextual risks:** In post-conflict countries security providers such as the army and the police are often linked to human rights abuses. In Burundi, the political tensions increase the risk of extra-judicial deployment of security forces by the authorities. To reduce these risks in the Burundi program to a minimum, the SSD-program will also focus on internal and external control in the security sector. In addition, the Netherlands will work closely with the CNIDH on mapping human rights violations. The Netherlands will furthermore remain engaged in a critical but constructive dialogue with the Burundian authorities.

**Programmatic risks:** The SSD program is managed and controlled by organs that include Embassy Office, Burundian Government representatives, program staff. To limit fiduciary and fraud risks, another layer of control has been added to the program: an external financial agent (GIZ) has been appointed.

## 4.2 Food Security

A new food security program will be initiated. Identification of the activities will take place in the first half of 2012. Below is a generic description. Proposed objectives, outputs and activities may be changed in the course of the detailed identification process. As this is a new program for Burundi in a challenging political environment, the program will be implemented with a gradual, phased approach, which will allow for further focus and adjustments in response to developments in the country.

**Goal B-1: Improved enabling environment for rural economic development offering opportunities to the poor, and particularly to women and young people including demobilized ex militants.**

**Goal B-2: Sustainably increased agricultural production including food production in the three provinces Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza and Cibitoke, produced and processed mainly by the poor including women, young people and demobilized ex militants.**

### Geographical focus

The activities will be as much as possible (but not exclusively) concentrated in three provinces: Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza and Cibitoke. These provinces have been chosen for four reasons:

1. Concentration is good for creating a more visible impact.
2. These three provinces have since 1993 faced the most serious problems of political violence with a large part of the population still supporting the FNL (opposition party). They will therefore continue to play an important role in resolving politically driven security issues.
3. Relatively few other donors are active in these provinces.
4. The area has a good potential for market oriented agricultural production because of its land resources (including fertile irrigable plains) and the nearby market potential of Bujumbura as well as for export to DRC and Rwanda.

This focus also allows for the creation of maximal synergy with the program for security and justice, and also with some *regional programs* of the Netherlands. These include the CATALIST-2 project for value chain development, regional renewable energy production (Rusumo Falls), and eventually regional water management programs (for Rusizi plain). As Burundi is small and member of the EAC, the regional context strongly determines opportunities for development of its agricultural / food sector opportunities and will as such form an important factor in the selection of activities.

### Value chain approach and private sector development

In order to further concentrate its efforts the Netherlands Embassy Office intends to intervene in a restrictive number of value chains, and to identify partner organizations and private sector actors that can be mobilized to address the bottlenecks and opportunities in these chains. The presence of such partners, especially private sector partners that would be interested in public-private partnerships, is difficult to assess in advance. Impact of a chosen value chain for poverty reduction, implying jobs and opportunities for smallholders, remains an important criterion. Value chain identification will be done in collaboration with a new regional Catalist-2 program, and taking the regional context into consideration.



### **Follow national policy.**

Improved food security and general economic development are closely interrelated in Burundi because of the fact that 90% of the population still lives from the land. This resource is scarce and rapidly becoming scarcer due to population growth and land degradation. However food security is not served by focusing only on local food crop production. Any increase in agricultural productivity, be it by introducing new cash crops (such as cotton on in the Rusizi plain), or by adding value to food crops by transformation that allows them to be marketed with less risk, will make subsistence farmers become more market oriented. They will earn more money, buy and use agricultural inputs that increase productivity in a sustainable manner, and thus break away from the vicious circle of unsustainable subsistence farming described in section 3.3 (without losing the ability to produce their own food besides market oriented production). The PNIA 2012-2017 is based on this orientation. The food security program of the Netherlands Embassy Office will mainly contribute to the national strategy components: 'professionalization of producers' and 'value chain and agribusiness development'.

### **Contextual risks.**

The choice to concentrate efforts on the three most *security sensitive* provinces allows the Netherlands to create the greatest visible impact on the peace dividend. At the same time though, by working in the most politically sensitive areas this creates an important contextual risk - if the peace process is interrupted by a new cycle of violence. The Embassy Office is deliberately taking this risk because of the urgency and the impact of this program when it succeeds.

Contextual risks are also associated with the limited progress to diminish corruption and the political interference in business. The Embassy Office will engage in political dialogue and activities for better governance (described in 4.1), working together with other donors (especially those that still provide general budget support: EU, World Bank), to try to influence political will and thereby diminish these risks.

**Programmatic risks:** These are evaluated separately hereunder, per activity and proposed aid modality.

The proposed outputs and activities are identified around the five essential factors which determine the enabling environment for fostering the envisaged economic development: 1. Law and regulation; 2. Access to markets; 3. Access to financial services; 4. Infrastructure; 5. Access to technology and knowledge. Country outputs and proposed activities are formulated for each of the five factors, with mention of modality and associated risks.

**Note:** Since the food security spearhead is a new theme for the Embassy Office, some proposed activities are new, which means that their feasibility has yet to be verified. Some activities will be developed faster and more, whilst others will be dropped. Therefore, the numbers given in terms of resources and impact per activity are indicative.

### **Law and regulation; access to land**

This is a vast area in which the Government of Burundi needs to make progress in order to improve its investment climate, diminish political interference in business and reduce corruption. The Netherlands will be engaged through activities for better governance described above (4.1), and with activities for secured access to land.

**Output:** *Rural households and individuals have more secure access to land.*

**Activities:** The Embassy Office will continue its support, through a silent partnership with Swiss Agency for Development (SDC), of land registration, with special attention to land use security for women. Only in cases where SDC is not interested in expanding its program to the provinces of Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza and Cibitoke, will a new Dutch funded program for these provinces be set up. If possible, this may include land access measures for young people including demobilized militants. Because of the high political risk of such a program, its funding will be from project funding, working through an established and independent organization, which collaborates harmoniously with the decentralized authorities, reinforcing their capacity for being in charge of a follow-up phase of the program, as stipulated in the new land law. Dutch organizations like Royal Tropical Institute (*KIT*) and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (*VNG International*) could also be associated.

**Risks:** There is a risk that the new law on succession rights will not pass, in which case women's access to land remains problematic. Furthermore, programmatic risks remain acceptable (despite the political sensitivity of such a program) by choosing a project modality with experienced NGO partners.

### **Access to markets**

**Outputs:** 1. *Small holders have increased access to good quality agricultural inputs (seed, fertilizer, pesticides, etc.);* 2. *Small holders have increased access to consumer markets.*

**Activities:** Although the market is often the most important risk factor for producers, even more than climate, the Embassy Office will not engage directly in market development. It will instead use its political influence, together with other donors, to lobby for a better business environment and for helping to generalize the concept that food security is best guaranteed with open markets and regional exchange, so that more surplus is produced, markets become less 'thin', and prices will be less volatile.

The Embassy Office may facilitate public-private partnerships in value chains with a potential to contribute to food security and agricultural market development. The choice of such value chains will depend on private actors that show an interest. Funding of partnership activities may concern existing instruments such as PUM, PSI and CBI. Initiatives may also come from producer organizations willing to organize themselves better for marketing products and obtaining inputs including agricultural credit. The *IFDC-catalist* program has demonstrated the viability of such an approach (*'Competitive Agriculture Systems & Enterprises'*), and several Dutch NGOs are also active in this domain with the Co-financing System *MFS2* funding from the Netherlands.

A third activity to be explored by the Embassy Office, associated with value chains, will be the possibility of *certification*: a trademark for sustainably produced products from Burundi. This existed in the 90's for coffee and should be revived. Before the war there was a growing specialty export sector, for example tropical flowers, organic asparagus, green beans, essential oils. Dutch expertise could evaluate the possibility of re-establishing this sector. Organizations that may be involved in such a *certification* initiative include: the regional Trademark East-Africa program.

**Risks:** Although the Embassy Office will not hesitate to be vocal and proactive in the political dialogue, the political and programmatic risks of these activities are small. However there is an important contextual risk: if the Government does not succeed in improving the general business environment and diminishing corruption, private partners will remain reluctant to invest in Burundi.

### **Access to financial services and business development services**

**Output:** *Small holders and women have increased access to finance (and eventually insurance)*

**Activities:** The Embassy Office will continue to contribute to the micro-finance fund *FORCE*, in order to make the credit products more relevant and accessible for agricultural producers and processors. It will also try to make Dutch financial institutions like *Terrafina* to engage more in agricultural credit (which hardly exists in Burundi) and *weather risk insurance* (which does not exist in Burundi). The on-going experiences of *IFDC-catalist* with systems like *warrant* may be interesting for financial institutions to use and apply to Burundi, as will be the supply of credit and insurance products in value chains that get become better organized (linking up with the above activity). This could be extended to the Rusizi plain including the DRC side where virtually no rural finance is available despite a large potential for it.

The Embassy Office will also continue to support, through USAID, the Business incubator project, helping entrepreneurs to formulate *bankable* business plans. The Embassy will propose to orient this project more to initiatives in rural areas around Bujumbura.

**Risks:** Preventing the creation of new institutions and assuming that these partners will be interested the programmatic risks remain small.

### **Infrastructure**

**Outputs:** 1. *Rural households have increased access to (renewable) energy;* 2. *Water management through irrigation and drainage will be improved on farmland.*

**Activities:** Construction and maintenance of roads will be taken up by other donors, like World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB) and European Commission (EC). So will drinking water supply. In the field of infrastructure and public service delivery, the Netherlands is looking into options to support a program for renewable energy through hydropower plants (Rusumo Falls and eventually others). Embassy Office will also explore possibilities of promoting value chains for energy production in agriculture: wood from agro-forestry (in combination with erosion control), but possibly also other forms of production of agro-fuel like ethanol from sugarcane, biodiesel from vegetable oil producing crops like *Jatropha*, and/or biogas from livestock. Since energy will always be relatively expensive in a land locked country like Burundi, the latter initiatives will be developed mainly through public-private partnership constructions.

Another domain of infrastructure in which the Netherlands may consider co-funding is water management for irrigation. This will be considered for valley bottoms and plains where agriculture is difficult without such

improved water management systems, and where construction of it is relatively easy and thus relatively cheap (less than Euro 3000,- per ha). Labour intensive methods for infrastructure development using *cash for work* will be used in such programs for short term employment creation. Development of new agricultural land through improved water management is also important to create opportunities for settlement of landless youth and ex combatants, which may be a strong argument to participate at its funding. Adaptation to drought risks associated with climate change is also an argument to invest in irrigation. Dutch expertise in irrigation with high salt content water is particularly pertinent for the Rusizi plain.

**Risks:** Programmatic risks are small because these funds will only be invested after approval of sound project proposals, and for larger power plants in co-funding with World Bank. For eventual settlement programs, political sensitivity is much greater (who will have access to the land); the Embassy Office will then advise to invest in decentralized land management and in land use management capacities of local governments including resettlement.

### **Access to technology and knowledge**

**Output:** *Small holders and women have increased access to new technologies and innovation of production*

**Activities:** The innovation system in Burundian farming has to be re-invented. Ideas about it exist, among others at the agricultural research institute Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Burundi (ISABU), which receives institutional support by BTC. This support should go well beyond the public institution itself, not only because of its weak capacity, but also for principal reasons which have to do with putting agricultural producers and their organization in the driving seat. ISABU already has some experience with this, which could be revived. Participatory research at farmer level implying research institutions, extension, producers, and preferably also other private sector actors, leads to relevant research and quick, applicable results, because binding constraints in livelihood systems are better taken into account.

Where necessary, the Netherlands Embassy Office could look into and facilitate involvement of Dutch (knowledge) organizations like *KIT*, the Agricultural University Wageningen and Research Center (*WUR*), *Agriterra*, *ICCO*, *ZOA*, and others. .

This could be linked to one of the value chains to be promoted, preferably in one of the three focal provinces. More broadly it could concern a topic such as soil fertility management and/or better integration of agriculture and livestock; allowing more sustainable soil fertility management by using a feasible combination of chemical and organic fertilizer (residues, compost and manure), and at the same time increased milk and meat production contributing to better income and high quality food. Important link with environmental management.

**Risks:** Program and political risks will be limited because of the modality to be used, which is project funding. The projects will have an important component of capacity building in order to prepare local organizations in maintaining the innovation systems after the project intervention.

### **Support capacity building and sector based approach**

The above activities are described in terms of direct interventions and separate projects, whereas it is also important to support / follow the Ministry of Agriculture in its process of reform and capacity building. This will enable it to take leadership of the transformation process of the agricultural sector. This leadership will include the organization of stakeholder participation at decentralized decision making, in which farmer organizations are supported to play their part.

**Output:** *Increased capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and its institutions including for stakeholder participation in decision making.*

**Activities:** The Embassy Office shall finance studies, workshops and training and reserve funds for an eventual common donor fund for the sector.

**Risks:** This sub program will diminish the risk of limited scope for reinforcing the system as a whole (sustainability), which is associated with the modality of project funding only. Starting too early with program funding would increase programmatic risk. Good indicators for institutional capacity will be identified to monitor progress. The Embassy Office will take into account experiences of the new PAIOSA project of BTC which will give institutional support to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MINAGRIE).

### 4.3 Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights including family planning

Below described program elements have been identified in collaboration with the Burundian government, UNFPA, the German development bank KfW, and Netherlands NGOs. In the coming months, more details need to be identified and proposed outputs and activities elaborated further. In 2012 the SRHR activities will be identified in more detail and slowly started up, to only in 2013 embark full fledge on the program. Proposed objectives and outputs may hence be changed or adapted.

#### **Goal C-1: Support Government efforts to reduce the unmet need to family planning**

**Outcome C-1:** Reduction of unmet need for family planning (indicator and target: unmet needs down from 49% in 2011 to 24 % in 2015)

##### **Country Outputs C-1:**

- Increased availability of modern contraception (indicator and target: contraceptive prevalence rates up from 19% in 2010 to 29% in 2015)

##### **Embassy Outputs Output C-1:**

- (number) of additional distribution points of modern contraceptive commodities
- (number) of health workers trained in modern family planning procedures (availability of choice of methods to meet the demand)
- (number) communities sensitized in using modern contraception

**Activities:** The Netherlands will contribute to family planning programs of both the public (PNSR<sup>8</sup>) well as the private sector (PSI<sup>9</sup>) by augmenting and continuing the support of KfW.

The following PNSR activities that focus on the provision of family planning will be supported: Purchase and distribution of modern family planning commodities and community outreach, incl. by mobile clinics; Community Family Planning (FP) workers; Training of health workers; Communication incl. community sensitization.

The following PSI activities that focus on the provision of family planning will be supported: Social marketing of condoms; Social mobilization and information on reproductive health.

##### **Risks:**

- At the outcome level: The official position of the Catholic Church and its affiliated hospitals and clinics towards family planning may hamper the program's effectiveness. 267 of all 800 clinics in the country are linked to the Catholic Church. Following the example from Rwanda it is proposed that governmental kiosks for FP services are provided next to the FP restricting health facilities.
- At the country output level: Lack of technical capacity in communities.

#### **Goals C-2: Improve access by youth to quality sexual and reproductive health services and help them make informed choices regarding sexual attitude and behaviour**

**Outcomes C-2:** Youth using quality sexual and reproductive health services and making informed choices regarding sexual attitude and behaviour (intermediate outcome); Youth enjoying good sexual and reproductive health and rights (final outcome). (indicators: adolescent fertility rate (age < 20years) and adolescent sexually transmitted infection (STI) rates/ targets to be defined).

##### **Country Outputs C-2:**

- Access to youth friendly counselling, information and sexual / reproductive health services is realized in 50% of all health districts
- Gender respect and acceptance of mutual rights are norms among 50% of youth

##### **Embassy Outputs C-2:**

- (Number of) youth friendly advocacy and mobilization materials that have been tested, produced and distributed
- (Number of) clinics that have adopted youth friendly working arrangements
- (Number of) youth clubs formed and active

<sup>8</sup> Programme National de Santé de la Reproduction

<sup>9</sup> Population Services International

**Activities:** With technical support from The Netherlands (e.g. Rutgers-WPF) and in close collaboration with Burundian organizations, a process of consultation and capacity building will result in the establishment of a youth platform for change. Such platforms will generate activities by and for youth to promote the access to information and services in the field of sexual and reproductive health. They will also promote the necessary gender dialogue and use youth appealing approaches (sport and pop music events) to promote responsible attitude and behaviour.

**Risks:**

- At the outcome level: With the deterioration of the social fabric the social support within communities for youth development to flourish may be absent. As some youth groups are currently being drawn into political or other purposes that may include violence, access by such youth to improve their empowerment could be perceived as a threat by some conservative forces. Alliance with political youth groups should be avoided.
- At the country output level: Political and/or social resistance from elders to empower youth
- At the embassy output level: The availability of an appropriate technical agency.

**Goal C-3: *Reduce sexual and gender based violence***

**Outcomes C-3:** Decrease in the number of cases of gender and sexual based violence (intermediate outcome); Increased gender equality (final outcome). (Indicators: number of reported cases of gender and sexual based violence; number of women in traditionally masculine positions)

**Country Outputs C-3:**

- Reduced fear for sexual violence
- Enhanced position of women and more gender equity in sexual relations

**Embassy Outputs C-3:**

- Sexual aspects of gender relations have been incorporated in the security theme
- Vulnerable position of sex workers addressed
- Guidance and rehabilitation provided to young sex offenders and support given to their victims

**Activities:** Sexual aspects of gender relations will be incorporated in the security theme, with technical knowhow and professional guidance and assistance. Netherlands added value, e.g. of the Netherlands police, will be used. The vulnerable position of women and commercial sex workers (both full time and transactional) will be addressed to ensure that their human rights are respected and protected. Guidance and rehabilitation of young sex offenders while in custody will be included as well as support to their victims.

**Risks:**

- At the outcome level: Changing attitude and behaviours cannot be done within a short timeframe, the consistent availability of local technical skills and patience is crucial. Macho driven criminal forces may perceive the gender equity towards security and sexual safety as an infringement into their assumed influence and authority.
- At the country output level: Political and/or social resistance to realize gender empowerment

## 5. Other interventions and involvement in Burundi by the Netherlands

There are more than ten Dutch NGO's working with MFS2 funding in Burundi, with a total spending volume in the country of about Euro 8 million per year. In Burundi, the different MFS2 alliances work for about 70 % on the same themes as the Embassy Office program proposed in this document. Therefore, the Embassy Office is responsible for maintaining close contact to ensure complementary working and synergy whenever possible. These opportunities, as far as identified by associating these NGO's and some of their local partners in the MASP process (on September 8, 2011, among others, there was a session), are mentioned explicitly (but not exhaustively) in the text of chapters 3 and 4.

Other Dutch links include the 'private sector instruments': ORIO, PSI, CBI, PUM. When the activities proposed for the theme Food Security are developed as planned, the number of Dutch enterprises interested in investing in Burundi will increase so that these instruments will also be used more frequently. The Embassy Office shall link closely with "agentschap.nl" to facilitate this.

Dutch money is also channelled into Burundi through multilateral channels: European Union (EU), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN organizations. Where possible and appropriate, the Embassy Office

will follow these projects and investments, inform the ministry in The Hague and also direct our representatives in the respective Permanent Representations (PVs), in order to act where necessary - either at the respective Headquarters/Boards through the PV, or in country by the Embassy Office.

The cooperation of Burundi on the issue of (compulsory) return of irregular Burundi migrants in the Netherlands needs improvement. The Embassy Office will advise and support the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs & Kingdom Relations with regard to anchoring the issue of (compulsory) return in the bilateral relation with Burundi. In addition, the Embassy Office will stress the importance of cooperation between Burundi and the Netherlands with regard to (compulsory) return in its conversations with the Burundi authorities.

## 6. Financial implications

*Financial ODA implications 2012-2015 in € (Policy area, budget-code, description)*

2.5 Security, good governance and rule of law	23,000,000
4.1 Food security	31,000,000
4.3 Private sector development	22,200,000
5.4 Sexual and reproductive health and rights & HIV/aids	12,600,000
6.1 Sustainable use of environment	5,0000000
<b>Total budget 2012-2015</b>	<b>93,800,000</b>