

THE DUTCH ENGAGEMENT IN URUZGAN: 2006 to 2010

A TLO socio-political assessment



The Tirin Kot-Chora Road / GTZ

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Acknowledgements

This report builds upon five years of TLO work in Southern Afghanistan. TLO would like to emphasize its commitment to independent and impartial research. Findings in this report are the sole opinion of TLO and do not necessarily reflect the views and position of the Dutch government.

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About The Liaison Office (TLO)

The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups. TLO's mission is *to facilitate the formal integration of communities and their traditional governance structures within Afghanistan's newly emerging peace, governance and reconstruction framework.*

TLO main areas of activity are Research/Analysis using the do-no harm approach; Dialogue facilitation/Peacebuilding, and Natural Resource Management.

In addition to the TLO headquarters in Kabul, the organization has four regional offices (Paktia-Southeast, Kandahar-South, Nangarhar-East, Kunduz-North), three provincial offices (Uruzgan, Khost, Paktika), and three district offices (Spin Boldak - Kandahar, Chora and Deh Rawud - Uruzgan) across Afghanistan, with over 200 staff.

TLO was established in 2003 by swisspeace on the request of community leaders in the Southeast. TLO has been funded by various non-governmental and governmental donors, international organizations and foundations. Currently these include the Heinrich Boell Foundation, the US Institute of Peace, Development Alternatives International, Association for Rural Development, Counter-Part International, GTZ, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, and the governments of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Poland, United States (USAID) and Switzerland (SDC).



Table of Contents

Glossary	iii
Executive Summary and Key Achievements	vi
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Study Limitations	2
1.2 Provincial Background	3
2 Socio-Economic Development and Reconstruction	6
2.1 Development Assistance	8
2.2 Agro-Economic Development	9
2.3 Achievements in Health Care	13
2.4 Achievements in Education	16
2.5 Achievements in Media/Communication	22
2.6 Achievements in Gender Equality	23
3 Governance and the Rule of Law	27
3.1 Provincial Government	28
3.2 District-level administration	30
3.3 Elections	32
3.3.1 Provincial Council Elections	32
3.3.2 Upcoming Wolesi Jirga Elections (September 2010)	33
3.4 Afghan National Security Forces	34
3.4.1 Afghan National Police (ANP)	34
3.4.2 Afghan National Army (ANA)	36
3.5 Justice Sector	37
4 (In)Security and the Insurgency	40
4.1 District Security and Government Control	41
4.2 Road Security	45
4.3 Insurgency	46
4.3.1 Regional Dimensions	48
4.3.2 Underlying Conflict Potentials	49



5	International Military Actors and the Dutch Withdrawal	50
5.1	Perception of International Military Forces	51
5.1.1	Perception of Dutch Forces	51
5.1.2	Perceptions of U.S. Forces	52
5.1.3	Perception of Australian Forces	52
5.2	Dutch Withdrawal	53
6	Conclusion and Recommendations for Dutch Successors	55
6.1	Development/Reconstruction	55
6.2	Diplomacy/Political Engagement	56
6.3	Defence (Stabilization/Security)	57
	ANNEX I: Ethnic/Tribal Composition of Uruzgan’s districts	58
	ANNEX II: Uruzgan Healthcare Performance Indicators (AHDS)	59
	ANNEX III: Overview of Media Outlets in Uruzgan	62
	ANNEX IV: List of Provincial Council Members	64
	ANNEX V: List of Nominees for the 2010 WJ Election ⁷⁸	65
	ANNEX VI: Maps	68



Glossary

'3D'	The Dutch Approach of Defence, Diplomacy, and Development
ACTD	Afghanistan Center for Training and Development
Afs	Afghani, official currency of Afghanistan
AHDS	Afghan Health and Development Services
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCC	Afghanistan National Re-Construction Coordination
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces (ANA, ANP, NDS)
ANSO	Afghanistan NGO Safety Office
AOG	Armed Opposition Groups
AWCC	Afghan Wireless Communication Corporation (Mobile Phone provider)
BBC	British Broadcast Corporation
BHC	Basic Health Center
CDC	Community Development Council, elected bodies through the NSP in charge of identifying and implementing community priorities
CF	Coalition Forces
CHC	Comprehensive Health Centre
CHW	Community Health Worker
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CoP	Chief of Police
DAI	Development Alternatives International, USAID contractor
DCA	Dutch Committee for Afghanistan
DG	District Governor
EQUIP	Education Quality Improvement Program
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FDD	Focused District Development
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GSE	Growing Sales Exchange
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)



IDLG	Independent Directorate for Local Governance responsible for coordinating sub-national governance policy and controlling the appointments process for most government offices below the national level
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEC	Independent Election Commission, the Afghan government organization responsible for carrying out elections at all levels
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IIFC	Islamic Investment and Finance Cooperatives
IMF	International Military Forces
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force—the NATO security mission in Afghanistan operating under U. N. mandate since December 2001
Jirga	Tribal Council
Kandak	Military Unit
Meshrano Jirga	Upper house of parliament
MISFA	Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MRRD	Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Directorate of Security (Afghan Intelligence Body)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSP	National Solidarity Program of MRRD
OCC-P	Provincial Operational Coordination Centre
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PBGF	Performance Based Government Fund
PC	Provincial Council
PDC	Provincial Development Council, provincial forum for donor coordination and development planning but lacking budget authority
PDP	Provincial Development Plan
PKR	Pakistani Rupee
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team, a civil-military development unit intended to provide recovery assistance to their respective provinces ideally in partnership with local government organizations



PTA	Police Training Academy
SCF	Save the Children Federation
Shura	Customary Council
Tashkeel	A term indicating the officially allocated number of professionals for a specific government department
TLO	The Liaison Office
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the U.N.-appointed office responsible for helping oversee U.N. assistance programs in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Federation
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar
WOCCU	World Council of Credit Unions
Wolesi Jirga	Lower house of parliament



Executive Summary and Key Achievements

Uruzgan is one of thirty-four Afghan provinces and belongs tribally and culturally to Afghanistan's Southern region. The majority of the population of Uruzgan is Pashtun (91%), with the remainder consisting of Hazara (8%) and other communities (1%).

On 1 August 2010, the US-led multinational Combined Team-Uruzgan replaced the Dutch command of the province. The Dutch had led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Uruzgan since 2006. Despite the short span of four years, the Dutch have brought positive change to Uruzgan through a comprehensive '3D' engagement approach (development, diplomacy/governance, and defence/security), that emphasized 'development where possible', 'force where necessary', capacity-building of Afghan National Security Forces, and engagement of key community leaders. The Dutch targeted their efforts on the three more populated districts of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and Chora. Today Afghan government and non-governmental actors have a greater presence in these regions and as a result residents have better access to resources. In the four remaining districts of Uruzgan (Char China¹, Gizab, Khas Uruzgan, and Chenartu) US and Australian Special Forces secured a continued but very limited Afghan government presence. In these areas the Dutch implemented an 'under the radar' development approach to reach the population. Limited resources, however, did not allow for assisting in the improvement of governance.

As their four year engagement concludes, the Dutch military can leave confident that their mission contributed to both security and development in Uruzgan. In fact, over time Dutch efforts in the province came to be considered a model of successful civil/military intervention within the context of the counter insurgency in Afghanistan.

Socio-economic development achievements

- Increased access for local and international non-governmental organizations (from six to over 50 in the past four years) in the three focus districts of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and Chora. Greater employment opportunities, especially with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Afghan government (mainly as teachers, police officers and/or soldiers), and health care facilities.
- In the past four years, donor projects in the **agricultural sector** have increased the availability of improved seeds, fertilizer, saplings and poultry; agricultural training, including training women in home gardening in Tirin Kot; construction of roads and dams; and cleaning and digging of canals.

¹ This district has two names, Shahidi Hassas and Char China. The name of Char China is more common and will be used in this report. It literally means four streams.

The diversity and number of crops, orchards and gardens has increased, irrigation systems have improved, transportation has become more efficient, and overall agricultural productivity has risen.

- Four years ago **health facilities** in Uruzgan were very limited. Today, additional clinics, staff, resources, and capacities have made health care more accessible. With support of the European Community, the Dutch Government and the Dutch NGO Cordaid, the local organization Afghan Health & Development Services (AHDS) constructed Comprehensive Health Centres (CHC) and/or Basic Health Centres (BHCs) in each district except for Gizab, increasing the total number of active health care facilities in the province from nine to seventeen. The number of health posts doubled to 200, and community health workers (CHWs) increased from 130 to 300, of whom 100 are women. There is also a new a midwifery school as well as community nursing school improving the provision of professional health care staff.
- With the exception of the district of Char China, there has been an increase in **schools** and school enrolment in all districts. The largest number of schools are located in the districts of Tirin Kot, Gizab, and Khas Uruzgan. In 2006 there were only 34 schools, with girls schools present only in Tirin Kot, Khas Uruzgan and Gizab. In 2010 there are 159 schools operating, of which 29 are girls schools and thirteen are mixed. In addition, 92 are closed, of which seven are girls schools and one is mixed. Fourteen schools were recently built but not yet operational, one of which is a girls school in Chora. The Dutch have been very involved in funding and promoting educational facilities in the province.

In Uruzgan province it is estimated that 20% of all school-aged children attend school, a figure which is significantly lower than the national average of 50%. The percentage of girls enrolled in Uruzgan's school is even lower and estimated at about 6.15%, with Gizab at 27%, Khas Uruzgan at 14%, Tirin Kot 6% and Chora with 0.40%. Furthermore, only 43% of all students in Uruzgan actually study inside a school building.

- **Media outlets** in Uruzgan have increased from three to eight with five radio stations, one TV station and two combined radio / TV stations. Most of the radio stations have an emission radius of approximately 30 km from the centre of Tirin Kot. The lack of electricity makes for a limited TV audience. Uruzgan had no **mobile phone coverage** in 2006, but now Tirin Kot and Deh Rawud are connected to two mobile networks, Roshan and AWCC.
- A few noticeable achievements have occurred in **gender equality**, with one woman now present in both the Provincial Council and in the *Meshrano Jirga* (upper house of parliament) and four running for the *Wolesi Jirga* (lower house of parliament). Achievements in health care include the training of midwives and greater access to medical facilities. Opportunities for girls education have increased with 36 girls schools of which 29 are operating and 14 mixed boy/girls schools of which one is closed. And one significant but informal observation is women increasingly frequent the Tirin Kot bazaar, with rough estimates of about 100 women shopping per day.

Over the past four years growth in reconstruction and development has been substantial. That said, energy provision continues to be deficient. Corruption among government officials remains a concern, including allegations of skimming of salaries for teachers and police officers. The sustainability of service provision remains uncertain, especially in health care and education, which is heavily supported by local and international NGOs.

Achievements in Governance and the Rule of Law

Despite the Dutch, Australian and US government support and funding of sub-national (reform) programs, four years was not enough time to install a functional civil servant culture in Uruzgan.

- In 2006, only an estimated 20% of district positions were filled. Four years later only 30% of district level government positions are filled. While all districts, even Taliban controlled Char China, have a district governor and chief of police, other government departments including education, public health, and agriculture, remain understaffed. The lack of personnel capable and willing to fill government positions in insecure areas remains a fundamental problem.
- Compared to the 2004 presidential **elections**, voter turnout for the August 2009 presidential and Provincial Council (PC) elections dropped precipitously throughout the south and east. Nationally, voter turnout dropped 50 percent between 2004 and 2009. Karzai was re-elected by the Uruzgan voters, but all Uruzgan PC members were replaced. The new council is still dominated by members of the Popalzai tribe with 50% of all seats. Uruzgan has one of the lowest numbers of Wolesi *Jirga* candidates in Afghanistan in 2010 with only 19. In most cases the Ghilzai did not even nominate candidates, apparently doubting the elections would be free and fair and expecting strongmen of other tribes to determine the outcome.
- The numbers of **Afghan National Security Forces** have increased in the province to about 2,000 to 3,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) and about 2,500 Afghan National Army (ANA). In the districts of Char China and Khas Uruzgan there is a deficiency of Afghan security forces with about 1 policeman/soldier per 100 people. The Dutch mission in Uruzgan focussed on the training of ANP forces. In 2010, for example, ANP forces in Chora completed a training course, after which they received better ratings from district residents. While the overall perception of the ANP did improve slightly since 2006, the reputation of ANP officers remains low, with drug addiction, ill-fitting uniforms, bad equipment, bribery, and extortion remaining. Residents speak more highly of the ANA because they are better trained, well mannered, and more equipped than the ANP.
- There have been limited improvements in the formal **justice sector**. While private prisons and indiscriminate detention are less common, the capacity of the formal justice system remains low. Twenty percent of all judges are in place, and a general sense of distrust of the formal justice system is pervasive. Both the ANP and the National Department of Security (NDS) have been accused of abusing detainees. Most conflicts are solved by traditional structures, Taliban judges or arbitrarily by government officials.

Security and Counterinsurgency Achievements

The free movement of people and government control slowly improved following the Dutch arrival in Uruzgan, especially in the three districts of Tirin Kot, Chora and Deh Rawud where the Dutch focussed their efforts. In, 2006, 2007 and 2008 the international military conducted operations against the Taliban in the districts of Chora and Deh Rawud and as a result mobility and government have increased in these districts.

- At present it is estimated that the **government controls** up to 85% of Deh Rawud, 75% of Tirin Kot, and 45% of Chora. The biggest change, however, occurred in Gizab, where the district government was re-established in mid-2010 after four years of Taliban rule with assistance of Australian and US military. In the districts outside of Dutch focus, Chenartu and Khas Uruzgan, the circumstances have grown more insecure and in Char China the situation is basically the same. The presence of US and Australian Special Forces allowed a continued and limited government presence in these district centres.
- Even though **road security** generally decreased throughout 2007, it has gradually improved since mid-2008. The road from Tirin Kot to Deh Rawud is now considered among the safest in Uruzgan, largely due to Dutch efforts. Travel for government employees through Taliban controlled areas remains difficult.
- The **insurgency** in Uruzgan today is best described as a patchwork of tribes and individuals with a wide range of demands and interests. It was instigated by *old garde* Taliban, who still play a prominent role among the insurgency leadership, but an influx of new comers with a wide variety of objectives makes the group far from homogenous. Current estimates of the Taliban are between 1,400 and 3,500. Over the last three months the Taliban have changed their operational strategy. There are more activities in areas under the control of government and/or international military forces including more improvised explosive devices (IEDs), random attacks, propaganda against government and international forces (IMF) (e.g. sermons at mosques) and intimidation (e.g. night letters).
- **Neighbouring provinces** negatively impact the security in Uruzgan. Northern Helmand has been under constant insurgent control for the past years; Zabul has a mostly non-existent state security structure, which allows weapons and narcotics to flow unchecked into Uruzgan; and Kandahar and Ghazni are contested territories where the government and insurgency are fighting each other.

International Military Actors and the Dutch Withdrawal

When the NATO-mandated Dutch troops, along with a significant contingent of Australians, took command of the Tirin Kot Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) on 1 August 2006, they entered a charged environment. US forces were seen as intervening in tribal affairs by supporting the Popalzai government leaders and excluding Ghilzai, Achekzai, Barakzai and Nurzai/Babozai communities who were seen as associated with the Taliban insurgency.

The Dutch government has tried to counterbalance this by engaging Tokhi (Ghilzai) and Barakzai leaders and focusing on “local ownership” of development and security projects. Local confidence was built through a combination of consultation with a variety of local communities and authorities, respect for local structures and customs, as well as a conservative use of military force. Furthermore, Dutch troops worked with the Afghan police or army wherever they could and tried to stay in the background through the outsourcing of reconstruction contracts.

Local perception is that the Dutch engagement has been at times at odds with US-led Coalition Forces (CF) focus on counter-terrorism. Local respondents understand US and Australian Special Forces to engage local strongmen to fight the Taliban while the Dutch engage a wider network of tribal groups in effort to establish tribal balance.

- While the **Dutch** are generally seen in a favourable light, their engagement approach focussing on dialogue and treading carefully has also been interpreted as indecisive and less forceful than that of US and Australian forces. The clear separation of civilian and military tasks has made Dutch development engagement much less visible. Local communities and implementing partners appreciate that by being less public their work is less contentious and less visible to Taliban actors.
- More unfavourable perceptions of the **Americans** continue to be based on actual events and insurgency propaganda. Respondents explain the US military appears caught up, willingly or unwillingly, in local conflicts and manipulated by various parties into eliminating rivals. Some people express confusion about the ultimate US plan in Uruzgan or Afghanistan.
- Feedback about the **Australians** is less common, as they are frequently either put into the US or Dutch camp. Due to their more visible and hands-on approach (e.g., going out to build schools and clinics), they are generally considered to be ‘more serious’ and productive when it comes to both development and security. This leads to the overall perception that the Australian military deliver what they promise and monitor their projects.

Initially the **Dutch withdrawal** created concern, especially among some Tokhi and Barakzai leaders with whom the Dutch had established relationships. A carefully established balance of power between different tribal leaders and power brokers is at risk of unravelling, possibly creating insecurity by pushing some community leaders into the insurgency and halting the positive developments. Regionally, Uruzgan will be affected by adjacent areas. The continuity of Dutch success from the past four years depends on how their successors build upon past work and the maintain the continuity of the Dutch approach.

1 Introduction

On 1 August 2010, the US-led multinational Combined Team-Uruzgan² replaced the Dutch command of the Southern province as part of ISAF. Discussion over the extension of the Dutch military engagement stalled when its cabinet fell on 20 February 2010. The withdrawal of their 1,600 troops raises the question whether the Dutch government might have cut short their momentum in Uruzgan and whether the changes they introduced will prove to be durable.

The Dutch entered a strongly divided political landscape. They took a less aggressive approach than the US military and managed positive contributions to Uruzgan through a distinct style of engagement that received local and international acclaim. Uruzgan over time came to be considered a 'model' province within the increasingly insecure South.

The Dutch comprehensive '3D' approach (development, diplomacy/governance, and defence/security), emphasizing 'development where possible' and 'force where necessary', proved to be relatively effective in Uruzgan. The approach translated into an overall 'conservative' use of force, with major military operations in Chora in 2006, 2007 and 2008 and Deh Rawud in 2008. The political strategy was based on understanding the local balance of power and including marginalized local elites in the Afghan government. The approach supported the Afghan army and local authorities to exert control and to create an environment for reconstruction projects, with an emphasis on basic infrastructure, bridges, schools, mosques, drinking water and medical services. In practical terms, the Dutch provided the funds but the reconstruction work was done by the Afghan Government, the UN, international and Afghan Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as well as Australian military. This stands in contrast with the more direct and visible involvement of other actors, both in security and development.

Rather than spreading themselves across Uruzgan, the Dutch used an inkblot approach including a counterinsurgency strategy³ complemented by 'under the radar' development efforts focusing on the central districts of **Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud, and Chora** (and parts of Khas Uruzgan) where about 50% of the population lives⁴. Today these areas enjoy the greater access for Afghan government and non-governmental actors and better availability of basic services.

² Combined Team-Uruzgan includes around 1,800 U.S., Australian, Singaporean, Slovakian, New Zealand, and French personnel. The majority of these, about 1,500 are Australian troops.

³ This strategy, devised by NATO when it took over command of southern Afghanistan, focused on setting up secure zones, from which they could slowly expand outwards like "ink spots" on blotting paper. Rachel Morarjee, 'Taliban hinder NATO 'ink-spot' strategy', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August 2006; for the Dutch this meant focusing on gaining control in the central districts of Uruzgan where the majority of the population lives.

⁴ We acknowledge that Dutch official sources claim these districts constitute 70% of the provincial population. However, our estimates suggest a different picture: Tirin Kot (90,000), Shahidi Hassas/Char China (84,000), Khas Uruzgan (80,000), Deh Rawud (78,750), Chora (72,000), Gizab (59,000), Chenartu (30,000).

The sustainability of the Dutch efforts in Uruzgan depends on how successor nations—especially the United States and Australia—will continue the Dutch course. At present, the Afghan government is still considered too weak, corrupt, and non-representative to be able to take control of the province on its own. This means a continued, possibly broader, engagement with all communities is necessary that seeks to strengthen the state and sidelines spoiling political influences⁵.

Using a 2006 TLO assessment conducted at the beginning of the Dutch civil-military mission in Uruzgan as a baseline, this report evaluates the changes that have occurred in Uruzgan over the past four years. It draws upon approximately 64 interviews conducted between 1 June and early July 2010 and four years of continuous research.

1.1 Study Limitations

Several issues need to be kept in mind when reading and interpreting this report. First, as the Dutch government never operated alone in Uruzgan but was supported by Australia and also the United States, changes and achievements in Uruzgan cannot be attributed to the Dutch government alone. In order to isolate the impact of the Dutch approach, a much more detailed assessment would be necessary that goes above and beyond this report.

Second, the different engagement strategies of the three civil-military actors in Uruzgan shape the perception people have about them. As the Dutch approach enhanced a sense of 'local ownership' of initiatives by empowering local authorities and communities, their direct development contribution may be less visible than Australian troops who engage directly in reconstruction.

Third, four years is a short time for measuring impact on economic development and governance. Here one needs to acknowledge the seeds the Dutch have sown, even though they were not able to stay in order to reap the fruits.

Fourth, there are very few 'hard facts' in Afghanistan in general and Uruzgan in particular. The last census was conducted in 1979, and many statistics, especially those linked to government resources, are manipulated. For example, some departments may obtain more funds from the central government if they artificially increase the number of teachers or police on their payroll.

Last but not least, the Dutch departure casts a shadow over this assessment, creating anxiety, especially among leaders of marginalized communities with whom the Dutch government specifically engaged. Thus, while it is politically important to assess the impact of the Dutch presence in Uruzgan, the timing of the research creates limitations. A follow-up analysis at the end of 2010, when some of the disquiet around the Dutch departure has settled, would help to validate our findings.


⁵ Indications that the Australians and U.S. are aware of the importance of this were visible through the facilitation of a meeting in early July 2010. The first steps were taken in early July 2010 with Australian Special Forces facilitating a meeting between Matiullah Khan (Popalzai key leader and Head of the Operational Police), Nabi Khan Tokhi (a key Ghilzai leader) and Daoud Khan (Barakzai key leader, Governor of Chora).

TLO tried to mitigate all these issues as much as possible by combining the use of available 'facts' with perceptions, and differentiating the perceptions from communities that fell under the Dutch focus against those that did not, as well as communities where leaders were engaged by the Dutch against those who were not.

1.2 Provincial Background

Uruzgan is one of the thirty-four provinces of Afghanistan. It is part of Southern Afghanistan's tribal culture and falls under Kandahar's political and economic influence. It borders Daykundi to the north, Kandahar to the south, Helmand to the southwest, and Zabul and Ghazni to the east (see Map 1).

Map 1: Uruzgan and its neighboring provinces



Past population policies have determined the current boundaries and ethnic and tribal composition of Uruzgan. The province was restructured on 28 March 2004 just prior to the presidential election. By separating Daykundi from Uruzgan President Karzai gave in to a long-term Hazara demand to create a second Hazara-majority province. Two districts—Khas Uruzgan and Gizab—still have large Hazara minorities (27 and 21 percent, respectively). Gizab initially was made part of Daykundi, but was rejoined with Uruzgan in 2006, a decision some Hazara of the area are actively trying to reverse.

Uruzgan was once inhabited mostly by the Hazara, but they were gradually forced out when Afghan kings resettled Pashtun tribes in the 18th and 19th

century to consolidate state administration in the region⁶. The majority of the population of Uruzgan today is Pashtun (91%), with a Hazara minority (8%) and other smaller ethnic communities (Sayed, Tajiks, Quraish, and Sikh/Hindu) making up the remaining 1% of the population (see Table 1 and Annex I for a district breakdown and Map 2 in Appendix VI for a regional one).

Table 1: Estimated Ethnic and Tribal Composition of Uruzgan Province⁷

Zirak Durrani	57.5%	Panjpai Durrani	18.5%	Ghilzai	9.0%	Other	6.0%
Achekzai	35.0%	Khogiani	1.0%	Hotak	4.0%	Babozai ⁸	5.0%
Popalzai	10.5%	Nurzai	17.5%	Tokhi	2.5%	Kakar ⁹	0.5%
Barakzai	9.0%			Suliman Khail	1.0%		
Mohammadzai	1.5%			Andar	1.0%		
Alkozai	1.5%			Taraki	0.5%		
Hazara	8.0%	Sayed/Quraish/Tajik	1.0%				

King Ahmad Shah Durrani began a policy of settling Ghilzai Pashtuns on Hazara lands in an effort to decentralise Pashtun power by spreading tribes across Afghanistan. Later, Amir Abdur Rahman gave Durrani tribes Hazara and Ghilzai land for their support defeating rebelling Hazara and Ghilzai tribes in Uruzgan¹⁰. As a result areas of Uruzgan have a mixed population (see Appendix I)¹¹.

⁶ Ahmad Shah Abdali (locally also called Ahmad Shah Durrani or Ahmad Shah 'Baba' – the father of Afghanistan) expelled the Hazara of Deh Rawud, Tirin Kot and parts of Shahidi Hassas during his empire building efforts in the mid 18th century. Later, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan continued the process by pushing out Hazara from remaining parts of Shahidi Hassas, Chora, Khas Uruzgan, and Gizab in the late 19th century.

⁷ Percentages from the 2006 survey are slightly revised, e.g., downward adjustment of the Ghilzai Pashtun from 10-15 percent to 9 percent of the population. The correction reflects more detailed tribal mapping and categorization of individual tribes outside the two main confederations, e.g., Babozai and Kakar are represented here under "Other Pashtuns".

⁸ Some Babozai consider themselves to be a sub-tribe of the Nurzai (Panjpai Durrani), while other tribal elders say they are a sub-tribe of the Hotak (Ghilzai).

⁹ The Kakar are considered as belonging to the Ghargasht confederation. The Kakar are considered as belonging to the Ghargasht confederation.

¹⁰ The former were pushed north or into Quetta, Pakistan, and the latter east (Ghazni, Paktia, Wardak, and Zabul) where the Ghilzai heartland now lies.

¹¹ It is worth noting that the Panjpai Pashtuns historically belonged to the Ghilzai tribes, until they were annexed into the Durrani confederation in the late 18th century, but in many ways are still considered second-class Durrani. Especially the Nurzai, one of the largest tribes in Uruzgan (17.5%), are still considered Ghilzai Pashtuns in some parts of Afghanistan (such as neighbouring Zabul).

While local politics in Uruzgan are partially shaped by these historic alignments, ethnic (Pashtun/Hazara) and tribal (Durrani/Ghilzai) rivalries are just one element in a complex environment. Two other important conflict lines have crystallized and need urgent addressing: between pro-government strongmen vs. former Taliban and internal community divisions.

Between 2002 and 2006, Popalzai control of government in Uruzgan has grown stronger despite the fact that they represent only 10% of population. There have been limited reconciliation initiatives aimed at including excluded communities and their leaders. As a result in some cases tribal rifts have deepened, pushing some people into the insurgency. For example, the governor's office initiated a 'witch hunt' against everybody who had even marginally association with the Taliban government including the Ghilzai in Tirin Kot, and the Durrani in other districts. This alienated the Ghilzai and created divisions within the Achekzai and the Nurzai, two of the largest Durrani tribes in Uruzgan. These government policies have created pro- and anti-government camps with the latter thought to support the insurgency.

Meanwhile, some provincial government policies have been directly beneficial for Popalzai members. The government helped to carve out the new Popalzai-majority (75%) district of Chenartu from southern Chora, essentially as a 'tribal enclave' that would allow a greater share of resources to flow directly to the area, instead of through Chora as before.

Today, politics, conflict and violence in Uruzgan are driven by a polarization amongst Pashtun communities: a tight network of strongmen—linked to the previous provincial governor Jan Mohammad Khan vs. large parts of the population. The relation between Hazara and Pashtun communities in Gizab and Khas Uruzgan has also grown increasingly tense over the past year¹².

¹² Representatives of the thirty-person Sikh/Hindu community in Tirin Kot Bazaar argued that they were worse off now than under the Taliban regime.

2 Socio-Economic Development and Reconstruction

A country's well-being can be assessed by a wide range of factors, from its material living standards to the nature and quality of its social and environmental circumstances. Following the lead of the millennium development goals, this section will look at the changes over the past four years in terms of agricultural and rural development, livelihood issues, education, health care, media and communications. A separate section addresses gender equality and women's empowerment as having a multiplier effect for socio-economic development¹³.

In addition to targeted development and reconstruction efforts by the Dutch, Australian and US governments, increased basic security has strongly influenced living standards over the past four years. In 2006, the TLO Provincial Assessment observed, *"Reconstruction in Uruzgan is hampered by insecurity and lack of implementing capacity. Insecurity makes the challenge of implementing any reconstruction project particularly daunting. In this respect, the situation has significantly deteriorated in the last 2 years [2004-2006], with the operational space of traditional reconstruction actors and of the government continuously shrinking, as a result of which international and credible national NGOs are practically absent from the province."*

The Dutch approach understands the provision of security and development assistance to go hand in hand, with the military providing an enabling environment for civilian development actors and development projects contributing to a more stable and secure environment. This has increased access for local and international NGOs in the three focus districts of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and Chora, bringing visible improvements. In 2006 only five NGOs were operating in the province, today there are over 50 national and international NGOs operating throughout Uruzgan¹⁴.

Some of the changes in socio-economic developments in Uruzgan over the past four years are not quantifiable and therefore difficult to measure. Furthermore, even quantitative measures need to be considered carefully as statistics are often unreliable and sometimes manipulated. With this in mind, residents did report improvements in the key areas of education, health care, agricultural development, and transportation (roads) since 2006, with more services reaching communities, especially in the Dutch target districts.

The Dutch ink blot approach improved security in *Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and parts of Chora* which enabled development improvements. The relatively good security situation as well as the presence of Afghan National Security and International Military Forces have not only attracted more development actors, but also more than doubled the number of businesses in the Tirin Kot bazaar from 900 to 2,000, with the Chora and Deh Rawud bazaars also showing expansion. In addition to Afghanistan's Central bank, two others have recently

¹³ UNDP, What Will It Take to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals? An International Assessment, New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme, June 2010; http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=2620072, p.1

¹⁴ Many are supported by the Netherlands and some by the U.S. and Australia.

taken up business in Uruzgan: Kabul (2009) and Azizi Bank (2010). Increased business and employment opportunities and relatively better security have attracted people to move to the provincial centre, Tirin Kot, from surrounding districts. Work on the Tirin Kot-Chora road has been completed up to Surkh Murghab and as a result more people go to the bazaar in the evenings to sell their crops and buy household commodities (for other road construction projects see Map 3 in Appendix VI).

Residents of the other four districts, *Char China, Gizab, Khas Uruzgan, and Chenartu*, in contrast report that economic conditions have not improved over the past four years. The frequency of Taliban threats, operations by International Military Forces, insecure roads are unfavourable to development projects or private sector activities. The exception is Gizab centre, which was recently re-captured by government forces, and residents express hope that economic development will follow.

Over the past four years employment opportunities in Uruzgan have increased, especially with NGOs, the Afghan government (mainly teachers, police officers and/or soldiers), and health care facilities. Nevertheless, most households still depend on farming, gardening, and remittances from migrant work to sustain themselves, in part because government jobs have low salaries and many development-related jobs are temporary. An estimated 20-40% of young men in Uruzgan migrate to work in Iran and Pakistan or to other places in Afghanistan. Respondents estimate that remittances make up an estimated 20-30% of a household's income in Chenartu and Gizab, while in most other districts respondents estimate dependency on income from migrant labour lies between 60-70%.

Increased development, employment and security have also had one adverse effect, prices, especially for food and rent, have gone up. In the centre of Tirin Kot housing prices have quadrupled over the past four years, largely due the increased demand of migration from insecure districts. The cost of many items of daily use and foodstuff is now about three times higher than four years ago. Thus, additional employment opportunities have not yet raised the wealth of most Uruzgani citizens, with most income still being spent on food and items of daily use.

Commodity prices, however, are also driven by the fact that Uruzgan's economy is not self-sufficient and most food and clothing items are imported from either Kandahar or Kabul. While international fuel prices also affect transportation costs (and by association the prices of goods and services), road insecurity forces merchants to either pay a security levy or switch to airfreight instead of ground transportation. The road from Kandahar to Tirin Kot, for example, is notoriously insecure and under the control of Matiullah Khan (Head of the *Kandak-e Amniat-e Uruzgan*¹⁵), who only ensures convoy safety about once every ten days for a steep price. As a result, the toll has gone up, which is discounted in the price of car services. The Dutch promoted Kabul linkages through Kam Air flights between Kabul and Tirin Kot, allowing Kam Air to land

¹⁵ Formerly the Highway police and now the Operational police which falls technically under the command of the Chief of Police and is part of the Afghan National Police structure.

inside Camp Holland. After one year, the airline increased the flights from two to three per week by July 2010, with the maximum number of passengers up from 20 to 40.

Dependence on Kandahar City markets leads to reliance on the Pakistani Rupee, the main currency of the province. The Afghan currency, the Afghani, is rarely accepted in local stores, and is often exchanged at the same rate as the PKR, despite its higher value. The result is Uruzgan's economy is more under the influence of Pakistan than oriented towards Afghan markets, true of many of the economies in the Afghan South.

2.1 Development Assistance

There is a Provincial Development Council in Uruzgan headed by the governor and including all key departments and stakeholders involved in development. It should be responsible for overseeing progress on the Provincial Development Plan (PDP), but a clear strategy is not visible and resources are lacking to complete the list of priority projects¹⁶. Residents say the main problem confronting the province is not a lack of development, but the continued weakness of the government. Locals see development and reconstruction projects as something 'foreigners' do, while the state thus far is largely deemed unresponsive to their needs.

This raises concerns about the sustainability of service provision, especially in health care and education, which are done mostly by NGOs, with Afghan Health & Development Services (AHDS) leading in health care and Save the Children in education. There is little trust in the ability of the Afghan government to do development. As a Popalzai elder from Deh Rawud notes: *"In my opinion, Afghans should not be provided with cash unless all the administrations are corruption free and professional people are appointed in the offices. The best way is that foreigners themselves implement provincial projects."*

The only exception might be the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) currently implemented in Deh Rawud, Chora and to a lesser extent in Chenartu by the local NGO Afghanistan National Re-Construction Coordination (ANCC)¹⁷ and in Tirin Kot directly by MRRD. Among respondents, NSP was not only the best recognized but also best-liked sub-national government program in Uruzgan. It was seen as responding to people's wishes and needs as well as providing leadership opportunities, which corresponds to what it had set out to be¹⁸. One re-

¹⁶ Tilmann Röder, "Provincial Needs Assessment: Criminal Justice in Uruzgan Province", The Embassy of the Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), 15 May 2010, p.10.

¹⁷ It has been successful to establish 240 Community Development Councils (CDCs) in three districts of Uruzgan and made some 60% of progress with development projects; <http://www.ancc.asia/>

¹⁸ Jennifer Brick, "The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in Rural Afghanistan," 2008, p. 17, 36; see also Hamish Nixon, "The Changing Face of Local Governance: Community Development Councils in Afghanistan", Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008 for another study of CDC structures and roles.

peatedly cited key advantage of NSP by local residents is the provision of employment, which helps the image of the government.

While some advances have been made in the areas of reconstruction and development, especially in the areas of education, health care, media and telecommunications, many problems remain. In particular energy provision is still quite deficient. As of 2010 Uruzgan has not yet been connected to the Afghan electricity grid. While the district centres of Tirin Kot and Deh Rawud are serviced by two government owned generators, most other districts have no public access to electricity. Residents have to rely on privately owned generators, solar panels (in some areas provided by NSP), or dams (sometimes constructed with support from the Netherlands or with the help of the Provincial Reconstruction Team-PRT) that generate hydroelectricity. These services, however, are only available to a few, usually affluent district residents. Tirin Kot's generator serves 350 households and runs between six to ten hours per day in summertime and for a few hours at night in the wintertime. In Deh Rawud the generator only runs for about two hours per day. Charges are between 30 and 40 Afs. (USD 0.70-0.90) per kilowatt. In Tirin Kot, an entrepreneur has also started an energy business providing power to the bazaar area. Even though he charges more per kilowatt (reportedly between 57Afs. and 160PKR, USD 1.15-1.85), his service is preferred by Tirin Kot's residents, especially *bazaaris*, as he offers 14 to 16 hours of electricity per day.

Another problem with development initiatives is corruption. In large-scale construction projects, such as the resurfacing of the Chora-Gizab road that was funded by the US, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been swallowed by bribes and kickbacks¹⁹. While USAID has been especially known for its use of multiple sub-contractors, the Dutch and Australians have attempted to contract local companies, rather than putting out national tenders. This appears to have reduced the embezzlement of money that often comes with multiple sub-contracting.

Even the much-praised NSP is not fully free of corruption allegations, especially in Chora. One person that was interviewed quit as a NSP community mobilizer due to frustration over corruption and strongman meddling. In Deh Rawud the complaint was less with monies being embezzled than with the poor quality of work by contractors used to implement NSP projects.

2.2 Agro-Economic Development

As in 2006 subsistence agriculture remains the primary economic activity of the bulk of the population in Uruzgan, but other economic activities are slowly increasing. In 2006 the condition of the irrigation systems was bad, poppy cultivation had done away with the diversity of crops, and most livestock had been killed.

In the past four years, donor funding in the agricultural sector have focussed on the improvement of farming, including rural infrastructure and water re-

¹⁹ Matiullah Khan recently removed his security guards from this road alleging that he had not been paid for nine months. He cited the number of sub-contractors as a problem with money flow.

source management (see Maps 4 and 5 in Appendix VI). Projects have promoted the distribution of improved seeds, fertilizer, saplings, poultry; agricultural training, including gardening training for women in Tirin Kot; construction of roads and dams; cleaning and digging of canals. In addition a technical working group on agriculture and livestock was established in Uruzgan to enhance coordination and synchronization within the sector, exchange information, and decide on joint action. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), this is unique for Afghanistan. In addition to efforts by the US and Australian government, the following Dutch supported agricultural programs deserve special mention:

- Strengthening of three value chains (almonds, grapes, vegetable oil) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), including almond de-husking machine in Chora and the purchase of over 1 million fruit tree seedlings from community nurseries and distributed to farmers.

- Distribution of certified wheat seed and fertilizer to 32,000 families during two seasons across Uruzgan. The best farmers are being chosen to produce certified seed in the future.



Picture 1: Improved Wheat Seed: TK-Deh Rawud Road/ TLO

- Support to 1,000 vulnerable farmer households.
- Chickens were distributed to 500 families, mostly to widows with small children. Each family received seven hens and two roosters per family. The eggs can be sold in the bazaar and the manure can be used for gardening.
- Setting up of Para Veterinary Units by the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan (DCA) and training of para-veterinaries.
- SADA implemented several projects in the Darafshan area in Tirin Kot and the Qala-e Ragh area in Chora. In the first half of 2010 these projects included flood protection by placing gabion; 6 hand pumps; the cleaning of 6 *karez*es (irrigation channels); and the distribution of 60 solar of which 4 families per panel benefited.
- Since 2007, a small Dutch company, Growing Sales Exchange (GSE), has supported saffron production in Uruzgan, controlling the entire supply chain: cultivation, training, providing equipment, and buying the final crop. With about 500 farmers (220 started participating this year) participating

in the program, production was 51.5 kg in 2008, 97.5 kg in 2009 and an expected output of 200 kg in 2010²⁰. Qualitatively the production is better than expected; quantitatively the yield should have been 20% higher. This might be due to the relatively poor condition of the soil or to the fact that farmers do not always sell their produce to the pre-established buyers. The goal is to multiply the cultivation areas by 300% over 5 years. Most (90%) of the saffron production is qualified as second and third order quality, but in 2010 5-10% of the yield will be first order quality saffron²¹.

- The Netherlands also support a program under MISFA implemented by WOCCU for micro-credit to 2,295 members of Islamic Investment and Finance Cooperatives (IIFCs) in Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawud. The program issues credit to mostly farmers and trades people to improve the quality, productivity, and ability to transport their products to the market. Recently, a third IIFC was opened in Chora.

As a result of these efforts, the diversity of crops has increased, the number of orchards and gardens has gone up, irrigation systems have improved, transportation has become faster, and agricultural productivity has risen. In addition to the illegal opium export, Uruzgan currently produces cumin, black beans, and dried fruits (almonds, figs, and apricots) for export to India and Pakistan. Additionally, grapes and almonds that used to be imported from Mazar-i Sharif are now locally grown.

This said, wheat and other agricultural products (vegetables, cereals) are mostly cultivated for local consumption and generate very little revenue. Poppy remains the most important cash crop. The selling of agricultural goods is hampered by the fact that most crops in Uruzgan take at least two years to see success in cash farming (e.g., almond trees which can take five years to harvest)²². Tirin Kot is not a big trading centre and Uruzgan is also not located on a main transit route. Due to the insecurity on the road to Kandahar it is almost impossible (or at least very pricey) to build an agro-export economy.

Furthermore, agricultural output is heavily dependent on weather conditions. In 2006/7 and 2007/8 Uruzgan suffered droughts followed by harsh winters, which impacted on agricultural output. More favourable weather, especially

²⁰ The program provides each farmer with 800 kg of saffron bulbs which he plants one jerib (2,000sqm). From 2009-10 220 farmers participated planting a total of 168 tonne of saffron bulbs. The distribution of these bulbs was organized by the local NGOs SADA, ANCC, and ARPD.

²¹ The sale price of saffron has decreased over the past three years. In 2008 the price was between USD2,400-3,000/kg. The global economic downturn and high saffron productions in Iran have caused this decrease in prices. Prices are expected to stabilize in 2010 at around USD2,200-2,400. The saffron has found its way to Dubai and Spain. Intermediary Blue Green World will continue buying Uruzgan saffron in its entirety in the next few years. It is important to keep an eye on the production chain, and some distribution and sales options are being developed through a Dutch company. Another option is to switch to organic saffron, which would have a 25% higher price. Uruzgan's production is organic already with the exception of use of chemical fertilizer.

²² The exception is vegetable seeds, which germinate in a few months.

rain, in the 2008/2009 and especially 2009/2010 seasons increased agricultural output, with bumper harvests this past year.

Legal crops compete with poppy, with farmers making choices to maximize income. The Dutch have tried to counter poppy production with a government approach that focuses on promoting certified wheat, almond, saffron, and apricot production; improved rural infrastructure; collecting information on those involved in processing and trade; drugs awareness through radio, TV programmes (soaps), posters and magazine; and treatment centres for drug addicts.

While these measures have been partially successful, statistics of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) suggest that opium remains Uruzgan's biggest cash crop in 2010²³. In Tirin Kot, for example, poppy cultivation still takes up 50-60% of the fields. Locals find it hard to comprehend why military forces or Afghan National Police have not intervened into poppy cultivation or sale so close to the district centre of Tirin Kot, and blame it on corruption. There are indeed allegations that several pro-government strongmen, and not just the insurgency, are involved in the drug trade in Uruzgan. Furthermore the fact that there are semi-open poppy bazaars in both Deh Rawud and Tirin Kot adds to the perception of impunity.

Whereas poppy cultivation continues in most parts of Uruzgan, it is an achievement that, based on observations in May 2010, Deh Rawud has in fact complied with a government ban on poppy cultivation. Yet, tribal elders expressed disappointment that their compliance was not rewarded. According to local information, also in Chora the government ban on poppy cultivation was supported by the district *shura* through an agreement and successfully implemented.

International demand and high prices seem to drive poppy cultivation. A man from Chenartu, for example, noted that while poppy is usually the district's main source of revenue it has been experiencing bad years because of drought. Tirin Kot residents added that poppy cultivation would have been more extensive without the distribution of alternative seeds and saplings. Some argue that as long as poppies have a higher market price than other crops in Uruzgan, there will never be an incentive to cultivate other crops. In 2008, when the price for wheat increased on the world market due to wheat shortages, more farmers indeed switched from poppy to wheat cultivation. The recent prediction of a rise in wheat prices because of extensive flooding

²³ UNODC prediction that Uruzgan was likely to become one of the five highest poppy producing provinces in 2006 came true when cultivation increased from 4,605 (2005) to 9,703 ha taking up the majority of all arable land. Since 2006 cultivation has fluctuated, but never dropped below the 9,000 ha mark (9,204 ha in 2007, 9,939 ha in 2008, and 9,224 ha in 2009). According to the latest UNODC estimates, Uruzgan cultivation will moderately increase again in 2010, most notably in the districts of Tirin Kot and Char China. Uruzgan now produces 7.5% of total national opium poppy production and ranks fourth on the list of poppy producing provinces (with a majority produced in Helmand). Additionally, UNODC reports that half of the surveyed poppy-growing villages received cash advances from external sources to grow opium poppy in 2010, up from an estimated 20% the year before. UN numbers are derived from a small sample size and do still not include Gizab district, where cultivation levels are reportedly high. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010. Winter Assessment; Feb. 2010; http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2010_Final.pdf

in wheat producing regions of the world may once again provide an opportunity to promote wheat cultivation in Uruzgan.

Last but not least, projects aimed at boosting agriculture in Uruzgan are often met with opposition from Taliban. There have been several instances mentioned of Taliban interfering in wheat distribution or destroying dams. The Dutch government has tried to circumvent insurgency involvement through 'under the radar' projects that work in villages with a small amount of funds²⁴.

2.3 Achievements in Health Care

UNDP notes that improved health care does not only decrease overall mortality, especially that of women and children, but also leads to a higher productivity²⁵. Indeed, much has been undertaken in the domain of health care in Uruzgan in the past four years. The Dutch and other foreign donors have been mainly funding two Afghan NGOs in order to improve healthcare in Uruzgan: AHDS (Afghan Health and Development Services) and Afghanistan Centre for Training and Development (ACTD). They have focussed on constructing health facilities, building local capacity by training of mid-level health workers and sustaining public health care programs, as well as raising the awareness of health issues in villages. The most notable improvement occurred in the Dutch focus districts of Tirin Kot, Chora, and Deh Rawud (see Table 2 and Map 6 in Appendix VI).

With support of the European Community, the Netherlands Government and Cordaid, AHDS built Comprehensive Health Centres and/or Basic Health Centres (BHCs) in each district except for Gizab (see also Annex II)²⁶, bringing the total number of active health clinics in the province up from nine to 17.

In order to facilitate at least rudimentary access to health care in rural and remote communities, AHDS is coordinating health posts in the province. Each post is staffed with one male and one female health worker, who provide basic help and medication, raise health awareness, and refer patients to more medically qualified people if necessary. In the past four years, the total number of posts throughout the province doubled to 200, with a corresponding increase of community health workers (CHWs) from 130 to 300, of whom 100 are women. Adding CHWs to the pool of health care providers, the ratio in Uruzgan increases to 7 professionals per 10,000 people. This figure, however, may under-represent the provision of qualified health care services.

²⁴ Cf. The Liaison Office, *Three Years Later: A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009*, Kabul: The Liaison Office, 2009

²⁵ UNDP 2010, p.1

²⁶ In Gizab health care provision remained the same after the Ministry of Public Health and the European Community shifted responsibility for implementation of the Basic Package of Health Services to another NGO as Gizab was transferred back and forth between Uruzgan and Daykundi.

Table 2: Comparison of operational health facilities²⁷: 2006 and 2010

DISTRICT		July 2006	Existed in 2006	June 2010	New additions
Tirin Kot	↑	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District Hospital • BHC 	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District Hospital upgraded to a 75 bed Provincial Hospital (with women's wing) with psychiatric unit and TB centre • Addition of 50 beds under construction • 1 CHC • 1 drug treatment centre • 69 health posts • Midwife training • Community Nursing School
Deh Rawud	↑	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHC 	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 BHCs • 1 drug counselling centre • 39 health posts
Chora	↑	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHC 	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 BHC • 1 drug counselling centre • 24 health posts
Khas Uruzgan	↑	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHC 	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 BHCs (one was built and one health sub-centre was upgraded to a BHC) • 1 Health sub-centre • 26 health posts
Chenartu	↑	0		1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 BHC was upgraded to CHC, but technically still operates as BHC and the new building is not yet constructed
Char China	↑	0		2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 CHC • 1 BHC under construction • 17 health posts
Gizab	→	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CHC • 2 BHCs (under Taliban control) 	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 BHC under GoA control • 1 BHC under Taliban control but open • 29 health posts

²⁷ These are operated by the Afghanistan Health and Development Service (AHDS). There are six additional private clinics in the provincial centre.

The problem with these CHWs is the discrepancies between the expectations residents have of them and the services they are capable of providing. Residents treat them as qualified doctors when in reality they are more a referral service for health care facilities, with the ability to provide a cure for simple colds or the flu at most. Moreover, the CHWs are all volunteers. They are overwhelmed with requests while they have their own daily occupations to attend to as well. They often cannot manage all the requests and, when the security situation is bad, cannot count on assistance from the supporting NGO.

Save the Children supported a School Health Project and UNICEF financed projects for Management of Acute Malnutrition throughout the province. In addition, an ambulance for Tirin Kot's bazaar and Chora district were purchased. In order to deal with growing drug addiction, one drug treatment centre was built in Tirin Kot and one drug-counselling centre each in Deh Rawud and Chora.

The doubling of the number of health facilities in Uruzgan and the fact that some of them were built in unstable areas have made health care in Uruzgan more accessible. Especially the upgrading of Tirin Kot's hospital from a district to a provincial facility by adding an outpatient clinic, a blood bank, an operation room, a mortuary, and a cholera ward, and a separate women's ward was cited as an important improvement in the health care sector for the entire province. A respondent noted that he was recently able to have his appendix taken out in Tirin Kot hospital, a procedure for which he would have had to go either to Kandahar or Kabul in the past. The provincial hospital also cooperates with the military hospital: patients who have been operated at the military hospital go to the provincial hospital for postoperative care.


Despite the increase in health care facilities, the number of health care staff has changed from 89 to 124, but the percentage of female workers has stayed the same at about 19%²⁸. With 56 doctors and nurses in total there is one qualified health care professional per 10,000 people in Uruzgan (The OECD average is 3.2 per 1,000). Figure 1 depicts health care staff subdivided by occupation (total and for women).

There are 31 doctors in the province, up from 19 in 2006; (including one dentist, one female internal specialist, two general surgeons), 18 technicians up from 12 in 2006; (including lap, dental, pharmaceutical, X-ray technicians and anaesthetists), 26 vaccinators, up from 20 in 2006, 11 Community Health Care Supervisors (including one woman), up from eight in 2006, and 25 nurses (no increase), of whom four are female. Midwives, all women, have increased from five to 13.

With funding from the Dutch NGO Cordaid and management of the local NGO AHDS, a midwifery school was started in Tirin Kot. It has a capacity for 12 female students, with the first cohort graduating in the spring of 2010 and a second course starting. In addition, ACTD collaborated with the Dutch NGO Healthnet TPO to train 35 men and ten women as community nurses, community laboratory technicians and community pharmacists in Tirin Kot.

²⁸ This report compares data from 2006 and 2010 provided by AHDS that includes vaccinators and technicians. In 2009 TLO reported a doubling of numbers of health care workers based on a comparison with 2006 data that did not include vaccinators and technicians.

Figure 1: Health Care Professional in Uruzgan: 2006 and 2010 in comparison



Even though the number of female health workers has gone up, compared to four years ago, finding qualified female healthcare workers is a major problem for AHDS. Much of this relates to the lack of education among girls and to cultural norms against women working.

For a province where hardly any healthcare was available four years ago, the additional clinics, staff, resources, and capacity building clearly marks an improvement. Yet, for many provincial residents, specifically those outside the Dutch focus districts, there are still serious capacity limitations. The expectations of health care are usually higher than other public services. There are complaints about unqualified or absent staff or unavailable medication in the health posts and the clinics. One of the main reasons why many respondents who had attended a health centre were not satisfied with the service received were shortages of drugs, and unqualified staff. In Chenartu, for example, the monthly medicine supply is usually completely depleted within two days. These supply and staff shortages practically mean that clinics in remote areas can only deal with minor illnesses. If the condition is serious, people hope to be treated in Tirin Kot, in the provincial hospital or in the PRT. But not all roads are safe for travelling. For example, insecurity on the Mehrabad road requires Khas Uruzgan residents to travel 15 hours to Kabul or somewhat less to the neighbouring Ghazni province for treatment (see Section 4.2).

2.4 Achievements in Education

UNDP emphasizes education provides a society with needed skilled labour that is essential to improving productivity and income. Education reduces poverty and decreases child mortality²⁹. While TLO relied on secondary sources in the past, it conducted its own assessment of the educational situation in Uruzgan

²⁹ UNDP 2010, p.1

in May and June 2010 by interviewing available headmasters and teachers in the province. The data for 2006 is more limited, making accurate comparison difficult.

TLO had knowledge of only 34 schools in 2006 (with girls schools present only in Tirin Kot, Khas Uruzgan and Gizab) but found 166 operating schools in 2010 (including 7 *madrassas*)³⁰, of which 29 are girls schools and 13 mixed; an additional 94 closed schools (including 2 *madrassas*), of which 8 are girls schools and 1 is mixed; and 15 not yet officially opened schools³¹, one of which is a girls school and one is a *madrassa* (see Table 6 and Map 7 in Appendix VI). In addition to schools there are two teacher training centres in Uruzgan, one in Tirin Kot and one in Khas Uruzgan.

These numbers break down as follows and Table 3 provides an overview of the distribution of operating schools by district:

166 Operating Schools and Madrassas

- 100 elementary schools, of which 18 are girls schools, and 7 are mixed.
- 37 secondary schools, of which 7 are girls schools and 4 are mixed.
- 22 high schools, of which 4 are girls schools and 1 is mixed.
- 7 *madrassas* for boys

15 Not Officially Opened Schools

- 12 elementary schools, of which one is a girls school
- 1 secondary school for boys
- 1 high school for boys
- 1 *madrassa* for boys

94 Closed Schools and Madrassas

- 80 elementary schools, of which 7 are girls schools.
- 4 secondary schools, of which 1 is a mixed school
- 8 high schools
- 2 *madrassas*, of which 1 is a *madrassa* for girls

³⁰ *Madrassas* offer religious education and are community based and funded, even though the Ministry of Education has recently begun to include them into their mandate. Their curricula revolve around religious subjects and are not standardized or institutionalized. The Afghan South does not have a strong history in religious education. The number of *madrassas* and their students in Uruzgan is therefore low and the educational levels are considered to vary.

³¹ This generally means that a building exists, but that these schools have not yet been officially approved by the Ministry of Education and put onto their *tashkeel*.

Table 3: Comparison of operational schools: 2006 and 2010

District	July 2006	June 2010		New Additions	No school building
Khas Uruzgan	<12	45	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 elementary (boys) • 9 secondary (7 boys, 2 girls) • 2 high schools (boys) 	35% no school building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 in private home • 5 in open air • 3 in mosques
Gizab	Unknown	38	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 under construction 	97% no school building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 24 in mosques • 6 in private homes • 5 in open air • 2 in tents
Tirin Kot	9	37	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 16 elementary boys • 3 secondary (2 boys, 1 mixed) • 3 high schools (1 girls, 2 boys) • 1 high school burnt down 	35% no school building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 in private home • 5 in open air • 3 in mosques
Deh Rawud	<8	17	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 elementary boys • 2 secondary boys • 2 high school boys • 2 burnt down (1 still operates) 	47% no school building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 in mosques • 3 in private homes • 2 in open air
Chora	4	12	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3 elementary (2 boys, 1 mixed) • 4 elementary (3 boys, 1 girls) • 7 burnt down (5 still operate) 	58% no school building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 in open air • 1 in mosque
Chenartu	Unknown	9	↑	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 under construction 	100% no school building <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7 in mosques • 2 in open air
Char China	1	1	→		
Total	<34	159			91 (57% no building)

With the exception of the district of Char China, there has been an increase in schools in all districts. The highest number of schools is found in the districts of Tirin Kot, Gizab, and Khas Uruzgan. For Tirin Kot, this means that access to education has increased. In Gizab the majority of schools are located in the Hazara areas, which have traditionally known a higher distribution of schools. In the Pashtun areas, however, open schools are few and far between because of security concerns. Residents of Gizab, Khas Uruzgan, Chora, Chenartu and Char China hope the security situation will increase so schools will reopen.



Picture 2: Girls at Malalai High School in Tirin Kot/ TLO

The increase in number of schools, however, does not necessarily reflect an increase in actual buildings, with only 43% of all students actually studying inside a school building (regardless of condition). In Chenartu 100% of all schools operated either in open air or in mosques, and in Gizab all but one school are either in mosques, private homes, in open air or operated out of tents. In Chora nearly 60% of all schools have no school building, followed by Deh Rawud where it is nearly 50%. In Khas Uruzgan and Tirin Kot nearly 65% of schools have an official school building. In Char China, the only school operates out of a building.

The Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP) of the Ministry of Education has been supported by the Dutch to establish School Management Committees, support the basic needs of the schools and to construct more elementary schools in order to improve education. There are currently 53 schools under construction of which 42 are operating either in private homes, mosques, tents or the open air, while the school building is being constructed.

The international NGO Save the Children, funded by the Dutch government, is planning the construction of another seven schools in the province and school walls surrounding the buildings to create privacy (especially for girls schools) and school yards. Furthermore, GTZ and the University of Wageningen (The Netherlands) are constructing a technical school and an agricultural school in Tirin Kot, as well as practical training in agriculture.

With the increase in operating schools, student enrolment increased as well (see Table 4). There are 42,772 students (6,774 girls) that go to school regularly and 5,234 occasionally (814 girls). Of these figures about 19,600 (3,600 girls) go to *elementary* school, about 15,200 (2,700 girls) to *secondary* school, and about 18,700 (2,200 girls) to *high* school.

Table 4: Number of children going to school regularly and occasionally in 2010


District	Boys			Girls			Grand Total
	Reg	Occ	TL	Reg	Occ	TL	
Tirin Kot	10,499	1,025	11,524	522	60	582	12,106
Deh Rawud	5,210	1,408	6,618	0	0	0	6,61
Gizab	4,843	719	5,562	3,424	601	4,025	9,587
Chora	3,508	599	4,107	52	21	73	4,180
Chenartu	1,066	178	1,244	0	0	0	1,244
Khas Uruzgan	10,816	461	11,277	2,776	132	2,908	14,185
Char China	56	30	86	0	0	0	86
TOTAL	35,998	4,420	40,418	6,774	814	7,588	48,006

Still, measured against an estimated number of school-aged children in the province, only 20% of them are actually registered. This percentage is significantly lower than the national average of 50%³². If the two districts with Hazara populations and highest school enrolments, Gizab and Khas Uruzgan, were excluded, the percentage of students attending school would be even lower. Tirin Kot is the only Pashtun dominated district with school enrolment of about 20% (see Figure 2). The percentage of girls enrolled in Uruzgan's school is even lower and estimated at about 6.15%, with Gizab leading with 27.3%, followed by Khas Uruzgan with 14.5%, Tirin Kot with 6.6% and Chora with 0.41%³³.

³² 2007 UNDP Human Development Report

³³ These figures are very rough estimations working with a population pyramid of Uruzgan that estimates 70% of the population to be 18 years or younger. Health data indicate that about 20% of all residents in Uruzgan are under the age of five; hence about 50% of the population can be considered of school age, and 50% of those girls.


Figure 2. Overview of percentage of school-aged children in Uruzgan's schools



In addition to regular schools, Save the Children UK supported home-schooling programs and "accelerated learning" for students that missed education during the Taliban years. A total of 80 accelerated learning courses (25-30 students per course) were started in July 2008 by ANCC in Tirin Kot (30 classes), Deh Rawud (30 classes) and Chora (20 classes) districts. Each course has two classes per year (6 months each).

Last but not least, there are 1,126 teachers, of whom 67 are female (see Figure 3). There is a teacher training school in Tirin Kot and Khas Uruzgan, with approximately 425 trainees. Residents of Chora, Chenartu and Char China in particular complain about the lack of schools and limited staff. The head of Char China schools had reportedly moved to Tirin Kot leaving this district without an educational director. Residents Tirin Kot and Deh Rawud have higher expectations of the salary and the qualification of teaching personnel.

Figure 3: Overview of Teachers in Uruzgan (2010)



The payment of salaries is a big problem in Uruzgan, due to a lack of allocation for teacher positions in the *tashkeel*³⁴, delays in the transfer of funds or corruption among education department heads. As a result it is not uncommon that teachers teach without being paid for months or even years. TLO spoke to a headmaster from Khas Uruzgan who came to Tirin Kot in July to collect the back-salaries (past four months) for around 40 teachers from his region. Ten days after his arrival he was still waiting to received the monies from the Department of Education.

Surveyors also reported threats to school facilities. The insurgency targets first teachers with verbal threats or night letters, or both, and at times directly threatens to kill them. About 90 teachers reported this problem, especially in Tirin Kot, Chora and Chenartu. Even in the one operational school in Char China, seven teachers had received threats. Khas Uruzgan and Deh Rawud seem to be the two districts with least threats. Students are also targeted, even though less than teachers, and some schools are reported to have been burnt down. Not always do threats, however, come from the insurgency only. Sometimes it may be linked to other conservative elements in an area, or personal disputes.

2.5 Achievements in Media/Communication

Over the past four years the media outlets in Uruzgan have increased, especially national radio broadcasts. In 2006, in addition to BBC and Voice of America Uruzgan had one government controlled FM radio station for a few hours per day when it did not have technical problems. International Military Forces had set-up two small FM stations in Deh Rawud and Char China for the local population. There was no newspaper or TV station in the province.

In 2010 Media outlets in Uruzgan have increased from three to eight with five radio stations, one TV station and two combined radio / TV stations. Most of the radio stations have an emission radius of approximately 30 km from the centre of Tirin Kot. The lack of electricity makes for a limited TV audience.

In addition to BBC and Voice of America, Radio Nawa is the most popular national radio station, especially its call-in programs. In terms of demographics, Nawa attracts more youth listeners, while the older generation prefers BBC. Uruzgan Zhagh, the ISAF radio, is often criticized for its lack of professional radio staff and is considered to be run by PRT interpreters. The latest radio station, Paiwastoon Zhagh (Connecting Voices), was recently set-up by Matiullah Khan in order to bridge the gap between the people of Uruzgan and its government. The radio station has been up and running since July 2010, broadcasting news, Islamic issues and music in a 40 km radius around Tirin Kot. There are concerns that this radio will simply become a platform for Matiullah Khan.

³⁴ The *tashkeel* is the number of teachers allocated to a school. If the teacher is not in the *tashkeel* that is approved by the Ministry of Education, s/he cannot claim salary.

In 2006, Uruzgan had no mobile phone coverage. One digital phone system was in place in Tirin Kot, mostly catering to government needs. In 2010 each district is to a certain extent connected to a telephone network. Tirin Kot and Deh Rawud are connected to two mobile networks, Roshan and AWCC. Deh Rawud was the most recent connection with the tower in the district centre beginning to operate in February of this year. Chora was already connected to AWCC last year with a tower 5 km south of the district centre. In Chora and Deh Rawud the AWCC services is restricted to 8-6 pm and 8-5 pm daily, allegedly due to Taliban threats. Other districts are not connected to mobile phone networks and rely on a few public call offices in the district centres, on privately owned satellite phones, or on accidental coverage via cell towers located in neighbouring provinces.

2.6 Achievements in Gender Equality

In 2006, TLO observed *"Uruzgan ranks among one of the most conservative areas in Afghanistan, distinguishing itself as the only province countrywide where no women candidates could be found to run for the three reserved female Provincial Council (PC) seats in the 2005 elections"* and that women *"are deprived of education, health as well as employment opportunities (the latter outside of their homes)."* Against this assessment, the few changes that did occur over the past four years are remarkable and noticed by both men and women:

- Woman from Tirin Kot: *"Four years ago, women only worked in hospitals and some of them were teachers in female schools. Currently women have more job opportunities. Nowadays women work in the directorate of women's affairs, the directorate of public health, and other organizations. And there are literacy courses for women in the Tirin Kot bazaar"*.
- Male shopkeeper from Tirin Kot: *"Over the past three years, some of the women have come out of their houses to participate in the affairs of the community, as head of the women's affairs directorate, as members of the provincial shura and parliament. Others work in the hospital or teach in the Malalai School."*

These comments touch upon changes in several domains within the lives of women. One domain that women have been successful in is the **elections** for the Provincial Council and in the nominations for the *Wolesi Jirga* (the lower house of parliament). In 2009 two Pashtun women made it into the Provincial Council: Hilla, an experienced NGO worker from Khas Uruzgan who lives in Tirin Kot, and Marjana, a Kuchi from Tirin Kot. With the support from Matiullah Khan, Hilla was later elected into the *Meshrano Jirga* (the upper house of parliament). For the upcoming election for the *Wolesi Jirga*, the number of women candidates has also risen, from two (2005) to four (2010). Another five women began the nomination procedure but did not complete it.

In general women in Uruzgan have not been participating in **political networks** and have only acquired a political position with outside support, as in the case of Hilla. Most people interviewed, however, argue that certain leaders support women to improve their image rather than out of concern for the po-

sition of women. Aside from the Provincial Council and in the Hazara or Shia areas in Khas Uruzgan, Gizab, and Tirin Kot, there are hardly any *shuras* (local councils) in which women participate. None of the NSP community development councils include women, and the implementing NGO ANCC claims it is impossible to do so. Yet, an elder from Deh Rawud argues that they were never told that women should be included into the NSP programme. The women's *shura* in Deh Rawud district was abandoned in late 2009 as the District Governor seemed to have used it as a platform to find a second wife and the *shura* that was organized by the Department of Women's Affairs in Tirin Kot also ceased because most women did not like the head of women's affairs.

It appears to be easier for Tajik and Hazara women to acquire a public position in Uruzgan than for Pashtun women. Of the four final *Wolesi Jirga* nominees, only one is a Pashtun, despite being 91% of the Uruzgan population³⁵. One nominee is a Tajik from Kabul, Fareshta Sami Wafa, who is the current head of the Women's Affairs department, a position she will have to give up in order to stand for elections. The other two are Hazara, one originally from the neighbouring Daykundi province. The situation is also different for women outside of Tirin Kot, as an elder originally from Chora district puts it: *"In the districts women have not come out of their houses to participate in the affairs of the community and only few women work in the local clinics."*

Health care, however, is an area that has become more accessible to women. One example is the graduation of the first cohort of (community) midwife trainees from the Tirin Kot women's hospital. The training, run by the Afghan NGO AHDS, started in 2006. Seven girls from Uruzgan were sent to the midwife school in Kanda-



Picture 3: Women's Ward Tirin Kot Hospital/ TLO

har-city for a two-year training period. In 2008, AHDS was able to start the course in Uruzgan, and attracted twelve students for an 18 months training, of whom nine graduated. AHDS is currently in the process of enrolling another 12 students, and hopes to reach out to districts beyond Tirin Kot and Deh Rawud. Messages have already been sent to the community health committees of the respective districts. The AHDS manager also reported an increase in women's visits to health care providers from 2004 to 2010 (40% of the pa-

³⁵ This is Malika Barakzai, mother of current Member of Parliament Sona Niloofar, who recently emigrated to Australia with her family.

tients are now women, whereas they hardly figured in the statistics in 2004). Immunization of women has also increased from 26% to around 60%, child immunization from 32% to 75%, and family planning from 4% to 9% (see also Appendix V).

There are also indicators of change in the **education** sector, although they are not as substantial as in health care. In 2005 the first girls' school in Tirin Kot, Malalai High School, was established, with 20 students. Now there are two girls schools and a mixed one at each level of elementary, secondary and high school in Tirin Kot. The number of students at Malalai High School is about 400, with 351 girls attending school on a regular basis. In the whole province, there are a total of 36 girls schools of which 29 are operating, compared to 201 boys schools, of which 117 are open. Another 14 are mixed boy/girls schools, of which one is closed. Almost all of these girls or mixed schools are in the two districts with Hazara populations: Gizab and Khas Uruzgan. Of the Pashtun-dominated districts, only Chora and Tirin Kot have mixed schools. None of the other districts have girls' schools. Of the total number of students in Uruzgan, 16% are girls, most attending school on a regular basis.

There are only three permanent female teachers employed by the Ministry of Education in Uruzgan, and another 64 on temporary contracts. Of 119 headmasters in Uruzgan, only one is a woman. In order to identify women for teacher training, an intensive search took place in Tirin Kot through local elders and community leaders, identifying some 120 girls with some level of education (even though below national standards). These girls will be given the opportunity for training as teachers (with additional classes to enhance their education level), others may be encouraged to join the civil service internship programme or be trained for healthcare.

All in all, however, Uruzgan only has a *tashkeel* for 80 female teachers. Thus even if there were more girls' schools in the province, the Ministry of Education would not have funds to hire female staff until the *tashkeel* is changed.

Last but not least, women increasingly **frequent the Tirin Kot bazaar**. There are estimates of about 100 women per day shopping there, with a pharmacist arguing he received 15-20 women per day and another shopkeeper even putting it at 20-30 per day. An NGO worker, supported by one *bazaari*, argued that most women in the *bazaar* are non-Pashtuns (Tajiks or Hazara) or wives of NGO employees from other provinces. This is contradicted by other *bazaaris*, who claim that even Pashtun women come to their shops (especially pharmacies).

Despite these achievements, the attitudes of communities towards the employment of women, especially the link between women's work and a man's honour, still hampers the advancement of women. It might be one thing to allow a woman to get educated and work, but altogether another one to engage with women as equal, possibly taking on board her opinions. A woman from Tirin Kot explains the social pressure: "*People who listen to women are called cowards.*" A man concurs: "*Men would be embarrassed if they get help from women. People will say: look at that man who is seeking help from women.*"



Picture 4: Women walking next to the Tirin Kot/ Chora road/ GTZ

3 Governance and the Rule of Law

"I don't see any problem in the policies but the problem is in the implementation of policies. All the policies are written and organized very well, but due to unprofessional and unskilled personnel, lack of resources in offices, and lack of monitoring of provincial and district level, formal and informal institutions by the central government, the policies are not implemented in a good way." Achekzai elder from Tirin Kot.

Despite changes in governance over the past four years, and an attempt by the Dutch government to lobby with Kabul power-brokers to replace inefficient, corrupt and biased government officials, Uruzgan still resembles a political market place where savvy entrepreneurs dominate a merit-based appointment system³⁶. Personal links to President Karzai and/or to the Popalzai tribe of the president constitute a major advantage. In Uruzgan, as in much of Afghanistan, President Karzai is known to micro-manage government appointments down to the sub-national level. *"He appoints one-third of the upper house of parliament, provincial governors, district governors, the mayor of Kabul and all other municipalities, and the heads of a number of independent offices of commissions."*³⁷ The previous Provincial Governor Hamdam lamented that he lacked powers to change provincial department heads as many would simply call up the president to protest. The importance of the "Karzai" connection for political appointments also means that a change in the presidency could dramatically impact the power structure in Uruzgan, much as in other areas in Afghanistan.

Notwithstanding a concerted effort by the Dutch, Australian and US governments, substantive funding to sub-national (reform) programs³⁸ and continuous attention and support to sub-national government structures, very little impact is visible in the provincial and district government³⁹. A four-year time frame is simply not enough to create a civil servant culture. As elsewhere in Afghanistan, government performance and capacity in Uruzgan has been hampered by four key problems: lack of qualified personnel; lack of physical infrastructure; lack of financial and logistical resources; and lack of oversight

³⁶This issue is explored in depth in a forthcoming TLO/Clingendael report.

³⁷ Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams, *Governance in Afghanistan: Looking Ahead to What We Left behind*, Washington DC: Center for American Progress, May 2010, p.7; http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CAP_GovernanceInAfghanistan_LookingAheadToWhatWeLeaveBehind.pdf

³⁸ While the Afghan Government's Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) is active in Uruzgan, only very few programs, such as the Performance Based Governors Fund (PBGF), the provision of advisors to governors under the Afghanistan Sub-national Governance Programme (ASGP), as well as training for civil servants were known by respondents. The PBGF is a program that empowers provincial governors by providing them with operational budgets to enhance their relationships with citizens and improve their overall management capacity. <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Activity.166.aspx>.

³⁹ In addition to Dutch efforts, the Australians were very active in governance. They financially supported training of 49 interns for the provincial governors office, capacity development with MRRD, MEW, and Public Works Dept, the municipality of Tirin Kot. Also USAID (DAI) has supported governance in Tirin Kot.

and control mechanisms over public expenditures and processes. This compromises performance, and enables corruption and embezzlement of public monies and inefficient resource allocation⁴⁰.

De facto power does not yet match *de jure* power and the government still does not monopolize the use of force. Matiullah Khan, for example, continues to be far stronger than Juma Gul, the current Chief of Police; even though Matiullah Khan and his *Kandak-e Amniyat-e Uruzgan* legally should fall under the Afghan National Police command.

TLO shares the critique of the Dutch Afghanistan analyst Martine van Bijlert that "*international actors would be well advised to stop acting as if they are dealing with already de-personalised government institutions, where the adoption of policies and procedures will automatically lead to the intended changes in behaviour and corporate culture*"⁴¹. In other words, success of outside efforts will be limited as long as individuals implementing sub-national programs lack capacity and skills to do so and the political interest of key actors goes counter merit-based appointments. This is why training programs as well as close monitoring of provincial government were seen as particularly important by provincial residents to improve the performance of civil servants and curb corruption and mismanagement.

Now that the Dutch have left, there is concern about transferring governance support from the PRT to Afghan actors and programs. Residents say the main problem confronting the province is not a lack of development, but the continued weakness of the government. Locals see development and reconstruction projects as something that is done by 'foreigners', while the state is largely unresponsive to their needs.

3.1 Provincial Government

Provincial government in Uruzgan needs to be seen as monopolized by pro-government (Popalzai) strongmen, who increase their own power and that of their tribe by practising a policy of marginalizing members of the former Taliban regime (or those associated with them) and weakening other power holders by excluding them from access to political positions and economic opportunities. Leadership rivalries within tribes were also exploited such as between Shah Mohammad and his nephew Daoud Khan, who is the current Governor of Chora, over the Barakzai leadership⁴².

⁴⁰ Here no mention is made of the negative impact that over centralization and the resulting lack of flexibility have on government performance.

⁴¹ Martine van Bijlert, "Between Discipline and Discretion: Policies Surrounding Senior Subnational Appointments", Briefing Paper Series, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, May 2009, p.21

⁴² Since Shah Mohammad lost Jan Mohammad Khan's and Matiullah Khan's support after an incident of self-justice he has been trying to mend relations with his nephew Daoud Khan and seek his support. It is unclear if this is going to last however.

Of note is Jan Mohammad Khan, who ruled Uruzgan between 2002 and 2006⁴³. During his tenure, an increasing number of important tribal leaders who had initially supported a government grew frustrated. Most positions at the provincial level were held by a limited number of tribes dominated by a small Popalzai tribal elite, while the sizeable Nurzai, Barakzai and Achekzai population groups were only minimally represented.

Understanding these dynamics, the Dutch lobbied with the central government to replace Jan Mohammad Khan with Mawlawi Hakim Munib, who took office in March 2006. Jan Mohammad Khan however continued to meddle in politics and influence government appointments⁴⁴, restraining the influence and authority of Munib and subsequent governors.

Governor Munib, himself a former high official in the Taliban Ministry of Border Affairs, tried to include former Taliban, as part of an effort to reduce the distance between alienated community leaders and the provincial government⁴⁵. Even though most of his efforts did not go beyond inviting elders for dialogue, acknowledging their grievances, and discussing possible solutions, the alleged use of financial incentives to bring marginalized actors on board seemed threatening to pro-government strongmen in the province, leading ultimately to a break-down of his outreach strategy, and his resignation in September 2007⁴⁶. Publicly Munib was criticized as one-sided and empowering former Taliban and therefore not trustworthy and siding with the resistance⁴⁷.

⁴³ After the capture of Uruzgan from the Taliban in 2001, President Karzai initially appointed Malem Rahmatullah (Popalzai) as Provincial Governor, but soon replaced him with Jan Mohammad Khan (Jan Mohammad Khan, Popalzai)

⁴⁴ Jan Mohammad Khan is the uncle of Matiullah Khan and cousin of acting provincial governor Khudai Rahim (previous deputy Provincial Governor), both of who he promoted in their positions. Two of sons are married to two daughters of Haji Aziz Agha (Alkozai from Tirin Kot), the previous Head of the Agriculture Department. He is also close to Uruzgan MPs Mohammad Hashim Watanwal and Sona Neelofar (Barakzai; who he allegedly helped getting elected), and local strongmen Akthar Mohammad (Barakzai from Chora) and Ghulam Haider Khan (Nurzai from Char China). Of the twenty-five odd provincial government departments he is linked to sixteen of them, and he also is said to be involved in most district governor (e.g., in Char China and Deh Rawud) and CoP appointments (provincial and Deh Rawud). He is also very close to half of all elected Provincial Council members, helping some to get elected.

⁴⁵ To do so, Governor Munib had access to an "operational reconciliation fund" of 13 Million Afghani (= USD 281,233, calculated 5 March 2010) per month.

⁴⁶ The release of imprisoned Taliban insurgents, the free movement of Taliban commanders in Tirin Kot (e.g., visits to the governor's house), and the employment of a 40-man bodyguard force of mostly Babozai tribesmen (considered by Popalzai strongmen as Taliban sympathizers) added to the concern of pro-government strongmen of losing their monopoly on security provision.

⁴⁷ In particular the previous Provincial Governor Jan Mohammad Khan was opposed to the reintegration attempts of Governor Munib, as he feared it could undermine his carefully engineered power-base.

Munib was replaced by another outsider to Uruzgan, Assadullah Hamdam, who continued to address some of the tribal and ethnic imbalance in government positions⁴⁸. Under his rule some Ghilzai elders, who had been systematically sidelined, were included as heads of line departments. While Popalzai still dominate by holding six departments, Achekzai and Tokhi now head four and three departments, respectively. Barakzai hold two departments, fairly representative of their population size, while Alkozai, Babozai, Hazara, Kakar, Nurzai and Sayed each hold one. Of the Ghilzai confederation, the Hotak (Taliban leader Mullah Omar's tribe), mostly living in the insurgency controlled Mehrabad area of Tirin Kot, are absent, despite a higher population percentage than the Tokhi. Among the larger tribes in Uruzgan, the Nurzai are most under-represented, heading only one department.

Hamdam only lasted a little over two years in office, and was forced to resign in early 2010 due to allegations of corruption, such as requesting kickbacks from road construction firms. This said, he had also been frustrated with his inability to effectively govern, and presented his resignation already twice prior to his dismissal.

For unknown reasons, Hamdam was not immediately replaced, leaving his deputy Khodai Rahim Khan as acting provincial governor, with no new appointment expected until after the parliamentary elections in September. One could speculate, however, that this might be due to the trouble with finding an individual able to govern in Uruzgan, with several strongmen also aspiring to this position. Most of Uruzgan's residents feel that appointing Khodai Rahim has weakened the provincial government and placed power squarely back into the Popalzai camp. People see the acting governor as ineffective and little more than Matiullah Khan's placeholder (Rahim is a maternal uncle of Matiullah Khan).

The authority of the Provincial Government is still hardly felt in most districts (for details see Section 4.1 and Table 6). Even though most key government departments exist in Tirin Kot, many residents of Uruzgan speak disparagingly about their provincial government officials. They regard them as poorly qualified, nepotistic and more concerned with filling their own pockets than administering. If there is any governmental presence, it is the district government. And even here it is scant, with elders feeling that international actors prop up the local government.

3.2 District-level administration⁴⁹

In 2006, only an estimated 20% of district positions were filled, which has only risen by 10% in the past four years. While all districts, even Taliban controlled Char China, have a district governor and chief of police, other key government departments, such as education, public health, agriculture, and

⁴⁸ This is not to suggest that tribal and ethnic representation is sufficient in itself, as the community may not see the office holder as their representative despite the same tribal or ethnic background.

⁴⁹ Tirin Kot is not included because it is administered by the provincial government.

electricity and water, remain largely absent (see Table 5). It is interesting to note, however, that in addition to the education department only the national department of security currently has a presence in all districts but Char China, showing the importance of these departments for the Afghan government. Despite the importance of health care, no departments of public health are present in the districts.

Table 5: Key government Directorates at District Level⁵⁰

Directorate	2006	2010
Public Health	Deh Rawud, Khas Uruzgan	None
Education	Deh Rawud, Chora, Char China, Khas Uruzgan	All but Char China
Statistics / Census	Chora	Chora, Deh Rawud, Khas Uruzgan, Gizab
Agriculture	Deh Rawud, Char China, Khas Uruzgan	Deh Rawud, Chora, Gizab, Khas Uruzgan
Finance	All functioning districts (except Gizab)	Deh Rawud, Gizab
Religious Affairs	Chora	None
Communication	Chora, Deh Rawud	Chora, Khas Uruzgan
Electricity and Water	Khas Uruzgan	None
Municipality/ Administration	Unknown	Chora, Khas Uruzgan, Gizab
National Security Department (NDS)		All but Char China

The lack of personnel able or willing to fill government positions in insecure areas, staffing of government offices remains a fundamental problem. Furthermore, the "prolonged absence of provincial and district governors from their offices also contributed to widening of the gap between the state and the people."⁵⁰ Lastly, poor coordination and communication between the provincial and district government adds to poor governance. Often, district officials bypass the provincial government altogether and seek assistance directly from Kabul.

⁵⁰ Given the changing environment in the province, this information could evolve rapidly.

⁵¹ The Asia Foundation 2009, p.6

There were also questions as to the transferability of Dutch efforts to the Afghan government. Deh Rawud elders, for example, argued that good governance and security are still very much linked to the Dutch. Locals can call up the PRT to report IEDs and they will be removed safely. The government was seen as not being able to front the bill for the salary of most government officials, let alone manage development projects.

3.3 Elections

Compared to the 2004⁵² presidential elections, voter turnout for the August 2009 presidential and Provincial Council elections dropped precipitously throughout the south and east. With a 50 percent decrease in voter turnout from 2004 nationwide, Uruzgan was no exception. According to the Independent Election Commission (IEC), about 140,000 voter registration cards were issued⁵³, but only 23,646 and 28,326 valid votes were cast for the presidential and PC elections respectively in 49 polling centres (with 340 polling substations)⁵⁴ in the province. Amidst allegations of corruption throughout Afghanistan, especially meddling by pro-government strongmen, President Hamid Karzai received the greatest number of valid votes (61%) in Uruzgan, followed by Ramazan Bashardost (15%) and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (9%).

3.3.1 Provincial Council Elections

In a show of discontent with past PC members, all incumbents were replaced by new members at the 2009 elections. Members of the Popalzai tribe still dominate the PC (holding 50% of all seats), which can be explained by the fact that Popalzai have a strong constituency in those areas where most of the voting occurred—Deh Rawud, Chenartu, and Tirin Kot. Of these PC members, Hilla (Ahmadzai from Khas Uruzgan who lives in Tirin Kot) and Haji Amanullah Khan (Popalzai from Tirin Kot) were nominated to the upper house of parliament (*Meshrano Jirga*). Their seats were filled by Jan Mohammad (Popalzai from Chenartu) and Haji Naeem (Nurzai from Char China, living in Tirin Kot)⁵⁵. The departure of Haji Amanullah Khan led to a reshuffling, making Amanullah Khan (Babozai from Deh Rawud) the head of the PC, and Abdul Ali (Hazara) the deputy head, despite the fact that Abdul Ali had the highest vote count by far (19.7% to 10.8% of the next candidate; see Annex IV).

⁵² 2004: 61,540 total votes in Uruzgan Province

⁵³ This high number of registered voters may not only be due to double-registrations but also two other reasons: first, some residents of the province needed their voter registration cards as a passage permit. For instance, police in Deh Rawud district demand travelers from Char China to show their voter ID cards. Second, in the provincial centre, the ANCC non-governmental organization announced that it would distribute wheat only to those with ID in the form of voter registration cards.

⁵⁴ The IEC disqualified one polling centre in Khas Uruzgan District and one polling station in Salam Khana High School in Khanaqa village, Tirin Kot District.

⁵⁵ He is the son of Ghulam Hayder Khan, a prominent Nurzai elder from Char China, who is running for the Wolesi Jirga.

Even though Haji Naeem, a Nurzai (the second largest tribe in Uruzgan) made it into the PC, Achekzai, Barakzai (largest and fourth largest tribes of Uruzgan) and Ghilzai are not represented. Some claim this was due to rigged election. There are, however, other explanations linked to security and community divisions⁵⁶.

3.3.2 Upcoming Wolesi Jirga Elections (September 2010)

With 19 nominees, Uruzgan has one of the lowest number of *Wolesi Jirga* candidates in Afghanistan (only Zabul, Nimroz and Panjshir have less); interestingly enough the same figure as in 2005 (see Annex V). Two of the winners in the 2005 elections - Abdul Khaliq (Ackekzai from Chora) and Mohammad Hashem Watanwaal (Popalzai from Tirin Kot) are running again in the 2010 elections⁵⁷.

There are already numerous rumours of the 2010 elections being fraudulent. Most Ghilzai did not even bother to nominate candidates, doubting that there would be free and fair elections and expecting strongmen to determine the outcome. Some candidates said in interviews with TLO that they even had received calls from officials of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) stating that the election would not be fair and that they were under pressure from some provincial power brokers to manipulate nomination lists⁵⁸.

Concerns over fair elections have also influenced whether candidates bother to campaign in Uruzgan, especially those with limited funds. While campaigning has slowly started in the province, it is limited to a few candidates and more secure districts and areas under government control⁵⁹. It is also possible, however, that campaigning is limited in order not to upset pro-government strongmen.

⁵⁶ In Khas Uruzgan, only the Hazara were able to mobilize and collectively vote for their candidate, because they were able to reach the polling sites. In Chora the Achekzai could not rally around a small number of candidates, which led to a split of votes with which the necessary quota to send a candidate to the PC could not be reached. In Char China and Gizab, security did not allow for voting. However, even though Tirin Kot also had a low voter turn out due to Taliban threats, it still managed to get three candidates into the PC, two moving on to the meshrano jirga with another one still in the PC.

⁵⁷ The only female candidate to win in 2005, Sona Niloofar (Barakzai from Tirin Kot) picked up a nomination form, but ended up not submitting it, however her mother Malika Barakzai did. It is said that Sona used parliament to leave for Australia.

⁵⁸ Some explained that IEC officials are aware of the difficult situation, and because they would not be able to safeguard free and fair elections, are trying to warn candidates to avoid wasting their time and money by withdrawing their nomination. Others, however, claim that these rumours are spread by the very strongmen interested in manipulating the elections.

⁵⁹ By early August 2010 only Malem Rahamatullah had campaigned in Deh Rawud on behalf of his son, also the current MP Malem Haji Abdul Khaliq travelled from Kabul to Tirin Kot and held a rally in the bazaar, Ghulam Haider Khan who campaigned in Chora and Deh Rawud, and Haji Naqibullah who came from Kandahar to hold individual meetings with his supporters. It is said that Jan Mohammad Khan is also planning a trip to Deh Rawud to campaign for the current MP Mohammad Hashim Watanwal.

3.4 Afghan National Security Forces

In the 2006 Provincial survey, TLO observed that *"the government can barely align a non tribal force of 600 to 650 relatively poorly armed and poorly equipped men, confronting a Taleban threat that is at least twice that size, and is forced to use auxiliary forces whose primary loyalties are tribal."* Of this number, the majority were Afghan National Army troops, with a number of Afghan National Police ranging between 100-150. Other armed men were largely auxiliary in nature and not fully under the control of the Afghan government.

Even though police and army numbers have increased in the province, ANP and ANA allocations are far from being met in districts such as Char China and Khas Uruzgan, with about 10 police/soldier per 1,000 people in Uruzgan. Nevertheless when the Gizab district centre was captured earlier this year, the new Chief of Police seemed to have been able to increase his initial 60 ANP force to 300 rather quickly, partially with men provided by Matiullah Khan and reportedly also reintegrated Taliban. The official nature and number of the Afghan Security Forces in Gizab, however, remains unclear at this point.

A Provincial Operational Coordination Centre (OCC-P, combining ANA, ANP, NDS) was established in 2009 in the PRT compound prior to the presidential elections, which many report as a success⁶⁰. The OCC-P has been meeting regularly every day and people involved say that it has improved information sharing and operations. While the OCC-P might be a step into the direction of coordination among security actors and possibly greater transparency and accountability, it has been critiqued locally for the fact that the authority still lies with the PRT rather than with Afghans and that International Military Forces do not always coordinate all operation with their Afghan counterparts.

3.4.1 Afghan National Police (ANP)

Obtaining exact ANP numbers is still difficult. As the auxiliary police forces in Tirin Kot, Chora, and Deh Rawud were integrated into the ANP, the number of ANP increased and has been steadily growing over the past four years. In an initial interview the Provincial Police Chief (CoP) Juma Gul cited a figure of around 3,100 ANP at his disposal in Uruzgan, but when asked to verify this figure in terms of *tashkeel*⁶¹ and the 'actual boots on the ground', he gave a more general answer of around 2,000-3,000 men. The lower estimate matches most closely the official figures from the Ministry of Interior (MoI): as of June 2010 there are 2,213 ANP in the official *tashkeel* of Uruzgan, with 2,776 being on the MoI human resource list and 2,782 actually on the pay

⁶⁰ In the opinion of the Dutch PRT, the coordinated support of OCC-P during previous elections proved successful. Furthermore, the OCC-P reacted in a coordinated manner when a rumour was spread that the U.S. had defamed Korans during an operation sparking demonstrations.

⁶¹ *Tashkeel* is a term indicating the officially allocated number of professionals for a specific government department.

⁶² A problem might be the exact knowledge of the number of Matiullah Khan's Operational Police (estimated at 550 men) securing the highways, who only in theory lie under the CoP command.

role⁶². The CoP was similarly vague on the number of check-posts throughout the province, initially mentioning 142 checkpoints including those along highways at first, but later providing a breakdown of 87 ANP and 59 highway police check-posts, which totals 146.

Juma Gul's problem, however, never seems to be a lack of recruits, but rather the *tashkeel*; he claimed to have recently sent 300 recruits to Kandahar as he could not accommodate them. This situation seems to match the observation that the ANP has become a recruitment centre for unemployed youth. This has provided some solution to unemployment on the one hand, yet ANP ranks continue to be filled with inexperienced, and in many cases under-aged individuals, some of whom are abused⁶³.



Picture 5: Members of Deh Rawud police/ TLO

Another demographic characteristic of the ANP is the disproportionately large number of Hazara in the police force. A Hazara teacher from Gizab explained this as follows: "Taliban declared that Tajiks should return to Tajikistan, Uzbeks to Uzbekistan, and Hazara should go 'to the ground.' With this comment in mind, the Hazara have started joining the ANP. It is their way of saying that we are from Afghanistan, we fight for Afghanistan, and we fight the enemy of Afghanistan." This skewed composition, however, can also pose problems. ISAF and US military are required under the new COIN doctrine to use ANP for

⁶³ It is alleged that some police sub-commanders engage in *bacha bazi*; literally meaning boy player, which refers to sexual abuse of young boys, sometimes wrongly considered as an acceptable culture practice in Pashtun Afghanistan. It is nevertheless poorly regarded and tends to reflect a power imbalance between the *bacha* (boy) and the *bacha bazi*.

house searches, which is starting to create tensions between Pashtun and Hazara communities and has made Hazara a new target of the Taliban (see Section 4.3.2 for more details).

One aspect of the Dutch mission in Afghanistan was the Afghanisation of security in Uruzgan. To attain this, they set up ANP training sessions at Camp Holland and deployed four police officers to the EU Police Mission to serve as advisors to the ANP of Uruzgan. Another program is the Police Mentoring Teams, with five so far deployed, consisting of constabulary forces and infantry, to assist and train ANP on the job, including those who have participated in the American Focused District Development (FDD) training program that screens and trains a whole district's force. In 2010 Chora's ANP force completed the training. As a result, Chora residents say they are happier with the new style of the ANP. The Dutch also funded the construction of a provincial prison, a police-training academy (PTA)⁶⁴ in Tirin Kot and ANP regional stations and checkpoints. Some 800 policemen have been trained at the PTA since its establishment. Despite these efforts, Juma Gul cited training as a key problem for his police force. He lamented that only 940 ANP (roughly 30%) had received training, while he had heard that 2,400 were trained during six months in Helmand.

Even though the overall perception of the police force did improve slightly since 2006, the ANP is still considered less professional than the ANA. Their general reputation still revolves around drug addiction, ill-fitting uniforms, bad equipment, bribery, and extortion. As one man sarcastically stated, "*there are no more criminals in Uruzgan, as they have all joined the ANP*". The engagement in bribery, however, is often excused as a supplement to low salaries that is received quite irregularly. Some also reported less extortion since the ANP has begun to obtain revenue from the drug trade. The MoI recently introduced identity cards with access to bank accounts to all policemen in Uruzgan. This has reduced the skimming off of ANP salaries by the CoP, who now allegedly takes from their allowances for clothing and equipment.

There is concern that the ANP is not strong enough to operate independently from international assistance. In Deh Rawud, for example, people wonder how long the ANP would remain after the PRT has left. The general sense is that the ANP are weak and poorly organized, with the expectation that the Taliban would capture the district hours after the Dutch have left.

3.4.2 Afghan National Army (ANA)

The numbers of the Afghan national army has gone up significantly over the past four years. In 2006 only one *kandak* of 900 military professionals existed which was based in Kandahar and deployed to Uruzgan. By 2010 the ANA

⁶⁴ <http://www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:76536&type=org>. The PTA deserves some attention as it was initially established against the existing policies that provinces should not have PTAs. But the Dutch PRT considered it an essential step toward improving the capacity of the Uruzgan ANP, especially local recruits who seem reluctant to leave their province for training.

tashkeel had increased to 4,781 distributed over five *kandak* that all belong to Uruzgan. In reality, however, only about 4,000 soldiers are present in Uruzgan with about 1,000 either on official leave (57%) or simply absent for unknown reasons (43%). There is also a Special Forces *kandak* that is not counted in the figures above. There are no ANA reported in Chenartu or Gizab. The following *kandak* are currently present in Uruzgan, mostly in Tirin Kot and spread across about seven bases, each with about 200-300 soldiers:

- 1st *kandak* (Deh Rawud, Char China, Khas Uruzgan)
- 2nd *kandak* (Chora and Tirin Kot: Baluchi valley and Mehrabad, Kosy area)
- 3rd *kandak* (currently split in separate divisions located in Surkh Murghab area of Darafshan, Perosha area, Sajawal area and Qala-e-Naw area)
- 4th *kandak* (Tirin Kot/Camp Holland)
- 5th *kandak* (Tirin Kot/Camp Holland)

Residents generally speak more highly of the ANA because they are better trained, well mannered, and reasonably equipped. In Chora residents explain they hope that the number of ANA will be increased so that they can eventually take over the command of operations and missions from International Military Forces. In Tirin Kot in contrast, some residents suspect that the ANA has reached an agreement with the insurgency in order to stay alive.

3.5 Justice Sector

The provision of justice is an important element of good governance. In 2006, prior to the Dutch arrival, the judiciary was hampered by a lack of professionalism and understaffing resulting in a very low-level of service delivery. Under the rule of Governor Jan Mohammad Khan, strongmen were notoriously prone to overlook legal procedures (such as indiscriminate detention) and some reportedly kept private jails.

Little has changed in Uruzgan regarding the formal justice system over the past four years. While there may be less private prisons and indiscriminate detention, capacity and faith in the formal justice system is low, and both ANP and the National Department of Security (NDS) are still reported to abuse detainees. Conflicts and disagreements are primarily and satisfactorily solved by tribal *shuras*, community elders, mullahs, individual government officials or Taliban courts.

A formal court system is largely absent with only about 20% of all judges in place⁶⁵. Khas Uruzgan⁶⁶ has no judge, Chora and Gizab has no prosecutor, and

⁶⁵ "The existing court structure of Uruzgan is composed of one Appeal Court (mahkame-ye estinaf) with five judges in the provincial capital and three Primary Courts (mahkame-ye ebtidaya) with two judges in Tirin Kot (where the primary court is also called City Court: mahkame-ye shahri) and one in each Chora and Deh Rawud. Two of the Appeal Court judges only appear every six months in order to receive their salaries and refuse to act as judges." Röder 2010, p.15

⁶⁶ Furthermore, the Khas Uruzgan director of the Hoqooq department fled to Tirin Kot in April 2010 after serious threats by the Taliban. Ibid, p.10

Chenartu and Char China have no justice professionals at all. In Deh Rawud the position of the district judge was vacant for two years after the judge was killed in a coalition air strike in 2007. In absence of a judge, the Chief of Police played a key role in resolving mostly petty crimes and participated in *jirgas* convened for conflict resolution. Most parties referred their cases to him and he consulted the tribal elders to resolve the conflicts. The new judge who was appointed end of 2009 maintains these weak linkages between the formal and tribal justice system. He participates in the Thursday tribal *shura* meetings, which refer cases to the state court if they are unable to resolve a case or if conflict parties do not accept a decision. In turn, tribal *shuras* may refer cases back to the judge in case of non-solution.

The absence of a formal justice system forces the ANP and NDS representatives to take a role in the justice sector. They, however, often "*are not aware of the rules which are to be observed in the criminal prosecution, and violate the rights of suspects and accused persons*"⁶⁷. This said, none of the recognized judges have a university degree and most are graduates from *madrassas*. Yet it is not only the lack of professional qualifications that hampers access to justice, but also the perceived bias and corruption of justice professionals, something that is not unique to Uruzgan province, but reported across Afghanistan⁶⁸.

While there are no formal Taliban courts in Uruzgan province, several districts have Taliban judges that dispense swift justice according to *sharia*. More recently, however, there have been complaints of biased decision-making even among Taliban judges, a complaint usually levelled at the formal court system.

In mid-January 2010 Matiullah Khan established a tribal council of about 200 elders called *shura eslahi* or reform council in order to deal with the resolution of conflicts and disputes at the provincial and district level. Even though the *shura* still gathers every Thursday of each week, the number of participants has drastically decreased due the feeling that the *shura* was simply an astute move by Matiullah Khan to cement his power in the province, especially as meetings are held at Matiullah Khan's house and are headed by a Popalzai. One Nurzai elder noted: "When you are invited to somebody's house and eat his food, you will not be rude and oppose him". Despite its limited provincial reach, the Popalzai community of Chenartu has so far deferred many issues to the *shura*.

When the Provincial Development Committee (PDC) was formed in Uruzgan in early 2006, it created a committee responsible for Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights⁶⁹. In 2009 it was replaced by a 'Justice *Shura*', which in-

⁶⁷ Röder 2010, p.14

⁶⁸ Cf. Susanne Schmeidl, "Engaging traditional justice mechanisms in Afghanistan: State-building opportunity or dangerous liaison?" in Whit Mason (ed.), *The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Casualties of Myopia*, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming (2010).

⁶⁹ Participants in theory included representatives of the judiciary, prosecution, the Hoqooq, Women's Affairs and Anti-Corruption Departments, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, the Audit & Control Office, Provincial Council (PC), PRT, UN agencies, and NGOs (national and international).



cluded donor representatives for the discussion and resolution of current problems in the justice sector⁷⁰. Despite this, and small PRT initiatives, a recently Dutch commissioned provincial needs assessment about the criminal justice situation in Uruzgan concluded that relevant central state institutions and international organizations had neglected the justice sector in Uruzgan.

⁷⁰ Röder 2010, p.8

4 (In)Security and the Insurgency

In 2006, prior to the Dutch arrival in Uruzgan, TLO observed: *"While insecurity was mostly confined to the mountainous districts of Gizab, Khas Uruzgan and Shahiddi Hassas [Char China] until 2005, it has now spread to all districts. In this respect, ... the province is clearly one of the most unstable countrywide."*


Following the Dutch arrival in Uruzgan, security and government control slowly began to improve, especially in the three Dutch target districts of Tirin Kot, Chora and Deh Rawud, with the Dutch military pushing back the Taliban in the latter two districts in 2007 and 2008. Most roads in these districts are relatively safe to travel (aside from improvised explosive devices-IEDs). Deh Rawud is safer than for Chora or Tirin Kot, where districts to the east and north are still controlled by Taliban.

Security, however, is not as straightforward a concept as one may assume and means different things to different people. First, there are different kinds of security, such as state or human security. This report focuses on a more comprehensive people-centred understanding of security that includes both the security of the state (here the provincial and district government) and the security of the communities living in it. In addition to government control, this understanding of security looks at levels of access of civilian development actors, domestic safety (as perceived by the people), the quality of the rule of law and human rights (see Section 3.5), and the underlying causes of violence and insecurity in an area (see Section 4.3).

Secondly, there are different security challenges for different areas of Uruzgan. The security, or insecurity, especially violent incidents, follows what has been known as an "inverted U-shape": At the beginning of the curve are government-controlled areas (e.g., most of Deh Rawud and parts of Tirin Kot and Chora), which are relatively secure, at the other end areas under complete Taliban control (e.g., Char China) are also relatively secure. The peak of the curve, usually contested areas including Khas Uruzgan, Chenartu and Gizab are where residents have greater problems with insecurity. Since 2006, internal displacement from these areas, often to Tirin Kot and sometimes later to Kandahar have increased. About 6,000 people in total left Uruzgan over the past four years, with the majority between 2006-8.

Those areas that have seen increased access by Afghan National Security (ANSF) and International Military Forces (IMF) have now come under increasing pressure from the insurgency (starting in 2008, see Figure 4). As the insurgency is trying to gain more ground, especially with upcoming parliamentary election, pressure has increased in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks by armed opposition groups (AOGs). This, however, is a trend that can be observed throughout Afghanistan and is not specific to Uruzgan only.

Figure 4: AOG Attacks/IEDs vs. IMF/ANSF Operations in Uruzgan (ANSO)



4.1 District Security and Government Control

Over the past four years, government presence and control has improved mainly in the Dutch focus districts Deh Rawud, Chora, and Tirin Kot. The government now controls up to 85% of Deh Rawud, 75% of Tirin Kot, and 45% of Chora⁷¹. The biggest change, however, occurred in Gizab, where a district government was re-established in mid-2010 after four years of Taliban rule with assistance of Australian and US military. Government presence should, however, still be considered fragile. According to a Hazara commander of Gizab, *"it is easy to take the district centre, but it will be very hard to control the entire district, especially without the help of the Hazara."* Aside from Gizab, the situation in the other districts outside the Dutch focus areas has either deteriorated (Chenartu, Khas Uruzgan) or stayed the same (Char China). The presence of US and Australian Special Forces allowed a continued, but limited government presence in the district centres, but was not able to extend government influence.

In addition to the district-by-district overview below, Table 6 is a rough attempt to describe the level of access the government and the insurgency have today compared to 2006, when government reach was limited to tenuous control over the provincial centre Tirin Kot as well as most district centres. Percentages should be considered as indicative only and there are differences between daytime and night-time control. Furthermore, insurgency influence does not always constitute the physical presence of fighters but the ability of the insurgency to intimidate and summon people.

↑ **Deh Rawud:** With the help of international forces the local population managed to remove the Taliban from most parts of the district in 2007. Be-

⁷¹ The Uruzgan CoP even estimates government control in Deh Rawud at 99%.

cause of better communication and coordination between the district government, the community, and the Dutch-led PRT, it has been possible to keep them out of the province. The Taliban reportedly went underground and their existing “parallel” governor and chief of police spend most of their time in Helmand and Char China. International forces, ANA, and ANP established a perimeter of security around the district that allows local government to be operational. Additionally people report to be content about the tribal balance in the local government and *shuras*. The Malikan *shura* and the Tribal *shura* function and meet on a weekly basis.

↑ **Tirin Kot:** Over the past four years, the Taliban strongholds have been reduced to parts of Darafshan (West), Mehrabad valleys and Garmab. Road construction to Chora has improved security on this road until shortly after Surkh Murghab. While overall improvements can be noted in many domains of life, the Taliban are still able to plant IEDs and are capable of mobilizing men and resources for joint attacks in the area.

↑ **Chora:** In 2008 the government presence grew stronger in the district after it had fallen under Taliban control in 2006 and 2007. After a few operations by international forces, the district's centre has been under undisputed government control for the past year and a half. In spite joint attempts by Matiullah Khan and Australians to push Taliban out of the Khwaja Khadir area in the north of Chora, it is not entirely clear if they have succeeded. The Kamisaan valley is under control of the Taliban.

The young District Governor Daoud Khan, who inherited this position from his late father Rozi Khan in 2007, is still in competition with his uncle Shah Mohammad (though the latter has been trying to mend the relationship). While locally compared with a young sapling that has not proven his strength yet, he has received a lot of support from the Dutch and more recently from the Australians, much to the displeasure of Popalzai strongmen.

↑ **Gizab:** After four years of Taliban governance, government oriented Pashtun communities re-claimed the district, without Dutch involvement. A joint-operation of Afghan National Security Forces, mostly employed by Matiullah Khan, and Australian and US military (who came in via Daykundi), helped to take the district centre away from the insurgency. It is unclear if government control extends beyond the district centre, especially in Pashtun areas. Areas of Mohammad Khawja, Sar Qol, Tai Nal, Taboot, Charda Khak, Taala, Sar Mari and Khalaj are still contested and are considered controlled by no one. The Hazara areas were always Taliban-free but also not under government control, even though Hazara commanders argue that they oriented themselves toward the government in neighbouring Daykundi province.

A new district government was established, but no Hazara were included in the appointments. This created resentment within the community and renewed calls to move Gizab back to Daykundi from where the Hazara communities

have received some support⁷². It seems that Commander Etimadi—who incidentally is running for parliament for Daykundi province—obtained a vice-presidential decree stating that this would happen in the future.

It remains to be seen if the district government will consolidate its authority in Gizab over the next months. There are already rumours, however, that the Taliban will attempt to retake Gizab before the beginning of winter.

→ **Char China:** According to a district resident, there have been “No changes in government performance or international forces for the better, they have not done anything regarding security and development.” Taliban governance has been strong in the district for the past four years and local insurgents have solid relations with the Taliban leadership in Quetta. Haji Naeem, PC member from Char China, revealingly said: *“If you stand on the roof of the district government building in the centre of Char China and you call out “Talib!” they will pop up and wave back!”* The authority of the government never extended over the whole district, but was reduced to a small radius around the district centre in 2006 already. The district is divided in five zones by the insurgency and a commander and deputy are in charge of each. District residents speak highly of the mediating and governing skills of some of the insurgency leaders.

↓ **Chenartu:** According to a frustrated district resident: “Nothing has changed to the better, instead everything is getting worse day by day.” This district has had the same Popalzai governor and chief of police since the beginning of 2008. For long their area of authority was the Popalzai north, but their influence is allegedly crumbling due to an internal division and power struggle between District Governor and Chief of Police (CoP), with the latter having gained the upper hand. The ANP, however, has also revolted on numerous occasions, suggesting that the CoP is losing control. The residents, however, do name him their preferred judge in case of conflict. The strife between the two government offices has supposedly weakened government allegiance and allowed room for the Taliban, which however has not set up a parallel government structure in Chenartu, as it is not recognized as a separate district from Chora.

↓ **Khas Uruzgan:** The district government has been losing ground to the multiple insurgency groups in the district, which have allegedly been rearranging their composition and zones over the past year. Government presence is confined to the valley around the district centre, including the US Forward Operating Base (FOB) Anaconda. An elder sums up the frustration among the local population about this situation: *“In my point of view there is no change*

⁷² It is interesting to note that National Solidarity Programme of the Ministry for Rural Development and Rehabilitation also lists Gizab under Daykundi, even though it has not started there yet.

for the better in Khas Uruzgan, everything is getting worse. This is not just my thought, it is a clear truth."

The example of Gizab has apparently influenced the people in other districts governed by the Taliban. Nurzai elders in Char China recently requested to be armed in order to assist government and international troops in taking control in their district. In Khas Uruzgan a group of both Hazara and Pashtun tribal elders similarly petitioned for support with the provincial governor, chief of police, PRT, and Matiullah Khan to oust the Taliban from their district. The status of this request is unclear. Matiullah Khan refused to help as he did not have the resources and because he considered this to be the task of the chief of police. The regional commander of the South in Kandahar did reportedly promise arms and financial support. The subsequent problem was, however, to find men who would take up the fight.

Table 6: Approximate levels of government control: 2006 vs. 2010

District		2006	2010	Areas of Taliban vs. Afghan Government Control
Tirin Kot	↑	30-40%	75%	The Baluchi Valley (Darafshan) and Mehrabad are currently Taliban controlled; Garmab also has a strong Taliban presence. In all other areas government control has increased.
Deh Rawud	↑	20%	85%	The area north of the Choto bridge is controlled by Taliban, authorizing passage of goods and people to Char China. Tangi and north of Choto IEDs. The CoP of Uruzgan would put government control in Deh Rawud at 99%.
Chora	↑	20%	45%	The government is present between the borders with Darafshan in the south west to the village of Sarab. Everything beyond Sarab to the north east, including the Kamisaan valley, remains Taliban controlled.
Gizab	↑	0%	50%	The government presence increased after the recent operation in the spring of 2010. Government presence was established in district centre, and self-controlled Hazara areas are counted among 50% due to links with Daykundi government.
Char China	→	2%	2%	Government presence is limited to the district centre. Taliban centre is Yakhdan.
Chenartu	↓	part of Chora	20-30%	Taliban has increased pressure on the northern valley which was under government control; roads to the district are blocked.
Khas Uruzgan	↓	30%	15%	The government presence is approximately within a radius of 5 km from the district centre. Beyond, the Taliban rule. There are mixed stories about the Hazara areas in the east of the province. Some respondents have mentioned groups that are supporting Taliban rule; others claim they support the government.

4.2 Road Security

In 2006 TLO wrote, "outside of the city [of Tirin Kot], Taleban fighters effectively control most of the roads leading from the centre to outlying districts, setting up checkpoints and generally deepening their military and, more perniciously, social and political control over the local population. The only exception to this was the road from Tirin Kot to Deh Rawud, which was still being used by the government on a regular basis in early July."

Even though road security in general decreased throughout 2007, it has gradually improved since mid 2008. In particular, the road from Tirin Kot to Deh Rawud is considered among the safest in Uruzgan largely due to Dutch efforts. Residents, however, also credit the establishment of a police post in the War Jan area south of Deh Rawud as decreasing the presence of the insurgency. The newly constructed road between Tirin Kot and Chora has increased security until Surkh Murghab, due to private guards provided by local community leaders.

Nonetheless, it remains difficult for government employees to travel from their district to the provincial centre when the way leads through Taliban controlled areas. When a headmaster from Khas Uruzgan recently wanted to go to Tirin Kot to pick up four months of salary for the teachers of his school he had to travel through Ghazni, Zabul and Kandahar to Tirin Kot, because the Mehrabad road that would have otherwise have taken him in two hours, has been closed for the past few years.

Table 7 provides an overview of road security in Uruzgan, detailing government vs. insurgency-control. It should be noted that insecurity on roads is not only driven by the insurgency but sometimes by thugs and/or communities hoping to cash into security contracts. Some even allege that Matiullah Khan is engaging in fake attacks on the Tirin-Kot Kandahar Highway in order to justify the need for security provision by his men. When Matiullah Khan was no longer paid for road security between Chora and Gizab, he withdrew his men and the road once again became difficult to travel.

Table 7: Overview of Road Security on Major Roads in Uruzgan Province

Road		Government-controlled	Insurgency-controlled
TK-Kandahar Highway	→	Matiullah Khan organizes protection for travellers, ISAF supplies and government officials once every ten days. Locals who are not affiliated with the government or the internationals can travel the road freely.	Outside convoy days, the road is difficult to travel, and insurgency control ad hoc check posts prevails on parts of the road.
TK-Deh Rawud	→	The safest road in the province. It is controlled by ANA, ANP, and also some check-posts by Matiullah Khan.	
TK-Chora	↑	Road security has somewhat improved. With help from the Dutch, and local security providers put forth by Daoud Khan and Nabi Khan Tokhi, the road was constructed up to Surkh Murghab and is secure until km 16.	The northern part of Darafshan, up to the border with Chora, is still under control of the Taliban, restricting traffic to and from Chora (Baluchi valley is especially problematic).
Deh Rawud-Char China	↑	The American forces recently constructed the road to Choto.	After Choto it is Taliban controlled.
TK-Khas Uruzgan	→	The stretch to Mehrabad is relatively safe.	The stretch through Mehrabad has been closed for years. The part that passes through Chenartu has a few securer areas around Chenartu's government controlled district centre. Between Leywanyan and Syah, after Chalabay it becomes unsafe again, all the way up to the district centre of Khas Uruzgan.
Chora-Gizab	→	Matiullah Khan secured the construction of a road between Chora and Gizab. During that time the road was very secure. Recently his commissioners stopped paying him, however, after which he withdrew and the construction stopped. 40% is finished.	Ever since the checkpoints were broken up, the road is insecure again.

4.3 Insurgency

The insurgency in Uruzgan was sparked by *old garde* Taliban (first Taliban regime), which still play a very prominent role especially among the leadership, but also built on marginalised local elites and newcomers. Thus the insurgency today can be best described as a patchwork of tribes and individuals with a range of demands and interests, which are locally identified as 'non-corrupt' Taliban committed to Islamic principles of justice and purity, as opposed to the more opportunistic and violent parts of the movement (including thief-Taliban); local Taliban vs. those coming from foreign countries (e.g., Pakistani

Taliban, Arabs etc.), and active Taliban vs. those who participated in the first Taliban regime but are now 'sitting at home'⁷³.

In June 2006, a conservative TLO assessment of the number of Taleban in the province stood at "2,000 full-time fighters, organized in a number of fronts each led by a senior commander, themselves seconded by 30 to 50 lower level commanders in charge of 20 to 200 men each." As detailed in 4.1, they ruled more of Uruzgan than the government did. Furthermore, the insurgency had appointed a shadow government in Uruzgan, even in areas that are mostly government controlled. There is a provincial governor and chief of police in all districts but Chenartu, which the insurgency still considers as part of Chora.

Due to frequent movement of fighters, it is difficult to obtain an exact picture of insurgency numbers for 2010. Some villages also simply set up a Taliban cell in order to avoid the infiltration of foreign insurgents. TLO currently has knowledge of about 35 local commanders operating or commanding units in Uruzgan. It is fair to assume that each district has at least 200 Taliban fighters, possibly as many as 500 (the current estimate for Chora and Tirin Kot) at different levels of activity. This would put the number of Taliban fighters in Uruzgan currently at about 1,400-3,500.

It is important to note that the composition of the Taliban, as well as their behaviour, seems to change during operations. For example when the Taliban plan to 'seize' an area, they tend to bring outside Taliban from other districts, provinces, countries into the area to increase pressure⁷⁴. As a result, areas under Taliban control (e.g., Char China) often have less aggressive Taliban than those under government control (e.g., Chora). At present most insurgents in Uruzgan are from the districts they are operating in, albeit with the preparations for the parliamentary elections outsiders have begun to move in to maximize disturbance.

Recent information suggests that the Taliban has changed their operation strategy over the last three months and stepped up their activities in terms of IEDs, random attacks, anti-government and IMF propaganda (e.g., sermons at mosques) and intimidation (e.g., night letters), predominantly in areas under the control of government and/or IMF, such as Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud, and Chora. In contrast, in areas where the Taliban is currently trying to eliminate government presence (e.g., Chenartu, Khas Uruzgan, parts of Chora and Tirin Kot), ad hoc public check-posts are still prevalent. It is reported that the insurgency in Chora is more lenient regarding beards, music and other issues. The Afghan telephone company, AWCC, however, has been requested to not operate during night times in both Chora and Deh Rawud.

The links of Uruzgan commanders to the larger Taliban command have seen several changes, mostly responding to moves by international military actors. At the end of 2009, for example, the Taliban divided Southern Afghanistan

⁷³ Cf. Martine van Bijlert, "Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan", pp.155-179 in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.) *Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field*, London: Hurst & Company, p.160.

⁷⁴ In Chora, for example, this would mean Taliban from Gizab, Char China, Tirin Kot and Khas Uruzgan; while in Tirin Kot this may mean Taliban from all other districts but Chenartu.

into different regions. Uruzgan, Zabul, and Ghazni are now part of one region with fighters frequently rotating between these provinces. While Taliban from Northern Helmand have always played an important role in Uruzgan—with operations in the last months in Helmand also pushing insurgents across the border into Char China, Taliban from other provinces, such as Zabul (in Chora) or Kandahar (in Tirin Kot) have also been reported (see next Section 4.3.1). Foreign Taliban from Pakistan (southern and northern Waziristan), from Arab countries, and others who ‘do not even speak the language of local people or local Taliban’ come to the province for propaganda and training purposes only.

There are several tribal rifts running through the Taliban (either along the lines of tribal confederations, sub-tribes, or between foreign and local Taliban) resulting in tensions and/or internal fighting. In 2007, for example, the Pakistani Taliban bombed a building in Chora, which inspired hostility from local communities and local Taliban. There is especially a strong rivalry between Ghilzai and Durrani Taliban as the latter has more ability to arrange co-existence agreements with the government, such as the one that is assumed to exist between Tirin Kot ANA and local Taliban. For Ghilzai this is more difficult as participation with Taliban is more out of anti-government sentiments.

4.3.1 Regional Dimensions

Neighbouring provinces (see Map 1) variously influence different parts of Uruzgan. Northern Helmand has been under constant insurgent control for the past years; Zabul has mostly non-existent state security structure, which allows weapons and narcotics to flow unchecked into Uruzgan; and Kandahar and Ghazni are contested territories where the government and insurgency are fighting each other. This brings to the fore a necessity to strategize intervention in Uruzgan against the backdrop of regional developments. The following is a quick overview of Uruzgan’s districts in their regional context:

Tirin Kot: Insecure areas in Tirin Kot are influenced both by Zabul and Kandahar.

Deh Rawud: As with Char China, the negative influence of northern Helmand is felt in Deh Rawud, even though it has been reduced to the road north of Choto leading into Char China.

Chenartu: The southern part of the district, bordering Miyan Nishin in Kandahar, is currently insurgency controlled and Chenartu district officials claim it is part of Kandahar, while Kandahar sees it is firmly within Uruzgan. This “ungoverned” space is very much influenced by insurgency dynamics from Kandahar and Zabul.

Khas Uruzgan: The current pressure on Khas Uruzgan is driven from both Zabul and Ghazni. Insurgents can move freely into the district and are attempting to squeeze out the Afghan government.

Gizab: Taliban controlled areas of Gizab are connected with areas in Ghazni that are also Taliban controlled, allowing insurgents to move freely between the two provinces. The Hazara areas have long oriented themselves toward Daykundi in the North and the provincial government there has supported Hazara communities during times of Taliban control. This connection and the promise of a reunion with Hazara dominated Daykundi fuels latent Hazara-Pashtun conflicts.

Char China: Char China is nearly completely controlled by insurgents related to groups in central and northern Helmand. The inability of the Uruzgan government to keep insurgents from crossing over into the district—which has happened repeatedly over the last four years, provides little opportunity to extend control.

All this shows the dire necessity to continue to view security and development in Uruzgan in a regional light. Without a strong regional strategy, that considers especially Helmand and Kandahar, but also Zabul and Ghazni, it is difficult to make more gains in the very insecure areas of Char China, Chenartu, Khas Uruzgan and Gizab.

4.3.2 Underlying Conflict Potentials

In addition to the on-going tensions between pro-government strongmen, former Taliban and marginalized tribal leaders, tribal/community divisions over power and leadership create an environment that induces parties to the conflict to withdraw support for the government or actively engage with the insurgency. These include a Popalzai-Nurzai blood feud in Deh Rawud which flared up in 2007, Tokhi leadership rivalries in Tirin Kot which date back to the jihad and recently rekindled Barakzai leadership rivalries in Chora and Tirin Kot and long standing Pashtun-Hazara tensions. The latter deserves attention due to recent violence.

Tense relations between Pashtuns and Hazara go back to the blocking of Pashtun Kuchi (mainly Kakar) pastureland in Daykundi by Hazara in 1979. Even though Hazara and Pashtuns seemed to have reached a *modus vivendi* over the past years, there has been a deterioration of their relationship.

In **Khas Uruzgan** recently ten Hazara and one Pashtun were beheaded by insurgents, allegedly following house searches by Special Forces in Khas Uruzgan. While some claim it was a random act by the Taliban against Hazara, others say it was in retaliation for on-going harassment of Pashtuns during house searches.

The Hazara-Pashtun relations in **Gizab** are also uneasy. This was sparked by the fact that Hazara were not invited for recent government positions even though they had opposed the Taliban for years. This has increased separatist calls by Hazara to bring at least the Hazara areas of Gizab back to Daykundi province. Hazara commander Etimadi even went all the way to Kabul to complain and may have used his connections to obtain a vice-presidential decree stating that Gizab should in the future be reunited with Daykundi. This has created outrage among the Pashtuns, especially Matiullah Khan who noted that he risked the lives of his men to retake Gizab from the Taliban, hence would not accept it were Gizab to be returned to Daykundi.

In districts where no Hazara live the use of Hazara militias have impacted on Hazara-Pashtun relations in the province. In 2007, 15 Hazara working with US Special Forces in **Char China** arrested two Pashtuns under suspicion of supporting the insurgents. The families of the two arrested Pashtuns alerted the Taliban who showed up in force and ambushed and killed the 15 Hazara in the Menara area. In retaliation 15 Pashtun elders were killed in Kejran district of Daykundi.

5 International Military Actors and the Dutch Withdrawal

When the NATO-mandated Dutch troops, along with a significant contingent of Australians, took command of the Tirin Kot PRT on 1 August 2006, they entered a charged environment where US forces were seen as supportive of pro-government Popalzai leaders and, inadvertently, of their policy of marginalizing Ghilzai, Achekzai, Barakzai and Nurzai/Babozai communities who were seen as associated with the Taliban insurgency. TLO observed then: *"The operations of international forces, often perceived (rightly or wrongly) as heavy handed and culturally offensive by the local population, has added water to the mill of insurgents' propaganda. The fact that international forces are perceived as having made a number of wrongful arrests over the last years as a result of incorrect or manipulated intelligence has also contributed to a general feeling of discontent that insurgents have been quick to capitalize upon."* This had led some communities and their leaders to withdraw support for the Afghan government and/or seek active engagement with the Taliban. This was, for example, the case of the Babozai and parts of the Nurzai in Deh Rawud and some Tokhi in Darafshan and Hotak in Mehrabad areas of Tirin Kot.

The Dutch encouraged tribal balance, especially engaging marginalized Ghilzai and Barakzai community leaders. Supported by the Dutch, local leaders were able to reduce the presence and influence of the Taliban insurgency. Similar political deals with the Hotak of Mehrabad (Tirin Kot), the Khogiani of the Tangi area (Deh Rawud) or Kamisaan (Chora), Char China, Khas Uruzgan and Gizab, however, failed to materialise; these areas continue to be insecure and Taliban controlled.

Despite efforts of cooperation, local perception is that the Dutch engagement is frequently at odds with that of US-led Coalition Forces (CF) under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) focussing on counter-terrorism. Respondents mentioned the selective engagement of strongmen as allies in the fight against the Taliban insurgency by US and Australian Special Forces as a main cause for their perception. The Dutch tried to counterbalance this by engaging those Tokhi and Barakzai leaders that were excluded from this alliance.

These different, and at times conflicting, engagements have influenced people's perceptions, which are discussed in the next sections. The local population mostly perceives a contradiction between the more 'hands-off' Dutch approach of 'reconstruction where at all possible, military action where necessary'⁷⁵ and the more aggressive counter-terrorism stance of the Americans troops. Australians are in between, supporting both Dutch development efforts as well as providing Special Forces to the American-led contingent in capture and kill missions.

Geographically, the Dutch counterinsurgency strategy worked according to a so-called ink-blot strategy concentrating in the three population centres of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud, and Chora to support the Afghan army to create safe

⁷⁵ <http://www.cgvanancouver.org/files/pdf/AfghanistanFactSheet2.pdf>

areas with local authorities in control so that reconstruction could start. The aim was to reconstruct basic infrastructure, bridges, schools and mosques, and restoration of drinking water supplies and medical services. US and Australians (mostly Special) forces in contrast operated on the periphery in Char China, Khas Uruzgan and Gizab. There have been arguments that the Dutch ink-blot strategy could only work because US and Australian Special Forces provided a 'ring of steel' around it. Only Chenartu and Gizab seemed fairly untouched, albeit US Special Forces from a base in Nili, Daykundi sometimes intervened in the latter district⁷⁶.

5.1 Perception of International Military Forces

Overall there is an ambivalence regarding the international presence in Uruzgan. At times community distrust increases because of different IMF mandates and independent operations, which is locally interpreted as "*lacking coordination*" or "*internal disagreements*". Different engagement strategies (Americans with the Popalzai and Dutch with the Barakzai and Tokhi) further feed wild conspiracy theories of "*proxy wars*" being waged. *The words of a religious leader sum up the critique: "All international forces (US, Australian, Dutch) are uncoordinated, they compete with each other, fight each other. There is no one plan, no one strategy to bring peace and development to Afghanistan."*

This tends to shed a poor light on the Afghan government that is supported by International Military Forces, especially during joint operations: "*Such deeds create a distance between the public and the government and foreign forces, and the public will start despising the government.*"

5.1.1 Perception of Dutch Forces

The Dutch are generally seen in a favourable light, with the exception of some Popalzai leaders who saw the Dutch as a thorn in their side and hindrance to their own ambitions. Overall, the Dutch are considered to be serious about minimizing civilian casualties: "*they don't kill people*" or at least "*the Dutch never killed on purpose.*" They are also commended for "*respecting tribal elders, local customs and the culture of people*", and for engaging these elders about conflict resolution, project implementation, and "*tribal balance.*"

This said, an engagement approach that rests on careful dialogue has also caused a perception of the Dutch as being indecisive and less forceful than US or Australian forces. Similarly, an approach of outsourcing development and security projects has made Dutch development engagement much less visible than that of the Australians, for example. At times the Australian military also does reconstruction with Dutch funds, blurring clearly the ability of locals to understand who in the end fronted the bill. This has led to locals thinking

⁷⁶ In addition to the PRT in Tirin Kot, now under the U.S.-led Task Force Uruzgan there are five Forward Operation Bases manned by U.S. and Australian Special Forces. In Chora there is one Australian-lead FOB (previously Dutch), in Deh Rawuod one U.S.-lead PRT (previously Dutch) and one U.S. FOB, in Khas Uruzgan there is one U.S. Special Forces base (Anaconda) and in Char China as well (Cobra).

that the Dutch "*promise, but not deliver*" and overall as having "*small pockets*" in terms of development funding.

Yet there is also an appreciation by some actors to this local empowerment approach. Mostly community leaders and NGOs that operate in insecure areas claim that a more covert development strategy is less contentious and also draws much less attention to projects by Taliban actors. Often the Taliban, especially local, may allow civilian development to be carried out, as opposed to development projects implemented directly by military or contractors closely associated with them⁷⁷.

The security dimension of the Dutch approach in Uruzgan also has been received with mixed emotions. In the districts where the Dutch military presence was strong many are of the opinion that the Dutch that maintained security (Deh Rawud, Tirin Kot and parts of Chora) instead of the Afghan government. On the other hand in those places where the Dutch had hardly any military presence (Char China, Gizab, parts of Khas Uruzgan), local communities were disappointed and felt unacknowledged and unsupported in their fight against the insurgency.

5.1.2 Perceptions of US Forces

Perceptions of the Americans continue to be unfavourable, which seems to be based on a combination of actual events and targeted insurgency propaganda. Respondents feel that the U.S. army is still getting caught up, willingly or unwillingly, in local conflicts and despite good intentions, is manipulated by one or the other party into eliminating a rival. Furthermore, many argue "*nothing has gotten better with the U.S. Army,*" that the Americans have not learned their lessons and continue to act on the basis of misinformation. This often leads to unjust bombings, killing of innocent people, houses searches, and the detaining of innocent individuals. A lingering conflict between the Hazara and Pashtun in Khas Uruzgan, for example, was sparked by the fact that the Americans use Hazara ANP for house searches in Pashtun communities. The Pashtun accuse the Hazara of searching houses that belong to Pashtuns they are in conflict with. As in 2006, local conflicts still remain a dangerous trap for international actors.

There also seems to be confusion about the ultimate U.S. plan in Uruzgan. A religious leader summed it up, highlighting the heightened unrealistic expectations of the U.S.: "*The U.S. is playing games, they support the government and the Taliban at the same time. They could remove the Taliban in one day if they wanted, but they don't.*" In sum, the local perception is that Americans "*are applying wrong strategies and plans, killing innocent people.*"

5.1.3 Perception of Australian Forces

Feedback about Australians is less frequent, as often they are either put into the U.S. or Dutch camp. Due to their more visible and hands-on approach (in

⁷⁷ The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) has demonstrated in their statistics that the insurgency has begun to differentiate between NGOs and contractors, with attacks against the latter increasing over the past months; www.afgnso.org.

contrast to the Dutch approach), going out to build schools and clinics, they are generally considered to be 'more serious' and productive when it comes to both development and security. This leads to the overall perception that the Australian military is best about delivering what they promise, and best about monitoring their projects. This exemplifies that sometimes 'small is beautiful' as the Australians overall do less projects than the Dutch, but their visibility and quality control gives them a lot of credit.

This of course fuelled speculations, such as the one of an Achekzai who thought that the Dutch were keeping the Australians on 'a tight leash': "*Australia was under Dutch control,*" but "*When the Dutch leave, the Australians will try to do more things.*"

5.2 Dutch Withdrawal

In the beginning of 2010 the Dutch cabinet fell over the question whether to extend the mission in Uruzgan or not, mainly because of domestic political developments and tensions in the Netherlands. As a result, Dutch troops withdrew from Uruzgan on 1 August 2010 as scheduled. The news of the Dutch withdrawal created concerns and speculations especially among Tokhi and Barakzai leaders in the province, whom the Dutch engaged over the past years. In a big tribal gathering in Tirin Kot on 21 March 2010 with representatives from Ghilzai, Barakzai and Achekzai tribes, a petition was handed over to the Dutch military requesting them to extend their mission in Uruzgan. By June 2010 when it became clear that the Dutch were not able to extend their mission, anxieties grew and there were fears that the withdrawal would shift the tribal balance once again, bringing the Popalzai firmly back into power. This was exacerbated by rumours that Popalzai strongmen might try to level the playing field by eliminating rival leaders and that U.S. forces were planning to bring Jan Mohammad Khan back as Provincial Governor. The killing of Tokhi leader Haji Bashir in late June 2010 was seen as clear proof of this strategy.

Part of Uruzgan's community leadership is indeed worried about the near future. "*If the Australians follow the same approach as the Dutch, then things will stay the same; if they do not follow the Dutch policy, then things will get worse.*" Or a worse case scenario: "*If the Dutch leave, local people will fight – Popalzai vs. Ghilzai, Barakzai, Achekzai.*" Clearly, those tribal leaders who moved away from the Taliban insurgents through Dutch engagement now fear losing out.

Even though Australians and Americans stated that they would continue the Dutch engagement approach, local leaders expressed confusion about the conflicting messages sent by civilian actors, reaffirming support, and military actors, continuing to interrogate some Ghilzai and Barakzai leaders about their alleged Taliban affiliations. Here the Dutch withdrawal may pose an opportunity for international actors to emerge more unified. A first step was made in early July when Australian and U.S. Special Forces organized a joint-meeting at the PRT between Popalzai strongman Matiullah Khan, Tokhi leader Mohammed Nabi Khan Tokhi, and the Barakzai Governor of Chora Daoud Khan in order to reduce anxieties and clarify a unified engagement strategy. Despite



some tension during the meeting, the gathering was seen as a positive first step. Another more inclusive meeting with more elders is said to follow. For this to be successful, however, both U.S. and Australian military have to be willing to present a more unified front in terms of putting checks and balances on pro-government strongmen and tribal engagement in Uruzgan. As one elder argued *"If the U.S./Australians are coordinated then it is good, otherwise it will be the same problem as between the Dutch and Americans."* Here the onus is particularly on the U.S. to set policies straight and pursue a more balanced engagement with community leaders: *"Foreigners are blamed for bringing a tribal imbalance in Uruzgan, so they should fix it."*

6 Conclusion and Recommendations for Dutch Successors

At the end of their four years engagement, the Dutch military can leave knowing that during their mission advances in both security and development were made in Uruzgan, especially in comparison to other Southern provinces such as Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul. This can be attributed, amongst other things, to the Dutch bottom-up development strategy that engages community leaders. Additionally, they invested in research and analysis, which helped to tailor operations and projects to the local context and take into account the fractures in the social and political landscape. The uncertain future of Uruzgan after the Dutch departure, however, has created a security vacuum that the Taliban has been attempting to exploit. The first half of 2010 has been indicative that the steady trend to improve stability in Uruzgan may no longer be as smooth as anticipated.

The Uruzgan government is not yet capable of taking over the domains of security and development. The biggest challenge remains in the area of governance, where the context is defined by a state reliant on foreign aid and not strong enough to withstand the meddling of Popalzai strongmen that controlled the provincial government in 2006. This raises issues of transferability of Dutch achievements, both to the Afghan government as well as to other International Military Actors. As a provincial resident noted, *"If people do not have the support of foreigners then nothing in terms of security can be achieved."* The lack of much-needed confidence building between the population and the Afghan government is a central challenge that is now left for U.S. and Australian forces to deal with.

The overall success and sustainability of the Dutch advances over the past four years thus depends heavily on how well (if at all) their successors build upon it, how they maintain the momentum and sustain an enabling environment in which Afghan development partners can operate. The carefully established balance of power between different tribal leaders and power brokers that had a stabilising impact on Tirin Kot, Deh Rawud and Chora districts, are at risk of unravelling. If it does, the political fall out will affect the security situation (as disgruntled communities may join the insurgency) and halt the positive development in terms of development and women's access to social services and labour opportunities. This question extends to the regional perspective, as Uruzgan will not stay *"in a bubble"* while the areas around continue to be under Taliban insurgency control.

In light of the above, the following general recommendations in the areas of the Dutch '3D' approach can be made:

6.1 Development/Reconstruction

- Continue value-chain approach to agriculture by first concentrating on proven Uruzgan products, solve main constraints in the value chain and ensure more value added is generated within the province instead of in Kandahar. Secondly this approach can be extended to other agricultural products.

- Balance big landmark projects (e.g., roads, dams) that bring public support with Dutch “under the radar” development projects as the latter helps to minimize meddling by individuals interested in obtaining a share of the resources flowing into the province for bigger projects, and also does not attract insurgency attention.
- Encourage hiring of local labour to development organisations and thus contribute to local capacity building.
 - Request NGOs that are supported by international funds to demonstrate that a majority of their non-skilled staff is locally hired.
 - Encourage NGOs to train-up local capacities by creating apprenticeship programmes with professional staff from other provinces.
- Continue to monitor the impact of increased international and NGO presence in Tirin Kot on local prices, particularly rent, and formulate strategies to assist local communities in coping with this.
- Lobby government to
 - Allocate more female teachers to the provincial *tashkeel*
 - Allocate more schools/teachers to under-served areas
 - Create space for women to enter public service, especially in the health care and educational sectors
- Conduct a micro-study on how to improve the situation for female teachers/health care workers in Uruzgan and create incentives as well as an enabling environment for girls to enter these professions.

6.2 Diplomacy/Political Engagement

- Continue Dutch balanced engagement and community consultations, and extend it to include the Achekzai and Nurzai communities in Char China, Khas Uruzgan, and Gizab and the Ghilzai in Tirin Kot. A provincial “*shura*” with all key power brokers could be a first step in this direction, to be followed by district *shuras*.
 - Avoid being used by power brokers to create conflict within tribal communities, notably within the Barakzai and Tokhi communities, by supporting one of the factions. This will also help to address/minimize the spoiler potential of certain pro-government strongmen.
 - Ensure the inclusion of Hazara communities in order to decrease frustration and counter the deterioration of Hazara-Pashtun communities.
- Work on good cooperation and unity of effort among IMF and demonstrate it publicly through joint meetings and operations.
- Clarify the status and borders of Chenartu and the Wurjan area (south of Deh Rawud) with the Kandahar provincial government and extend government access to these areas

6.3 Defence (Stabilization/Security)

- Focus on continuing to foster an enabling and secure environment for Afghan and international actors (national government programmes, NGOs, UN organizations, international organizations) to keep working in Uruzgan.
- Address two main conflict lines through dialogue (here religious and spiritual figures can be of great utility) and possibly joint-projects
 - Pro-government strongmen vs. former Taliban
 - Internal community divisions
- Improve capacity building of Afghan National Security Forces, especially that of the Afghan National Police through continued training and mentoring.
- See Uruzgan's security in a regional perspective and coordinate with regional military forces.

ANNEX I: Ethnic/Tribal Composition of Uruzgan's districts

District	Zirak Durrani	Panjpai Durrani	Ghilzai	Other
Tirin Kot (90,000)	Popalzai (20%) Acheckzai (10%) Barakzai (15%) Mohammadzai (5%) Alkozai (2%)	Alizai (2%) Nurzai (1%)	Hotak (20%) Tokhi (10%) Suliman Khail (5%) Other Ghilzai (8%)	Sayed, Quraish, Hazara (2%)
Deh Rawud (78,750)	Popalzai (15%) Acheckzai (2%) Barakzai (5%) Alkozai (5%) Mohammadzai (2%)	Nurzai (30%) Khogiani (7%) Alizai (1%) Ishaqzai (1%)		Kakar (2%) Babozai (30%)
Chora (72,000)	Acheckzai (71%) Barakzai (26%)			Ghilzai, Sayed (3%)
Chenartu (30,000)	Popalzai (75%) Acheckzai (11%) Barakzai (6%) Alkozai (1%)	Nurzai (2%) Ishaqzai (1%)	Taraki (3%) Hotak (1%)	
Char China (84,000)	Acheckzai (16%)	Nurzai (70%)		
Gizab (59,000)	Acheckzai (78%)		Tokhi (1%)	Hazara (21%)
Khas Uruzgan (80,000)	Acheckzai (60%) Barakzai (8%) Popalzai (1%)			<u>Pashtun</u> Wardak (2%) <u>Non-Pashtun</u> Hazara (27%), Tajik (1%) Sayed (1%)
Total	57.5%	18.5%	9%	Hazara (8%) Other Pashtun (6%) Other (1%)



ANNEX II: Uruzgan Healthcare Performance Indicators (AHDS)

Indicator	Aug 2006	July 2010	Improvement
Number of functional Health Posts (couple volunteer CHWs)	59	187	128 new HP
Number of functional Sub-centres	0	1	1 new
Number of functional BHCs	1	6	5 new
Number of functional CHCs	4	6	2 new
Number of functional Hospitals	1 District H	1 Provincial H	upgraded
Number of consultations per person per year	0.6	1.4	doubled
Proportion of all pregnant women receiving at least one antenatal care visit	45%	80%	35% increase
Proportion of deliveries attended by skilled workers in the facilities	2.6%	15%	13% increase
Caesarean section rate among deliveries in the facilities	0	191 cases	new service
Number of current users of contraceptives	1,035	1,425	38% increase
Proportion of pregnant women receiving at least two doses of tetanus toxoid	29%	76%	162% increase (more than doubled)
TB detection rate	0	35%	increase
Treatment completion rate among TB cases detected	0	80%	80% increase
Proportion of children <5 receiving growth monitoring	81%	100%	increase
Proportion of children 0-11 months receiving Penta ⁷⁸ 1 vaccines	71%	103%	45% increase (by 32 percent points)
Proportion of children 0-11 months receiving Penta 3 vaccines	25%	87%	248% increase (by 62 percent points)
Proportion of health facilities with at least one female health worker	40%	62%	55% increase (by 22 percent points)
Number of Surgeons	0	2	complete

⁷⁸ Penta is a combined vaccine for diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, influenza and hepatitis-B

Indicator	Aug 2006	July 2010	Improvement
Total number of female doctors	0	1	better situation
Total number of midwives	2	15	7 times increase
Total number of female nurses	3	5	improved
Number of CHWs completed 3rd phase training	60	253	4 times increase
Number of female CHWs completed 3rd phase training	11	81	7 times increase
Completeness of HMIS reporting	100%	100%	same
Proportion of postpartum visits (within 6 weeks after delivery)	4.2%	25%	6 times increase
Malnutrition rate in growth monitoring	2.4%	5%	some increase
Transportation availability (for the districts)	40%	40%	same
Referral percentage of patients to higher level	0.5%	3%	6 times increase

Main Changes:

- 1 new CHC, 7 BHCs established
- District Hospital upgraded to Provincial Hospital
 - Mental Health was integrated into the BPHS program
 - Psychiatric unit was established in the hospital
 - Trauma centre was established in the hospital
 - Blood bank was established in the hospital
- Mortuary was established in the hospital
- 1 BHC upgraded to CHC
- 2 BHC building was constructed
- 4 BHCs are under construction
- Number of additional buildings constructed for the provincial hospital
- Family housings built for the Provincial Hospital and a CHC
- Training centre and medical warehouse was built
- Diagnostic facilities were improved in the hospital
- Specialist were hire in the hospital (Surgeons, Dentist, Internal Medicine)
- Number of health posts (HP) increased from 59 to 187 (186 male and 93 female CHW)
- Community based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) was established in 4 health facilities
- School Health was piloted in 4 schools; then it was expanded to 8 schools



- 2 mobile teams were established to boost up coverage of vaccination in remote areas of Khas Uruzgan, Deh Rawud and Char China
- Prison health was started by making a link with the hospital
- Community midwifery education was established to increase local reproductive health service providers (9 graduated and 12 enrolling)
- Community Nursing School was established in partnership with HADAF to increase local female healthcare providers
- Agriculture and livestock support for poor farmers families was to invoke sustainable improvement in nutrition status of women and children
- A six month hygiene education project in Tirin Kot
- A Household Survey to estimate coverage of 10 priority health services in Uruzgan
- Catchments areas annual census was done

ANNEX III: Overview of Media Outlets in Uruzgan

1. Uruzgan national radio (89.5) and TV

- 30 km radius around Tirin Kot
- 3 hour programs in the morning and five hours in the evening
- Supported by the Afghan Government
- TV is mostly in the evening

2. Uruzgan Zhagh (Voice of Uruzgan)

- 30 km radius around Tirin Kot and 20 km around Chora
- It operates 24 hours, and provides ISAF messages, news and other programs.
- It is operated and run by PRT and supported by the Dutch

3. Saba TV

- 10 km radius around Tirin Kot
- Operated by Saba foundation from Kabul.
- Sponsored by Dutch.

4. Aryana TV and radio (93 FM)

- Both TV and radio are reachable around 30 km in Tirin Kot.
- It has 24 hours programs from Kabul.
- It is run by Eng. Bayat, an Afghan businessman and owner of AWCC

5. Sadai Azadi (88.5 FM)

- 30 km radius around Tirin Kot
- It has 24 hours programs
- It sponsored by ISAF and operated from Kabul











6. *Paiwastoon Zhagh radio (89.9 FM)*

- 40 km radius around Tirin Kot
- Different programs 10hrs/day
- Sponsored by Matiullah Khan
- Main programs include news, Islamic issues, and music.

7. *Radio Nawa*









- 30 km radius around Tirin Kot, 20 km around Deh Rawud and Chora districts and 10-15 km in Khas Uruzgan.
- It starts at 7:00 am and finishes its programs at 10:00 p.m.
- It has different programs incl. news, sport, literature, religion, politics, educational, and call-in programs, which are quite popular.
- It is supported by Dutch and operated and controlled from Kabul.
- Nawa broadcasts news, sports, and political and religious programs to all districts except Gizab through FM relay station established with Dutch funding.

ANNEX IV: List of Provincial Council Members











Candidate	Picture	Tribe/ Ethnic Group	District	Comment	Votes	%
Amanullah Khan		Babozai	Deh Rawud	Head	1,736	6.1
Abdul Ali		Hazara	Khas Uruzgan	Deputy	5,573	19.7
Mohammadullah		Popalzai	Chenartu	Clerk (munshi)	1,383	4.9
Jan Mohammad*		Popalzai	Chenartu	Haji Amanullah Khan's substitute	1,009	3.6
Jan Mohammad*		Popalzai	Deh Rawud		3,068	10.8
Haji Mohammad Ibrahim (Akundzada)		Popalzai	Deh Rawud	Former sub-commander of Malim Rahmatullah	2,370	9.4
Haji Naeem		Nurzai	Shahidi Hassas	Son of Haji Ghulam Haidar Khan	998	3.5
Marjana		Kuchi	Tirin Kot	Only women candidate	667	2.4


* The pictures of the two Jan Mohammad could be reversed as we were unable to verify which belong to which Jan Mohammad.

ANNEX V: List of Nominees for the 2010 WJ Election⁷⁹

	Name	Picture	Father's Name	Ethnicity/Tribe	District	Comments
1	Haji Naqibullah		Abdul Qodus	Achekzai	Khas Uruzgan	Succeeded his father a tribal leader. Currently lives in Kandahar-city and is involved with the IDP Achekzai shura of Kandahar.
2	Haji Mohammad Hanif Hanifi		Mohammad Rafiq	Achekzai	Khas Uruzgan	
3	Malem Haji Abdul Khaliq Mujahed		Habibullah Khan	Achekzai	Chora	MP in the current parliament
4	Haji Mohammad Lal Rahmani		Haji Rahman Shah	Alkozai	Deh Rawud	Son of the late jihadi commander Abdur Rahman. Initially close to Karzai as he supported him against the Taliban in 2001; now distanced.
5	Haji Obaidullah Barakzai		Mohammad Rasul	Barakzai	Chora	
6	Ms. Malika Barakzai		Nasrullah	Barakzai	Tirin Kot	Mother of Sona Niloofar
7	Haji Saifullah Silab		Fazal Haq	Barakzai	Tirin Kot/Sarchakhli	
8	Ms. Rehana Azad		Mohammad Ishaq	Hazara	Daykundi province	


⁷⁹ <http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/cnlist/urozgan.pdf>

	Name	Picture	Father's Name	Ethnicity/ Tribe	District	Comments
9	Asadullah		Rahim Bakhsh	Hazara	Khas Uruzgan	
10	Mohammad Arif Arifi		Mohammad Jan	Hazara	Khas Uruzgan	
11	Haji Ghulam Haider Khan		Gul Mohamad	Nurzai	Char China	
12	Mohammad Hashim Watanwal		Mohammad Omar	Popalzai	Tirin Kot	MP in current parliament, supported by Jan Mohammad Khan
13	Haji Quadratullah Rahimi		Mohammad Karim	Popalzai	Tirin Kot	
14	Haji Esmatullah Faiz		Malim Rahmatullah	Popalzai	Tirin Kot/ Khan Aqa	Son of the current head of education department Malim Rahmatullah
15	Mohibullah Zahed		Ali Mohamad	Popalzai	Tirin Kot/ Turi	
16	Abdullah Salihi		Gul Mohamad	Popalzai	Tirin Kot/ Turi	
17	Ms. Fareshta Sami Wafa		Abdul Ghafoor	Tajik	Kabul district unknown	Head of Department of Women's Affairs in Uruzgan
18	Ms. Anisgul Amini		Abdul Karim	Tajik or Hazara	Mazar-e Sharif	


	Name	Picture	Father's Name	Ethnicity/ Tribe	District	Comments
19	Mohammad Karim Mihanwal		Haji Abdul Haleem	Popalzai	Chenartu	He belongs to an elite and well-respected family of Chenartu. All Popalzai there got together to nominate him. Father was Director of Public Works in Uruzgan province in 1970s and his brother Nader Khan worked in the municipality department of in the 1980s and during Jan Mohammad Khan's time as governor as deputy mayor of TK.

ANNEX VI: Maps

Map 2: Tribal Areas in Uruzgan




Map 3: Dutch-Funded Road Construction/Transport Projects⁸⁰




⁸⁰ Maps 3-7 are based on materials provided by the Dutch embassy and their implementing partners. Lacking GIS data for some projects led to exclusions. As a result, these maps should be considered a partial, but not complete, picture of all projects in Uruzgan.


Map 4: Dutch-Funded Agriculture Projects in Uruzgan



Map 5: Dutch-Funded Water/Irrigation Projects in Uruzgan



Map 6: Dutch-Funded Health Facilities in Uruzgan



Map 7: Dutch-Funded Education Projects in Uruzgan

